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ABSTRACT 
On becoming independent,. India adopted a parliamentary system of 
government which was a well considered one. The main objective of the State, 
as enshrined in Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights of our 
Constitution has been to usher in rapid socio-economic development for raising 
the disease, hunger and ignorance. Besides maintaining the governance 
apparatus inherited from the British, a large number of government and semi-
government organizations have been set-up to this infrastructure depends upon 
the competence, ethos, enthusiasm and interest of political elite and employees 
working in these institutions through good governance. 
Our founding fathers were convinced that given India's pluralism and 
heterogeneity, only the parliamentary system could hold the country together, 
while providing sufficient means to ensure the centrality of our people in the 
political processes of the country. A reading of the Preamble to our 
Constitution reinforces this centrality. 
Over the years, it has found that yet, governance has not been able to 
honour many of the commitments made to our people through the Constitution. 
Aberrations and distortions have taken place in the functioning not only of the 
state but also of the political and administrative systems. As a result, large 
sections of the people are unable to enjoy even the minimum rights the 
Constitution contemplated for them. 
The following contents are discussed in chapter first. Governance is the 
manner in which authority, control and power of government is exercised in 
mobilising a society's economic and social resources to address the issues of 
public interest. It is the art of governing, associated with the exercise of 
authority. 
The Indian political system has to be viewed and appreciated in the 
country's historical perspective. Before the British Raj, India was hardly a 
close-knit political entity. That was ruled by innumerable kings and rulers 
whose territorial boundaries kept changing every now and then. Occasionally, 
there were emperors like Ashok who ruled over almost the entire length and 
breadth of the country; but even so, the local rulers were autonomous to a large 
extent. Mughals also ruled through more or less autonomous rulers. It can 
safely be said that an independent India, with the present geographical size 
never existed before 1947. 
The political history of India took a dramatic and crucial turn when, in 
1765, a purely trading company called East India Company' was granted fiscal 
and administrative rights over Bengal, Orissa and Bihar by Shah Alam II. Rest 
of the story is well-known to us. The British Government shared power with 
EIC by means of the regulating Act of 1773, which was followed by the 
Declaratory Act of 1781. The followed the Charter Acts of 1833 and 1853. The 
latter provided for the separation of the executive and judiciary. In 1858, the 
power transferred from EIC to the British crown and the Indian Councils Acts 
of 1892 1909. The framework of Indian political system underwent through the 
experiments of Government of India Acts 1919 and 1935 before India achieved 
independence in 1947. 
The birth of Indian bureaucracy goes back to the Mauryan Empire of 
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Chandragupta in the 4 Century B C. The great Indian classic- Kautilya's 
'Arthashastra' is the oldest text on public administration. But India never 
achieved lasting imperial unity as it did during British Empire. The 
administrators of British East India Company laid the foundation of Indian 
administration. They reunified India by reshaping the Indian Civil Service in 
the 1850s and modernized this old institution at most opportune moment by 
introducing selection through competition and codification of laws for 
administrative purposes. But British administrators performed only a limited 
range of functions i.e. those relating to law and order and regulations. It 
projected a paternalistic image of government. 
Good governance is not a final product. It is epitomised by, among 
other things, predictable, open and enlightened policy making. It can be 
secured by sound, responsive and competent administration, respect to basic 
human rights values, strengthened democratic institutions and effective 
institutional as well as structural framework to ensure accountability and 
transparency. The issue of good governance has, in recent times, emerged at 
the forefront of the agenda for sustainable human development. However, the 
institution of government, in some form or the other, has existed since the 
dawn of history and has acted as an important tool of civilisation of mankind 
and governance has been practised since times immemorial. Hence, the need 
for periodical rethinking on and even remodeling of the concept and 
institutions of governance. The search for good governance has to be a 
continuing exercise which is difficuh to achieve in its totality. Very few 
countries and societies have come close to achieve good governance in its 
entirety. However, to ensure sustainable human development, actions must 
be taken to work towards this ideal with the aim of making it a reality. 
Chapter second is the study of major political problems and governance 
in India. During the past five and half decades or so, parties in India have 
responded to the upsurge of aspirations of people by shaping a welfare state 
and a participative democracy. Parties provided avenues for the elites from 
different social sections to enter the political arena and share power. But they 
were unable to keep pace with the aspirations of the upcoming elites or sort out 
competing leadership claims in an amicable manner. As parties came under 
pressure they have been splitting again and again, or new parties have come to 
the fore. While, parties have been instrumental in democratizing the way in 
which authority/power is constituted in the society, the way in which authority 
is constituted in parties moved in an opposite direction. One basic feature of 
party is that it should survive and continue to grow beyond the life span of any 
particular leader or regardless of the exit of any helmsman. But this we do not 
find in several parties - there is hardly collective leadership, or a leadership 
core. It is getting narrowed down to a leader or his family members. Power in 
the party and government are getting concentrated in one supreme leader, who 
reigns supreme like Hobbes' sovereign. But as there is democratic framework 
of polity, they cannot afford to appear as autocratic, but show that they are 
amenable to the wishes of the people and party followers. Parties face the 
biggest challenge to overcome this situation. While the credit for sustaining the 
democratic framework of politics goes to the parties to some extent, they also 
partake the blame for the ills that plague the polity today such as corruption, 
criminality and bad governance. While parties profess service to people, clean 
politics, etc. their practice is at variance, especially in recent decades, as we see 
more and more leaders excessively preoccupied in fiilfilling their self-interest 
beyond any reasonable limits. Sensible leaders in different parties feel and 
point this out but a feeling of helplessness also envelops them in this regard. 
While people's faith in democracy has remained intact or has increased, their 
faith in the ability of parties to provide democratic governance is low. This is 
repeatedly proved in the defeat of the ruling parties almost in every election, 
exceptions being only a few. The increasing role of money and criminals in 
party and electoral process are talked about widely today. Several party leaders 
are also acutely aware of this problem. Growth of regional parties, some of 
them very small, has been another factor contributing to political instability. 
There are instances of one-member parties playing a role in the formation of 
government! On the other hand, there have been instances where a candidate 
has lost his security deposit but won the election, on account of their being too 
many candidates coupled with a very low rate of voting! 
The loopholes of the political are coming to the fore. Very often, in the 
post-election maneuvering, the largest single party is left out of reckoning in 
the formation of the government. It is open to serious doubt whether the 
electorate ever intended to install the kind of government which eventually 
comes to power. Unviable coalitions come to power with the help of 'outside 
support' of heterogeneous combinations. Subsequently, whenever there is a 
threat to the government on accounts of splits and re-alliances of parties, palace 
revolutions are managed by the ruling party or alliance to remain in power. The 
consequences are disastrous; corruption, criminalization of politics, 
politicization of criminals, misuse of religious sentiments, exploitation of 
various castes and tribes as vote-banks. 
Hence political tolerance is by and large diminishing and the 
governance of the state is not as good as it should be. In view of this it is 
rightly felt that real good governance needs and political reforms more than 
anything else. 
Chapter third is administrative problem and governance in India. The 
administrative system designed by the British to suit their own requirements 
was inherited by independent India. During the time of EIC and British Raj, the 
main functions of the bureaucracy were regulatory—maintenance of law and 
order and collection of revenue. After independence, there arose a need to 
change the role of bureaucracy. Development administration rather than 
regulatory administration became the predominant requirement. It has been a 
moot point whether and to what extent the bureaucracy has been able to play 
this role. 
In particular, the relation between the political executive and the 
bureaucracy has been a matter of debate and controversy. It has been believed 
by the purists that the function of bureaucracy is to tender an expert and 
impartial advice to the political masters and then implement their decision 
without a demur. The ministers are the representatives of the people and, 
therefore, know the aspirations of the people. 
The situation becomes more complicated when the civil service becomes 
politicized. Now, the bureaucrats are ever keen not so much as to give the best 
possible advice, but the most palatable advice to their political masters. This is 
a very dangerous situation, because in many cases, the ministers may not come 
to know all the pros and cons of the decisions they take. Sometimes, a crucial 
piece of information may be held back from the ministers if it is likely to be 
unpalatable. This would be most unfair to a well-intentioned political 
executive. Actual situation is much worse, of course, when the political 
executive is also dishonest and corrupt. This kind of collusion between the 
politicians and bureaucracy can really spell disaster for the country. 
Another feature of bureaucracy emphasized by the purists is its 
anonymity and passiveness. It is argued that the responsibility of all decisions 
and policy initiatives being that of the political executive, the bureaucracy 
should really walk behind the scene without claiming any credit for its actions. 
The other side of the coin is that the bureaucracy should never be criticized in 
public and, in fact, should be defended by political masters. The political 
masters should own the entire responsibility for the actions of the bureaucracy. 
In this situation, some thinkers have advocated that bureaucracy should play a 
pro-active rather than a passive role. What it means is that instead of simply 
tendering their considered advice and then implementing the decisions of the 
political bosses without a demur, the bureaucrats should try to obstruct (of 
course, within the rules and regulations) wrong decisions and expedite positive 
policy initiatives which are likely to benefit the public. It is argued that the 
bureaucracy has a responsibility to uphold the Constitution also (as, indeed, 
every citizen of India has) and there it should not be a silent spectator if gross 
damage is being done to public. Indian Constitution specifically makes a 
mention of the Civil Service- a feature that is almost unique to the Indian 
political system. Therefore, it is argued that Indian bureaucracy owes 
allegiance to the Constitution and should not feel subservient to the political 
system but play a pro-active role in public interest. Of course a properly 
recruited and well-trained civil service is essential for the doctrine of pro-active 
bureaucracy to work. 
The task of policy making in the government is complex and needs 
specialist knowledge of the subject. Under the existing system all senior 
appointments in the ministries are monopolized by the IAS officers who are 
generalists. The hold on policymaking by a group of people who have no 
expertise in the area is regarded as the single biggest factor for poor 
administration in the country of most expert committees and knowledgeable 
persons. 
Most ministries have a centralized system of governance with ail 
powers concentrated in Secretariat/headquarters with very little delegation 
to various directorates, field outfits and autonomous bodies fiinctioning 
under them. Delegation of authority is critical to effective functioning of the 
government and cutting down levels and the time taken in arriving at a 
decision. Centralized control leads to inefficiency, delay and wastage, as one 
set of rules cannot be equally applicable to thousands of diverse situations 
which obtain in a country of India's size and complexity. The 
Administrative Reforms Commission had argued for greater delegation as it 
helps speedy decision which is the essence of good administration. It laid 
down two criteria: in making delegations the approach should be that powers 
to be delegated be the 'maximum possible' in the circumstances then 
minimum necessary. Wherever any modifications or changes have been 
made in the delegations, there should be done through amendments to the 
rules themselves and not through executive instructions. 
One pervasive feature of the Indian bureaucratic machine is the 
existence of a large number of rules relating to service conditions as well as 
operational matters such as fundamental rules, supplementary rules, general 
financial rules, delegation of financial power rules, treasury rules, account 
code and conduct rules. They have been framed during the British rule and 
bear a heavy imprint of colonial mindset with emphasis on checks and 
balances, lack of trust and suspicion. Numerous clarifications, 
administrative instructions and guidelines have been issued making them 
bulky, confusing and often incomprehensible. Even the ministry of finance 
and the department of personnel which issues innumerable clarifications on 
these rules every year is unable to keep pace and has now entrusted their 
publication to a private publisher, who brings out unauthenticated copies, 
which most government departments are forced to use in the absence of an 
official publication. One can imagine the chaos which the system leads to. In 
most of the government department these rules are interpreted and applied 
by junior functionaries in what is called babus, senior officers have neither 
time nor inclination to wade through them. 
Integrity is an important element in enforcing accountability in 
governance. The ministerial level has to discharge this responsibility in the 
government. The elected representatives perform the same task in the 
legislature and its committees. How can they elicit respect or generate just 
fear if their own integrity is in doubt? What is more, there is a general belief 
that incidence of corruption and misuse of authority is more widespread at 
that ministerial level than in the Civil Service. In fact, the nexus between the 
corrupt civil servant and the corrupt minister has been believed in this 
country since the very beginning. The political masters are, therefore, 
accepted by the public as shielding the corrupt and adding to the general 
environment proliferating corruption. There was suspicion of 'extra 
constitutional authority' exercising official power and engaging in misuse 
for political and family benefits. This was highly damning when the loyalty 
test was introduced for senior civil servants if they wished to enjoy safety 
and property. States were quick to follow suit. Corruption at all levels grew 
by leaps and bounds. There was no longer an adequate check to arrest the 
tide. There were willing civil servants available to join in the race for 
political favour in promotion to prestigious positions and in making 
illegitimate gains. The moral authority of the government was so eroded that 
it was in no position to control the cancerous growth in the bureaucracy. 
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Corruption at high places gets all the media attention it is the lower level 
graft which hurts the common man. An ordinary person has to face a great 
deal of inconvenience if he has to get a passport, a driving license or an 
electric connection. Departments such as police, municipal corporation, land 
records, sales tax, income tax, excise and customs are known to cause 
harassment to people and even routine work cannot be done without giving 
bribe to the lower level functionaries. In addition to the above mentioned 
efforts and simultaneous use of the various Inquiry Commissions appointed 
by the Government during the last about fifty and half years of the Republic, 
there has not been any concerted, coordinated, effective and continuous fight 
to prevent corruption or prosecute and punish the corrupt - a miniscule of 
successful cases of prosecution and punishment notwithstanding. 
With the changing role of the state, the public services have been under 
tremendous pressure for restructuring. It has become necessary to provide a 
more responsive government whose focus is to serve the public effectively and 
to ensure efficient and cost effective administration. There is growing 
realization and recognition about the need for administrative reforms to 
increase the capabilities of the administrative systems in carrying out goals for 
economic and social development. There is also a need for transformation in 
the civil services to make them more efficient, clean, and accountable and 
citizen friendly. This aptly sums up the present picture of Indian bureaucracy. 
Public administration and the civil services in India at all levels are passing 
through difficult times in terms of eroded credibility and effectiveness. There is 
a growing public perception of an unholy nexus between certain elements 
among politicians and civil servants and criminals. Honesty is at its lowest 
level. Transparency and accessibility to the political and bureaucratic elements 
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in charge of administration seldom exist. Pursuit of career advancement lias 
taken precedence over ethical values. The measure of good governance is how 
far the government is able to improve the quality of life of people. Even the 
best designed policy achieves little if not implemented properly. Poor quality, 
high cost, and corruption affect the delivery of services adversely. A well 
functioning bureaucracy can provide sound policy inputs and deliver critical 
public goods and services at least cost. 
Chapter Five, deals with conclusion and suggestions. The concept of 
political and administrative tolerance is by and large diminishing and, hence 
the governance of the state is not as good as it should be. There are look up 
sketching of political and administrative suggestions for good governance in 
India. 
The work is based on primary as well as secondary source. The work 
also under took relevant decisions of the Supreme Court in the context of 
political and administrative reforms 
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PREFACE 
In the new millennium, the greatest challenge before India as the largest 
democracy of the world is the overall growth in the country along the lines of 
fairness, equality, equity, justice and sustainability especially when the role of 
Government itself is being redefined. Good Governance is of paramount 
significance in these times of far reaching changes and ushering in the era of 
globalization, liberalization and privatization. Good Governance implies 
utmost concern for people's welfare wherein the government and its 
bureaucracy follow policies and discharge their duties with a deep sense of 
commitment, respecting the rule of law in a manner which is transparent, 
ensuring human rights and dignity, probity and public accountability. 
After the attainment of independence by India, the main objective of the 
State, as enshrined in the Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights of the 
our Constitution has been to usher in rapid socio-economic development for 
raising the standard of living of the masses suffering fi-om abject poverty, 
squalor, disease, hunger and ignorance. The success of this depends upon the 
competence, ethos, enthusiasm and interest of political elite and employees 
working in these institutions through good governance 
The Government in India, both at the Centre and the states, share the 
concern for ensuring responsive, accountable, transparent, decentralized and 
people-friendly governance at all levels. There is, however, considerable 
frustration and dissatisfaction amongst the people about the irresponsiveness 
and lack of accountability. India is certainly on the cross roads of her national 
destiny, facing serious challenges to our politics and administration, i.e., 
chronic delays, lack of sympathy and humane approach, corrupt practice, 
criminalization of politics, insensitiveness and callus, etc. The people, 
particularly the vulnerable groups, are also greatly concerned about the 
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deterioration in the performance of agencies concerned with law and order and 
investigation of offences and social welfare. 
AIM AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY: 
Presently the concept of political and administrative tolerance is by 
and large diminishing and, hence the governance of the state is not as good 
as it should be. It is high time that we should not blame the colonial rule even 
after 60 years of Independence. We are free to bring out changes in our system 
suited to our country to project good governance in theory and practice. It is 
visualized as proceeding on the basis of the Constitution and its values of good 
governance as enshrined in the parts of embodying the Preamble, the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, the Fundamental Rights and the Fundamental Duties 
of citizens. My endeavours in this study have been to explain and analyze the 
following objectives: 
> To bring out the appropriate definition of the concept of 
governance which has quite often been subject to misleading 
interpretation? 
> To describe historical overviews of governance in India and its 
impact on present system of governance. 
> To study good governance concept as definitional intricacies, 
genesis and the role of different agencies in interpreting and 
refining it. 
> To explain and analyze various political and administrative facets 
of affecting governance and the causes of the present malaise. 
> To review political and administrative reforms—recommendations 
of committees and commissions of government of India, and trace 
the finest areas of reforms further. 
> To describe various Constitutional provisions. Acts and judicial 
decisions on the functioning problems. 
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> To suggest possible political and administrative reforms—in 
keeping with the values, spirit and substance of the Constitution 
and without infringing its basic features or parliamentary system of 
government. 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY: 
The study has adopted the historical, descriptive, and analytical 
methods. In order to develop an overall understanding of the problem, an 
archival work has been done by consulting academic libraries as well as 
different national organization libraries at various places in India. The study is 
primarily based on the primary documents, government reports of various 
committees and commissions and individual researches of the scholars, and 
secondary sources as books, articles in journals, magazines and newspapers 
pertaining to the governance. 
, An humble attempt has been made to juxtapose the issues of good 
governance which are vital and essential for our country. The whole work is 
divided into five chapters, bibliography and appendices. This is as under: 
Chapter One which is of an introductory nature, is the analytical 
examination of concept on governance followed by descriptions of historical 
overviews of governance in India and last, interpretations of good governance 
by different agencies and political scientists. 
Chapter Two explains and analyses India's political problem and 
governance which mainly deals with working of party system followed by 
some critical area of electoral democracy, behavioural problems of legislature 
and last. Article 356 and its applications in centre-state relations respectively. 
Chapter Three explains and analyses India's administrative problem and 
governance which mainly deals with ministerial/parliamentary control over 
bureaucracy followed by some structural controversies/problems of 
administrative system, corruption in administrative machinery and last, 
bureaucratic response: from independence upto the globalization respectively. 
Chapter Four deals with the review of political and administrative 
reforms as long extent and their implementations in India since independence 
because, the shape and nature of governance largely depends on the political 
as well as administrative climate of the state. 
Chapter Five, the conclusion sums up the findings of this study and 
looks up the sketching of political and administrative suggestions for good 
governance in India. 
At the end of the work, some important documents have been added 
which have been crucial in the formation and working of the political and 
administrative aspects of governance in India. 
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INTRODUCTION 
GOVERNANCE: THE CONCEPT 
Governance, in generic sense, refers to the task of running a 
government or any other entity. Outer side the realm of government, the 
concept of governance refers to an aspect of the management of a given 
organization. Governance refers to a process or the act or function of 
exercising (usually legitimate) authority to regulate affairs of men in a given 
territory, generally a State. In effect, it is the conduct of business of a policy 
or society. Governance, in other words, means eager maintenance of the 
atmosphere, by the state, in which men have the opportunity to be their best 
selves.' 
The concept of governance has been the central to human society 
ever since social order became a necessity. The traditional use of 
governance and its dictionary entry define it as synonym for government. 
Yet in the growing work or governance there is a redirection in its use and 
import. Rather governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered 
rule; or the new method by which society is governed. 
Governance has three legs: economic, political and administrative. 
Economic governance includes decision-making processes that affect a 
country's economic activities and its relationships with other economics. It 
clearly has major implications for equity, poverty and quality of life. 
Political governance is the process of decision-making to formulate policy. 
Dilip Haider, "Democratic Governance is no Panacea", Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, New Delhi, Vol. L, No. 4, October-December 2004, p. 1048. 
Administrative governance is the system of policy implementation.^ 
Governance is viewed as the exercise of political, economic and 
administrative authority in the management of country's affairs at all levels. 
Governance has become fashionable word. The term used in 
different contexts and varies in perspective among those who govern and 
other who are being governed. 
O. P. Minocha states that traditionally governance refers to form of 
political system and the manner in which power is exercised in utilizing 
country's economic and social resources for development. It deals with the 
capacity of government to design, formulate and implement policies and in 
general, to discharge government functions.^Asok Mukhopadhyay makes a 
distinction between governance and government as the term 'governance' 
has wider meaning and implication than that of 'government'. Government 
refers to the machinery and institutions arrangement of exercising the 
sovereign power for serving the internal and external interests of the 
political community, whereas governance means the process as well as 
result of making authoritative decisions for the benefits of the society.'' 
Bhabani Singh Gupta in his word, "Governance is neither the government, 
nor the administration, nor even the structure of the state, although all of 
them are important. The central focus of governance is how a society 
through the nation-state handles the affairs of the state, which enables its 
Kamal Taori, Ethics, "Good Governance and Decentrealization: A Plan of 
Action" in S.N. Mishra, Anil Dutta Mishra and Sweta Mishra(eds), Public 
Governance and Decentralization, Vol. II, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 
2003, p. 999. 
O.P. Minocha, "Good Governance: New Public Management Perspective", 
Indian Journal of Public Administration, New Delhi, Vol. XLIV, No. 3, July-
September, 1998, p. 271. 
Asok Mukhopadhyay, "Reinventing Government for Good Governance", Ibid, 
p. 281. 
people to lead a peaceful, orderly and reasonable prosperous and 
participative life in running their affairs".^ 
Governance relates to the management of all such processes that, in 
any society, define the environment which permits and enables individuals 
to raise their capability levels, on one hand, and provide opportunities to 
realize their potential and enlarge the set of available choices, on the other. 
The processes covering the political, social and economic aspects of life 
impact every level of human enterprise, e.g. the individual, the household, 
the village, the region or the national level. It covers the state civil society 
and market, each of which is critical for sustaining human development. The 
state is responsible for creating a conductive political, legal and economic 
environment for building individual capabilities and encouraging private 
initiative. The market is expected to create opportunities for people. Civil 
society facilitates the mobilization of public opinion and people's 
participation in economic, social and political activities.^ It also 
encompasses the nature of functioning of States, institutional and structural 
arrangements, decision-making process, policy formulation, implementation 
capacity, information flow, effectiveness of leadership, and the nature of the 
relationship between ruler and the ruled . 
Above all, there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of 
governance following the triumph of market oriented system over socialist 
Bhabani Sengupta, Indian: Problems of Governance, Konark Publishers, Delhi, 
1996, p. vii. 
Planning Commission, Governance and Implementation: Tenth Five Year Plan 
(2002-07), Vol. I, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 177. 
Suresh Misra, "Governance to good Governance: Are We Committed to 
Reforms", in S.N. Mishra, Anil Dutta Mishra and Sweta Mishra(eds), Supra 
note 2, p. 939. 
or collectivist system. There is still some controversy as to what constitutes 
proper governance and the research continues for an all-inclusive definition 
that will encompass the various strands of thought and the realities in 
different parts of the world. 
The United Nations Development Programme defines: 
Governance is viewed as the exercise of economic, political, and 
administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It 
comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens 
and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
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obligations, and mediate their differences. 
The World Bank defines: Governance is defined "as the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and 
social resources for development". The World Bank has identified three 
distinct aspects of governance^: 
> The form of political regime. 
> The process by which authority is exercised in management of a 
country's economic and social resources for development; 
> The capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement 
policies and discharge functions. 
After browsing through the above definitions it becomes evident 
that these postulations maintain a close conceptual proximity with each 
other in so far as the main components are concerned. They assign in 
common the task of governance to some authority and the authority is 
United Nation Development Programme, Governance for Sustainable 
Development.: A UNDP Policy Document. New York, 1997, p. 4 
' World Bank, Governance and Development, Washington D.C., 1992, p. 3. 
government of presumably a sovereign state. The second component is the 
task or function of the authority which is management of resources, social, 
economic, and the third component is 'the benefit or interest of the citizen. 
Governance would then continue to include law and order, the 
assurance of basic needs and services, mechanisms for the settlement of 
disputes, a good judicial system, and so on, but would be guided by a vision 
of equity and social justice. It would be firmly wedded not merely to the rule 
of law but also to the protection of civil liberties, and would be an integral 
part of a democratic system (either parliamentary or presidential kind). It 
would be grounded on a right relationship between the state and civil 
society. It would be truly 'participatory' in the sense of being responsive to 
the people and involving them in its processes at all stages, so that 
'governance' is what emerges from the collaboration of state and civil 
society."^ This atmosphere should be maintained by the state through its 
organ-government which may have various forms ranging from absolute 
monarchy to the present day democratic practiced all over the world. 
In conclusion, governance has been variously defined. Expressed in 
the simplest terms the governance of a country relates to the effective 
management of its affairs at all levels of functioning; guaranteeing its unity 
and territorial integrity; and securing the safety and well being of all its 
people. The attainment of these objective requires political, economic, 
executive and judicial authority to be exercised in a manner which ensures 
that people are enabled to enjoy their rights; discharge their obligations to 
the societies in which they live and obligations to the state; and resolve their 
'° Ramaswamy R. Iyer, "The Meaning of Governance", Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, New Delhi, Vol. L, No. 1, January-March, 2004, p.49. 
differences and disputes peacefully within the parameters of the constitution 
and rule of law. 
G O V E R N A N C E IN INDIA: HISTORICAL O V E R V I E W 
Governance in Ancient India 
As above discussed, the term governance, in practice, is not new. In 
ancient India, the best illustration of the system of governance was in 
Kautilya's Arthashastra. Arthashastra was one of the most important 
windows to a detailed understanding of governance in Mauryan time. It 
dealt with a range and variety of aspects of governance. According to it, the 
state had to look after the welfare of the people, maintain order and stability, 
promote economic well-being and preserve dharma. Just punishment would 
ensure the upholding of law and order. The state was to see to the equitable 
distribution of wealth among the people. It was "a book of practical advice 
to kings on the best method of governing their kingdoms and building up 
their power"." In an age of monarchy and legitimized ascriptive in equality, 
Kautilya alone called the king a servant of the state who would harbour "no 
personal likes", it would be rather the likes of the servants that would be 
followed by him. This is a novel suggestion even in the age of democracy 
because at least in the Third world the servants still act as the masters of the 
people, particularly the poor. A properly guided administration was, 
according to Kautilya, a sine qua non for ensuring human welfare. 
Arthashastra is divided into 15 adhikarans which have 150 
chapters with 6000 verses covering administration, law, order and justice, 
Somnath Dhar, Kautilya and Arthasastra, Marwah Publishers, New Delhi, 
1981, p. xi. 
'^  R. Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthasastra, Book I, Chapter 19, Wesleven Mission 
Press, Mysore, 1929, p. 39. 
taxation, revenue and expenditure, diplomacy, foreign policy, espionage 
system, dependence and war. The first six books deal with internal 
administration such as the duties, training, required qualities, daily routine 
of the king and state activities in agriculture, mining, leisure and so on. A 
complete code of law detailing detection of crime, control over merchants 
and artisans, torture and capital punishment and miscellaneous matters such 
as the salaries of officials, as well as their responsibilities, is also included. 
It talks of the qualities needed not only in kings but also in ministers and 
bureaucrats. 
Kautilya laid down the qualities required in a king for being a good 
ruler, who had the welfare of his subjects always in mind. He said that only 
a god-fearing person with a religious bent of mind, free from lust, anger and 
avarice, was fit to be king. The king had to be ideal, that is he had to be non-
violent by nature, not covetous of another's wife or property and one who 
kept away from people who had such vices. The king's life was rigorous. He 
had to be educated and ensure that his subjects become literate and educated 
by providing ample funds for this. He had to be brave and courageous, and 
quick in his decisions and actions. Although, Kautilya lived during a 
monarchy, he was against arbitrariness and authoritarianism and, therefore, 
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against absolute monarchy. 
The king was no doubt the fountain of all governmental activities. 
The army and treasuries, the keys to all powers were under his immediate 
control. He could issue edicts describing a definite course of conduct, 
prohibiting slaughter of animals or announcing administrative innovations. 
Padma Ramachandran, Public Administration in India, National book Trust, 
India, 1995, pp. 4-5. 
Nevertheless the Mauryan Emperors did not degenerate into selfish 
autocrats. They followed the advice of 'Arthashastra' and regarded the 
welfare and interest of their subjects as more important than their own.''' The 
government was completely centralized, purely bureaucratic setup and was 
managed through several officers of different ranks. Kings were to be 
advised by their mantri parishads or by a council of ministers. A minister in 
those days was an adviser and not a decision-maker. 
Qualities were also laid down for ministers and executive 
bureaucrats such as emphasis on the need for a religion-cum-duty outlook, 
and for observing a code of conduct. There were concepts of security, 
identity (a minister was called a ratnin and given a jewel to wear by way of 
identity), information relating to functioning of the cabinet, superintending 
the kaya or records (one who maintained records was, thus, termed 
kayastha), rotating persons after three to five years in a post, upkeep of 
attendance registers, service for public welfare, salaries and promotions, 
punishments and maintenance of law and order. Even compensatory 
allowance was mentioned by Kautilya for occasions when ministers and 
high officials had to put in extra work. In addition to the remuneration of 
officials, he talk of concepts such as 'permanent' and temporary service, 
promotions based on seniority, qualifications of minister and government 
servant, and separation of executive and judiciary. A separate portfolio of 
the interpreter of shastras whose head was called pandit or dharmadhikari, 
and the chief justice of the Supreme Court called pradvivak were officers 
Shefali Kalia, Good Governance and Development, New Century Publication, 
New Delhi, 2004, p. 39. 
who, he said, needed to function freely without interference form the king or 
executive.'^ 
Arthashastra recommends steps for prevention and punishment of 
corruption, despite difficulties in detecting and dealing with it. It mentions 
about 40 ways of embezzlement. 
What is realized is entered later on, what is realized later, is 
entered earlier, what ought to have been realize us not 
realized, what is hard to realize is shown as realized, what 
is collected is shown as not collected, what is collected in 
past is entered as collected in full, what is collected in full is 
shown as collected in past, what is collected is of one sort, 
while what is entered is of another sort (such as pulses in 
place of rice, etc.), what is realized from one source is 
shown as realized from other, what is payable is not paid, 
what is not payable is paid, not paid in time, or paid 
untimely, small gifts made large gifts, price of commodities 
enhanced etc... Just as fish moving underwater cannot 
possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking 
water, so government servants employed in the government 
work cannot be found out while taking money for 
themselves. 
The Mauryans Empire covered a territory which was vast by any 
standards. It was naturally divided into a number of provinces with a viceroy 
in charge of each. Like the king the Provincial Viceroy was also assisted by 
council of Ministers. Provinces were sub-divided into Divisions while 
Divisions were sub-divided into Districts. The officers over the divisions 
were known as Pradeshikas while those over the districts were known as 
Rajukas. Both were assisted by a large number of subordinate officers 
known as Yuktas or Yutas. 
'' Padma Ramachandran, Supra note 13, pp. 5-6. 
'* Ibid. 
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Mauryans are credited to be the pioneers who evolved so elaborate 
rules for agriculture, animal husbandry, trade, commerce, education, army 
and so on. They could rule over a vast empire, the biggest in the 
contemporary world, with peace and tranquility for more than a country. It 
was a highly organized administration under a powerful bureaucracy at the 
centre with enough provision for local self government. The government did 
not only collect revenues but involved in production and commercial 
activities. The welfare of the subject was the foremost motto. 
The Mauryan system of governance induced much change through 
the passage of time. K.M. Panikkar in his book, "A survey of Indian 
History" has rightly opined that the Mauryan organization as it existed was 
taken over by the Muslim kings and later on from them by the British - if 
the present system is analysed to its bases, the principles and practices of the 
Mauryan state organization will be found to be still in force.'' 
In the Gupta period, the pattern and form of governance was 
generally similar to that of the Mauryans and was ultimately based on the 
administration of each village by a Headman with whom was associated the 
Village Assembly. The Village Assembly appeared to have been composed 
of the representatives and acknowledged leaders of the entire population of 
the village. Even in the subsequent period Monarchy was in the ascendant 
and was the dominant force in administration. 
Governance in Medieval India 
The Delhi Sultan was basically a Theocracy in which the Sultan was 
endowed with both power i.e. religious and temporal. The Sultans followed 
Shefali Kalia, Supra note 14, p. 57. 
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the tenets of Islamic law in public matters. They divided their territory into 
provinces (subah), districts (sarkar), sub-districts (pargana) and villages 
where local administration was carried on. 
It was the vazir or chief minister's responsibility to superintend civil 
servants, supervise the collection of revenue, and regulate and supervise 
expenditure and accounts. He was the head of the entire machinery of 
government. He had three ministers to help him together they were looked 
upon as the four pillars of the state. They looked after the military, inter-
state relations and court matters. There were agents in different parts of the 
kingdom to provide information from time to time. Those who were in close 
touch with the cultivators for assessment and collection of taxes were in the 
18 
pargana. 
The Sultan was the chief enforcer of law. He dispensed justice 
through the diwan-i-qada. There was a quid in every town to settle disputes. 
It was merely a police state - Defence law and order and collection of 
revenue were its primary concern. Welfare of the people was not the primary 
concern of the Sultans. They did not hesitate to sacrifice even the interest of 
their creed at the altar of their personal ambition. The people were for the 
state, not the state for the people. Toleration under the sultans was the 
exception rather than the rule. Shershah was the first Muslim ruler to follow 
the policy of toleration. He expanded the scope of state activity because of 
his realization that the function of the government was not merely policy 
and revenue collection but also the welfare of the people.'^ 
18 Padma Ramachandran, Supra note 13, p. 13. 
'^  Ibid., p. 14. 
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When we come to the Mughal Empire, which properly begin with 
Babar, it is said that the essentials of Mughul administration, which was to 
come later, was an adaptation of what took place in earlier times, 
particularly during the Sultanate period. Akbar had only to add a "wheel 
here and adjust a lever there". The Mughal form of governance was on 
military lines. The rank in the Imperial Government was closely correlated 
to the number of troops maintained by the Nobles, and even officials 
employed wholly in civil duties were graded in the Military Hierarchy. 
Every important official had been assigned to him the responsibility for 
maintaining and commanding the stated number of troops. The Commanders 
were known as Mansabdars or Place Holders and were graded as 
Mansabdars of 10,000, 5,000, and 1,000 and so on 10. The Provincial 
Governorships were held by Mansabdars of high rank. The Ministers were 
only the Emperor's advisers when he chose to consult them and his 
Assistants in whatever branch of administration he delegated to them. The 
amongst these Ministers was the Vakil{Xh& Emperor's Lieutenant in all 
matters was the Realm and the Household) .Next came the Vazir or Diwan, 
who in modem terms may be described as the Finance Minister. The other 
important Ministers were—the Sadar, who combined in himself the work of 
a Chief Justice and the Chief Bakshi who was the Pay- Master General and 
Chief Recruiting Officer. In the towns, law and order was maintained by 
Kotwal on whom many responsibilities were placed. During Akbar's time 
the Empire was divided into Sircars or districts which were under the 
°^ I.H. Qureshi, The Administration of Sultanate of Delhi, Oriental Books, New 
Delhi, 1971, p. 2. 
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charges of Fauzdars who combined the functions similar to those of a 
Magistrate, a Collector and a Military Commander. Qazi was the Judicial 
Officer. The judges followed the Quranic precepts, its previous 
interpretations (fatwa), and ordinances of the Emperor {qanun). Justice was 
speedy and imperial, as it was meted out equally to all, including the 
officials.'^ ^ 
Toleration and benevolence were the guiding principles of Akbar's 
governance, and he gave a new orientation to the conception of the state in 
medieval India. Akbar considered his subjects as his children and hence 
molded himself responsible for their welfare. According to Abul Fazl, 
royalty is a light emanating from God, Farr-i-izidi (the divine light) and 
many excellent qualities flow from the possession of this light. Among them 
are paternal love towards the subjects and a large heart. The state, as 
conceived by Abul Fazl and established by Akbar, was universal, including 
all human beings irrespective of sect, creed or nationality. It was based on 
the principle of peace with all (sulh-i-kul). The king was just, wise, 
enlightened, shepherd of his people, father to his subjects and protector of 
the weak. He was, above all else, cherisher of every sect and creed. 
However its partial continuation by Jahangir and Shahjahan, the Mughal 
rule had limited scope in its functions. 
Governance in Modern India 
The British rule in India, architectured by the East India Company, a 
trading concern entered India under a charter originally granted by Queen 
Krishna K. Tummala, Public Administration in India, Allied Publishers, New 
Delhi, 1996, pp. 17-18. 
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Elizabeth I on 31^' December. The early charters of East India Company had 
given it the authority to make reasonable laws, constitution, orders and 
ordinance for the benefit of its limited administration and to punish offences 
committed by its servants. It gave it no territorial jurisdiction. 
A significant step in the enlargement of the Company's 
Administration was taken in the year 1968 when in Bengal, the Company 
brought Zamindari rights. In 1773, by the Regulating Act, the then Supreme 
Court was set up in Bengal. The Office of the Collectors, Magistrates and 
Judges came into existence. By the Regulating Act of 1773, which may be 
regarded as the first serious attempt by the English Parliament to control the 
Administration in India, the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras were 
subjected to the control of the Presidency of Bengal. The subsequent 
important measure was that of Pitt's Act of 1784 which established a Board 
of Control ^^  in England. By the Act of 1833 adding six new members, 
called the "legislative Councilors", four of whom were nominees of the four 
Provinces (hitherto. Presidencies) . A law Commission was appointed to 
codify Indian law thus resulting in the Penal Code, and Civil Procedure 
Codes. 
The vent 1857 completed the dissolution of East India Company. 
Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 was the first step towards the association of 
the people with the every branch of administration. The concept of a 
22 
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The Board of Control consisted of six Commissioners: Secretary of State, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and four Privy Councilors appointed by the King. 
The six were: one nominee from each of the four Provinces (Bengal, Bombay, 
Madras and North-West Provinces), and the Chief Justice and one judge of the 
Supreme Court. To be nominated, one had to be a civil servant for at least ten years. 
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government by the representatives of the people, for the people rapidly took 
shape. Bureaucracy and Democracy were strangely mixed and closely 
associated with each other by implementing the Act of 1919. It was the birth 
and progress of the dyarchical Government. Even though unitary form of 
State was maintained, the spheres of central and provincial Government 
meant division of the Government in two sections; one of them fully 
bureaucratic and the other popular to a great extent. Both the sections had to 
work under the Governors of the provinces who had ordinary and 
extraordinary powers. The central and provincial spheres of administration 
were demarcated by this Act, and a large measure of independence was 
given to the provinces. The provincial subjects were divided into two 
groups; the reserved half to be administered where irrevocable council, 
existed and the transferred subjects were to be administered by Ministers, 
selected by the Government from among the elected members of the 
Provincial Legislative Council, who were fully responsible to that chamber 
for their actions and policies. 
Then came the Act of 1935 with its constitutional structure based 
on the concept of Provincial Autonomy and Federation. The Executive 
Authority of each province extended to matters with respect to which the 
Legislature of the Province had power to make Laws. The Chief Executive 
of the Province was the Governor who had threefold classification of his 
powers; those he had to exercise in his discretion, in his individual 
judgement, or on the advice of Ministers responsible to the Legislature. He 
had considerable powers in the matters of finance, and though the budget 
was subject to the vote of the Legislature in respect of the notable portion, 
the Governor had the discretion to restore the cuts. 
The Office the Collector was created by the Company to collect the 
revenue and govern the village. He was the Magistrate and the Head of the 
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Police Force. Some time he was also the District Judge. Later, Cornwallis 
introduced the system where Revenue Administration was kept distinct from 
Judicial and Police functions. But these administrative tendencies were soon 
reversed and power began to be concentrated in the hands of Collectors. In 
1863, with influx of the time the District Officer, Collector, became the 
Centre of the Administrative system. His duties varied from his primary 
work collecting revenue to suppression of crime and in tranquil times 
concentrated on development work. 
The frame work of administrative system changed slowly but 
steadily. The two reports of 1854 - one by Sir Stafford Northcole and Sir 
Charlies Travelyn and other by Thoman Babington MaCaulay formed the 
cornerstone of the administrative system designed by the British rulers for 
governing India. 
The Northcole and Trevelyn Report suggested that appointments to 
the civil services should no longer be made by patronage. They should be 
made hence forth by open competitive examinations by this means the best 
brains of the country would be harnessed to the public serviceman. 
The Macaulay Report dealing with qualifications and training 
observed that it is, undoubtedly, desirable that the civil servant should enter 
on his duties while still young (18-23 years of age) but it is also desirable 
that he should have received the best, the most liberal. The most finished 
education, such an education has been proved by experience to be the best 
preparation for every calling which requires the exercise of the higher power 
of the mind. 
The generalist civil services, ICS and IP and several other 
ex-secretary of state's services, like Education service, Forest service. 
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Political service etc., were established to govern India at the administrative 
levels, on the foundation of qualities of candidates who, in the words of 
Tomlin Commission (1930) '^* had "trained mental equipment of a high order 
judgement, savoir, insights and fair-mindedness, an intellectual equipment 
capable of ready mastery of complex and abstruse problems, imagination 
and constructive ability by virtue of their organized learning acquired not so 
much in any subject but in a method a way of thought, a mental and mortal 
decline". 
As the public services structure shows, the governance during the 
Raj had as its objective, political consolidation, economic exploitation and 
administrative utilisation through which the colonial masters maintained a 
tight hold over the empire. As the Administrative Reforms Commission 
noted the pre independence, governance was concerned mainly with the 
enforcement of the law, maintenance of order, and the collection of revenue. 
Involvement of the Government during the British regime in the economic 
and social spheres was confined to mainly the tasks like building and 
maintaining a modest transport and communication system, regulation of 
indigenous trade and commerce and providing a medium of facilities in the 
fields of education and health. 
Post Independence 
The situation subsequent to August 1947 heralds the new trends in 
governance. The state's philosophy and governance's ideology (with 
complete and responsible government based on the principle of collective 
responsible of the Cabinet) overnight underwent a nodal and seminal 
change, catapulting straightway into the arena of "welfare" and 
Report of Tomlin Commission (1930 )^ 
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simultaneously imparting to them a new dimension, direction and dynamics. 
Our founding fathers of India's Republic built the entire edifice of her 
constitution and democratic polity on the quintessential principle of 
sovereignty vesting in the people. 
G O O D G O V E R N A N C E : IMPLICATIONS 
Good governance is a buzzword in today's globalizing economy, 
which has received considerable attention the world over. It was the 
substantive part of functioning of states organizational life, being at the 
heart of the thing. Good governance is associated with efficient and 
effective administration in a democratic framework. It is evident to 
purposive and development oriented administration which is committed to 
improvement in quality of life of the people. It implies high level of 
organizational effectiveness. It also relates to the capacity of the center of 
power of political and administrative system to cope up with the emerging 
challenges of the society. It refers to the adoption of new values of 
governance with a view to establish greater efficiency, legitimacy and 
credibility of the system.'^ ^ 
The use of the term good governance has come into vogue 
increasingly because of the studies of developing countries relating to 
development and its total dependence on efficacy in maintaining the factor 
of 'goodness' in the governance of a particular country. Thus, the concept of 
good governance has acquired increased importance since 1990s. Largely 
because international aid agencies such as World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund began to recognize its absence as a serious barriers to 
economic development to the developing countries, which has been their 
" O.P. Minocha, Supra note 3, pp. 271-72. 
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vowed objective. It is the failure in developmental efforts that brought forth 
into prominence the need for as well as identification of the principal 
elements or constituents of good governance. But the pursuit of it is not new 
one as ensuring goodness in governance and raising its level has always 
been the considered goal of the people and persistent demand of the 
articulate sections in any society. It has been an eternal challenge to rulers 
since the very dawn of state irrespective of its nature, structure and form. 
Alexander Pope's famous dictum "for forms of government let fools contest 
whatever is best administered is best" , truly reflects the spirit of the 
concept of good governance. It has been a romantic ideal for political 
thinkers round the ages. 
The concept of good governance derives its relevance in the context 
of misgovemance which includes non-feasance, over-feasance and mal-
feasance.^^ Good governance is increasingly seen as essential form ensuring 
national prosperity by increasing the accountability, reliability, and 
predictability of decision making in governments, corporations, and non-
governmental organizations. Furthermore, this concept is being used in the 
development and management literature because "bad" governance is often 
identified as a root cause of social inequality, development failures, and 
corporate scandals. 
In many countries, the democratic form of government has proved 
to be ineffective for checking swindling of public ftinds for private gains by 
the elected leaders as well as permanent bureaucrats. Misuse of power. 
*^ Editorial, Indian Journal of Public Administration, New Delhi, Vol. XLIV, No. 3, 
July-September, 1998, p. IX. 
" Ashok Mukhopadhyay, Supra note 4, p. 282. 
*^ Mark Bevir (ed.). Encyclopedia of Governance, Sage, New Delhi, 2007, p. 359. 
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fraud, chicanery and embezzlement of funds are systematically perpetrated 
by the leaders of government and their unions. Misgovemance is rampant all 
around, especially in the developing countries. The concept of good 
governance becomes attractive as a remedy against this state of affairs. 
All the three wings of government, the three arms and 
instrumentalities of governance - legislature, executive and judiciary have, 
it seems collaborated to setup a joint venture in malgovernance. In our 
functional anarchy, where legislature and executive have conspired to 
sacrifice governance at the altar of political expediency: an 'activist' 
judiciary in a very brief flicker of hope, seemed a savior, but that light has 
also gone out, the system of governance is engulfed in a thick blanket of 
darkness. The delays, complications in legal dispensations, volumes of 
pendencies, the high costs of justice, the vagaries of lawyers - all combine 
to make courts of justice a dreaded place, almost a prohibited area for most 
sufferers. Bureaucrats, judges and politicians the three pillars of governance 
edifice do not bother about deadlines, because they deal in other people's 
money, time and moral. They all want to hog headlines and bylines. These 
three, in 'joint venture', which the other three, namely economic financial 
mafias, underworld dons and trade union/vested interest lobbies, have made 
a mine meant of good governance, resulting in malgovernance. 
Good governance is essentially free of abuse and corruption and 
with due regard for the rule of law. The purpose of good governance is not 
only to provide basic amenities to the people but a life, which is qualitative 
and dignified in the real sense of the term. The actual meaning of good 
governance for a common man is guaranteed right to health adequate 
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housing, sufficient food, quality education, fair justice and personal security. 
The true criterion of good governance is wiping every tear from every eye. 
Now the relationship between ethics and good governance must be 
analysed. A sociological understanding of ethics would be that they cover 
norms of behaviour which emerge from self-discovery by people who have 
several subtle ways to integrate social cohesion with self-realisation.^° The 
two indicators, to show that the social system is in a happy equilibrium, 
comprise that: 
> The system does not~induce people to do others what they would 
not like to be done to themselves. 
> The system would yield the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number, happiness being defined the way the individuals want it. 
Such equilibrium is not impossible to achieve as, by and large, 
human beings are well intentioned^' towards each other. There are sufficient 
numbers who can evolve, suggest and put through appropriate systems of 
economic, social and political relationship accepting people as they are with 
some acquisitive and selfish tendency; they are governed by the philosophy 
of Nishkama Karma.^^ There could be several obstacles to this achievement, 
the chief of which is absence of consultative processes built on democratic 
and dispassionate discourse. Consultative practices must ensure 
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participative decisions so that every decision would benefit everyone even if 
some were benefited more than others.'''* All this may give rise to class and 
group conflicts, but ethics consists not in aggravating them but in 
recognizing them as necessary or preludes to conflict resolution. So 
'ethics' covers much wider area than the narrow meaning of corruption. 
On the other hand governance means the act or manner of governing 
or the way of control. Good governance is, therefore, that system which is 
accepted as good. Pai Panandiker sees good governance as it pertains to a 
nation state which handles its people to lead peaceful, orderly, reasonable, 
prosperous and participatory lives.^^ Vivek Chopra defines good governance 
as unambiguously identifying the basic values of society and pursuing 
these.''^ Then it is clear that good governance has been defined sometimes in 
terms of goals, sometimes in terms of means, sometimes left entirely to 
democratic choice of goals and sometimes with preordained goals. 
In light of the above discussion, we have seen that ethics and good 
governance cover the same ground except that governance is concerned with 
the acts of the 'state', the 'administration' and the 'bureaucracy'. 
Nevertheless, if one chooses to judge the goodness of governance only by 
the outcomes, and ethics only as covering the means, the terms may not 
mean the same thing. 
Global Idea on the background conditions of the good 
governance concept: It is pointed out that contemporary western aid and 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Ibid, p. 36. 
/i/c?, pp. 150-51. 
Bhabani Sengupta, Supra note 5, p. 12 
S.C. Kashyap, Crime, Corruption and Good Governance, Uppal, New Delhi, 
1997, p. 113. 
23 
overseas development policy have three defining features. First, the aim of 
aid has been to promote open market friendly and competitive economics. 
This policy was embodied in the new conditionality of structural adjustment 
lending, developed in the 1980s. Later in the 1990s, two further features 
have been added to structural adjustment. These are support for 
democratization and improvement of human rights records, and insistence 
on what has come to be called "good governance" . 
World Bank Conceptualization: These aspects of good 
governance have assumed significance for the developed and the developing 
countries. The following are the factors deal with political and 
administrative aspects.^ ^ 
> Political accountability, including the acceptability of political 
system by the people and regular elections to legitimize the 
exercise of political power. 
> Freedom of association and participation by various religious, 
social, economic, cultural and professional groups in the process 
of governance. 
> An established legal framework based on the rule of law and 
independence of judiciary to protect human rights, secure social 
justice and guard against exploitation and abuse of power. 
> Bureaucratic accountability ensuring a system to monitor and 
control the performance of government offices and officials in 
relation to quality of service, inefficiency and abuse of 
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discretionary power. The related determinants include opens and 
transparency in administration. 
> Freedom of information and expression needed for formulation 
of public policies, decision making, monitoring and evaluation of 
government performance. It also includes independent analysis 
of information by the professional bodies, including the 
universities and others needed for a civil society. 
> A sound administrative system leading to efficiency and 
effectiveness. This, in turn means the value for money and cost 
effectiveness. The effectiveness includes the degree of global 
achievement as per the stated objectives and also the 
administrative system which is able to take secular and rational 
decisions and the system which is self propelling to take 
corrective measures. 
> Cooperation between the government and civil society 
organizations. 
On its wide experience, the World Bank document narrates vividly 
the problems of governance. For instance, despite technical soundness, 
programmes and projects have often failed to produce desired results, laws 
are not enforced properly and there are often delays in implementation. 
Privatized production and market led growth do not succeed unless investors 
face clear rules and institutions. In the absence of proper accounting system, 
budgetary policies cannot be implemented or monitored. Many a time, 
procurement systems encourage corruption and distort public investment 
priorities. Again, failure to involve beneficiaries and others affected in the 
design and implementation of projects has often led to substantial erosion of 
their sustainability. 
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Again in this background of malgoveraance World Bank has 
attempted to focus on some of the key dimensions of governance, such as a 
public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for 
development, information and transparency. Economic, human and 
institutional developments are considered important in bringing about sound 
development management. The conditions of good governance are thus 
carefully spelt out, in the Bank document which sums up: 
Governance is a continuum and not necessarily non-
directional: it does not automatically improve overtime. It is 
a plant that needs care. Citizens need to demand good 
governance. Their ability to do so is enhanced by literacy, 
education and employment opportunities. Governments need 
to prove responsive to those demands. Neither of these can 
be taken for granted. Change occurs sometimes in response 
to external or internal threats. It also occurs through 
pressures from different interest groups, some of which may 
be in the form of populist demands. Although lenders and 
aid agencies and other outsiders can contribute resources 
and ideas to improve governance, for change to be effective 
it must be rooted firmly in the societies concerned and 
cannot be imposed from outside ".''^ 
Views of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development countries: More pronounced political meaning of 
'governance' appeared in the policy directives of the OECD countries laying 
down conditions for receiving economic assistance. The OECD documents'" 
sought to link development assistance, with -
"" The World Bank, Governance and Development, Washington, D.C. 1992. 
"" Mohit Bhattacharya, "Conceptualising Good Governance", Indian Journal of 
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(a) Participatory development 
(b) Human rights and 
(c) Democratisation. 
The key components of 'governance' were identified as: 
> Legitimacy of government. 
> Accountability of political and official elements of government. 
> Competence of governments to make policy and deliver services, 
> Respect for human rights and rule of law. 
The Human Development Report 2002 advocates the human 
development perspective for good governance. It has described the features 
of good governance, which are identical to democratic governance. These 
are^^ 
> People's human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, 
allowing them to live with dignity. 
> People have a say in decisions that affect their lives. 
> People can hold decisions which are accountable. 
> Women are equal partners with men. 
> Private and public spheres of life and decision making. 
> People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, 
class, gender or any other attribute. 
> The needs of future generations are reflected in current policies. 
> Economic and social policies are responsive to people's needs 
and aspirations. 
42 Human Development Report in south Asia, The Crisis of Governance, The 
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> Economic and social policies aim to eradicating poverty and 
expanding the choice that all people have in their lives. 
Hyden involves identification of conditions that facilitate sound 
management and effective problem solving strategy in the study of 
governance. These are principal dimensions for good governance'' : 
> Citizen influence and one sight characterized by degree of 
political participation and method of public aggregation means 
of preference aggregation and methods of public accountability. 
> By degree Responsive and responsible leaderships characterized 
of respect or the civil public realm, degree of openness of public 
policy making and degree of adherence to rule of law. 
> Social reciprocities characterized by degree of political equality, 
degree of inter-group tolerance and degree of inclusiveness in 
associational membership. 
Good governance itself depends on a range of factors including 
administrative capacity, the country's stage of development, the external 
conditions that it faces and the state of information technology available to it 
for taking decisions. These are another some of the agenda items of good 
governance as follows*'*: 
> Enhancing effective and efficient administration, 
> Improving quality of life of citizens. 
> Establishing legitimacy and credibility of institution. 
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> Making administration responsive, citizen friendly and citizen-
caring, ensuring accountability. 
> Securing freedom of information and expression. Reducing cost 
of governance. 
> Making every department result oriented. Improving quality of 
public services. 
> Improving productivity of employees. 
> Eradicating of corruption to re-establish credibility of 
Government. 
> Removal of arbitrariness in exercise of authority. 
> Use of IT-based services to demystify procedures and improve 
the citizen government interface. 
It is clear that above discussion of criteria, does not enjoy 
uniformity. Good governance is value laden and these values are public 
interest, public welfare, public goods of government, which devoted to these 
values, is considered as good governance. It is something which covers the 
entire gamut of our lives: political, economic and social. We cannot talk of 
good governance, without ensuring the basic necessities of life. We can, 
therefore, define "good governance as a system of governance that is, able to 
identify clear the basic values of the society and pursue these values through 
an accountable and honest administration in order to achieve the goal of 
maximizing the welfare of people in all sphere of life. There are following 
characteristics on which the Good governance is based: 
Participation: Both men and women are the cornerstone of good 
governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate 
intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out that 
representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the 
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most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision 
making. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means 
freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized 
civil society on other hand. 
Transparency: It means that decisions taken and their enforcement 
are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that 
information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be 
affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough 
information is provided in easily understandable forms and readily available 
media. 
Responsiveness: Good governance requires that institutions and 
processes try to serve all stake holders within a reasonable time frame. 
Consensus Oriented: Good governance requires mediation of the 
different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is 
in the best interest of the society is in the best interest of the whole 
community and how this can be achieved. 
Equity and Inclusiveness : A society's well being depends on 
ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel 
excluded from the mainstream of society, this requires all groups, but 
particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain 
their over being. 
Effectiveness and efficiency: Good governance means the 
processes and institutions that produce results to meet the needs of society 
while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of 
efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the productive and 
effective use of natural resources and the protection of the environment. 
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Accountability: It is a key requirement of good governance: 
Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and rule of law. Not 
only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society 
organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional 
stake holders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether 
decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or 
institution. In general an organization or institution is accountable to those 
who will be affected by its decisions or actions. 
Good governance, however, is not a finished product. It is a 
dynamic concept. It encompasses fast-changing political, social and 
economic milieu, along with international environment and conditions of 
operational governance. 
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[tiBiaiiriii PROBLEM AN 
On becoming independent, India adopted a parliamentary system for 
governance which was a well considered one. Our founding fathers were 
convinced that given India's pluralism and heterogeneity, only the 
parliamentary system could hold the country together while providing 
sufficient means to ensure the centrality of our people in the political processes 
of the country. A reading of the Preamble to our Constitution reinforces this 
centrality. 
India's core political structure that were established through a new-
constitution came into being in 1950, was a clear continuity with the past 
that held the British power in India. The framers of the Constitution 
avoided friction between the centre and the constituent states in future, the 
Constitution incorporated and elaborated distribution of governmental 
powers - legislative, administrative, and financial between the Union and 
provincial governments. Despite a detailed distribution of power between 
the two levels of government, the Union government is constitutionally 
stronger simply because the framers wanted it so. It is, after all, to the 1935 
Government of India Act that is owed not only the federal structure and 
legislative acts, but also the continuance of the unified legal and financial 
systems, and such distinctive features as group rights, machinery for 
resolution of inter-state water dispute, state governors, and Article 356. 
There had, of course, been strong opposition to the 'federal' provisions of 
the 1935 Act that envisaged the future accession of the princes, including 
the right of secession that figured unambiguously in the 1942 Cripps 
Mission proposals. The 1946 Cabinet Mission also endorsed the plan for a 
central government with very limited powers and relatively strong princes 
having a considerable degree of autonomy with all the residuary powers. 
Despite inputs supporting a weak centre, the 1950 Constitution provided a 
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scheme of distribution of power that was heavily tihed in favour of a strong 
centre. The decision to go for a strong centre at the cost of regional 
autonomy was perhaps conditioned by pragmatic considerations of 
maintaining national integrity that received a severe jolt with the 1947 
partition. 
As it finally emerged, the Constitution has important federal features 
but cannot be characterized as federal in its classical sense. What it 
envisages is a unique document, which is, as Ambedkar articulated, 'unitary 
in extra-ordinary circumstances such as war and other calamities and federal 
under normal circumstances'. Hence, India is described as 'a union of states' 
where the union is 'indestructible' but not the constituent states because 
their contour and identity can be 'altered' or even 'obliterated'. There 
emerged a consensus and the Assembly rejected a motion seeking to 
characterize India as 'a federation of states'.' 
Present study attempts to analyse the following major areas of working 
of political system and the problem of governance. 
G O V E R N A N C E A N D W O R K I N G O F P A R T Y S Y S T E M 
The effective and efficient function of the democratic form of 
governance is held by the character and working of the party system. Party 
system breeds interaction between competing political parties. Provincial 
choices and options in the competitive interactions get shaped by the 
elections that also culminate in determining the support base of the parties. 
Ramashray Roy has rightly said that the crisis of governability cannot be 
understood without understanding charges that have occurred in the party 
system. Elections not only serve as event around which these changes can be 
' The Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 43. 
33 
observed, but electoral outcomes, besides determining political fortunes of 
individual candidates, reflect long term changes, often irreversible, in the 
party system. If the clue to the recovery of the representative system is to be 
found through "normal polities', it becomes all the more necessary to 
understand what has happened to the party system over a series of elections 
and whether there is any scope of retrieving the principle of representation 
through a restructuring of the party system. 
From 1952 to 1967, the peculiar party system generally described as 
the one-party dominant system prevailed in India "as only the Congress was 
voted time and again with an overwhelming parliamentary majority on 
plurality (not majority) of votes in democratically contested elections. It 
coincided with the premierships of Nehru, Shastri and pre-1969, Indira 
Gandhi".^ 
It was based on a peculiar pattern of Government opposition 
relationship that produced a party system with difference and provided an 
interesting alternative to other existing party system'*. Robert Dahl puts India 
into the category of nations which have a party system with one normally 
dominant government party that gains close to 50 per cent of the popular 
votes and a lot of more seats in the parliament with the opposition 
fragmented in three or more parties.^ Here was a paradox of a party getting 
Ramashray Roy; "Making the Party System in India Work" in V.A. Pal 
Panandiker and Subhash C. Kashyap(eds.) Political Reforms: Asserting Civic 
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majority of seats with minority of popular votes because of the 
fragmentation of opposition votes. Rajni Kothari described that it is a 
system in which a historically dominant party is opposed by a large number 
of parties and factional groupings that are dispersed throughout the country. 
The role of the dominant has been to evolve a consensus on both normative 
and procedural matters as well as major policy issues. In such a system, the 
dominant party becomes a norm setter for all other parties and the model set 
by the Congress had in fact been spreading both in terms of policies and 
programmes. In this system it is the dominant party that acts as an 
aggregation by developing into a comprehensive, representative mechanism, 
it represents all shades of opinion, all major interest groups in the society 
and indeed all other parties as well.^ 
Ideologically, the Congress took root and came to political power 
not as a party but as a movement for independence and reform. Secondly, 
from the beginning the Congress was committed to a democratic ideology. 
Thirdly, the comprehensive and authoritative organization of the Congress 
party provided the basis for building community and national leadership 
under Nehru who symbolized the unity and progressive of the nation. 
Historical reasons are necessary but not sufficient for the efficacy of a 
system. There is no doubt that in its character and depth, the congress was 
unparalleled movement for independence, and this had significantly 
contributed to its place in India.' Nehru's charismatic personality was 
described by his critics as a "banyan tree" under which independent leaders 
could not grow. In the same way the Congress was described as an 
Rajni Kothari, Supra note 4, pp. 320-21. 
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"umbrella" with no scope for other parties to stake claims to independent 
basis of support. 
The first general elections, under Nehru's direct stewardship, 
attracted worldwide interest. The Congress, by virtue of its being a pioneer 
in the freedom struggle, became an increasingly effective election winning 
machine. The people returned Congress candidates in impressive numbers. 
In 18 out of 22 state assemblies the Congress had absolute majorities. All 
the opposition parties put together secured 125 seats, that is 25.6 per cent of 
the total but in terms of total votes cast it was as much as 55 per cent. 
The second general election in 1957 came at a time when Nehru's 
influence and power was at its zenith, and before various economic, political 
and internal troubles assumed critical proportions. The Congress occupied 
365 seats in the Lok Sabha whereas the next largest party, the communists, 
occupied only 34, and the independents numbered only 135. This 
impregnable position of the Congress is largely attributed to Nehru's 
immense popularity among the masses. 
In the years preceding the 1962 election there were signs of 
fractional strife within the Congress party which endangered the chances of 
success of candidates representing the Congress. In a number of states^ 
Congress factions fought each other under the very nose of the High 
command. The leadership of the Congress party faced for the first time an 
opposition which was very vociferous in criticizing its politics. 
The formation of the Swatantra party in 1959 represented an effort 
on the part of some of India's most distinguished public figures to build iron 
leftist opposition to the ruling Congress party. The third Lok Sabha elections 
in 1962 came at the time when Indo-Chinese relations deteriorated abruptly 
and the country faced serious economic difficulties. The post-Nehru 
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elections took on a different character, because the great leader, who no 
longer at the helm. Lai Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru. The syndicate 
played the critical role in coalescing the diverse interests behind Shastri and 
in securing consensus within the party. He knew that his stature was 
considered to be less than his illustrious predecessor. In January 1966, 
within two years after he had assumed the office, Shastri died. The 
Syndicate chose Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister. 
The first three general elections were won by the Congress party 
with massive mandates because of the following reasons. First, there was the 
charismatic leadership of Nehru which acquired the form of personality cult. 
During the greater part of the Nehru era, complacency had crept in the 
Congress which made it reluctant to provide for the development of the 
essentials to the stabilization of democracy. It entertained the firm belief that 
it was an irreplaceable force and could retain power through cleverly 
managed permutations and combinations. 
Secondly, as Rajni Kothari says, in the "Congress system" the 
Congress had organizations at the grass-roots level which helped in 
assessing the interests and requirements of the masses. The politics of India 
operated at two levels - traditional and modem - and the party which had 
the capacity of combining both had better prospects of electoral success. In 
this respect the Congress was most apt because of the leading role it played 
during the struggle for independence. Besides, this provided it enormous 
legitimacy. 
Thirdly, during the first three elections, the success of the Congress 
was partly explained by the splitting of the opposition votes. Since the 
opposition to Congress mainly came from the divisions in the same elite 
groups, their future policies and perceptions of the problems were the same. 
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They could not emergence as a better alternative to the Congress, but act 
merely as "parties of pressure". Thus, these elections were conducted and 
fought in the framework of an established and stable one-party dominant 
system. 
The main features of the first model were intra-party competition 
within the Congress party, based on a historical consensus, and the role of 
opposition as a pressure group. The Congress party was successful in 
evolving a national consensus. The party system was oriented to conflict 
avoidance and group accommodation even at the cost of ideological 
coherence and effectiveness of performances.^ 
This model is characterized as the locality-oriented pluralist model 
marked by complex multi-layered factional and party political structures 
which were locally articulated along caste, community and the factional 
lines in villages and districts and aggregated at the state level by reasonably 
autonomous set of party elites in various states. This was the period of 
"consociation" dominance by the Congress party ruling with overwhelming 
majorities in the Parliament and almost all the state legislatures. All the 
three general elections held in 1952, 1957 and 1962 adhered to the above 
mentioned model. 
From 1967 to 1989 stands as a critical landmark in the development of 
India's party system for several reasons. First, it marked the beginning of 
Congress decline that initially started at the state level and later shifted to 
the national electoral scene. It took almost twenty years for the Congress 
system to be completely dismantled. Though the Congress party could win 
Ram Joshi and Kirti Deve Cesai, "Dominance with a Difference: Strains and 
Challenger", Economic and Political Weekly, February. 1973, p. 196. 
38 
the national elections in 1971, 1980 and 1984, these electoral victories 
overlook the emerging party systems in the states where the space vacated 
the Congress were gradually being filled with multiparty coalitions. 
Second, the 1967 general elections, for the first time in the history of 
independent India, ushered in coalition governments in the states on a large 
scale. In Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal, Kerala, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and 
Haryana, opposition parties joined together to form to coalition 
governments. An analysis of the nature of coalition politics in the various 
states and the reason for their instability has been done from the viewpoint 
of two broad variables: political opportunism as expressed by Paul Brass^ 
and Bruce Bueno De Mesquita'" and ideological differences as expressed by 
Iqbal Narain'' and Subrata K. Mitra'l 
A brief look at state politics after 1967 would endorse our argument 
that in many states the monopoly of the Congress had been broken and in its 
place separated party system different from that at the centre had begun to 
emerge. In both 1967 and 1971, there already existed a space for regional 
assertion in Indian politics, a space that continued to widen with Congress 
decline. In 1967 and 1971 national elections, the regional parties polled 10% 
and 13.8% of the vote and twenty five years later in the 1996 elections they 
Paul Brass, "Coalition Politics in North India", in Paul Brass, Caste, Faction and 
Party in Indian Politics, Chanakya Publications, Delhi, 1984, vol. I. 
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Strategy, Risk and Personality in Coalition Politics: 
The Case of India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. 
Iqbal Narain, "Ideology and the Indian Party System: An Essay in Conceptual 
cognition", in Iqbal Narain and P.C. Mathur, Politics in Changing India, Rawat 
Publication, Jaipur, 1994. 
Subrata K. Mitra, Governmental Instability in Four Indian States: West Bengal, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, Ajanta Publication, Delhi, 1978 
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polled 18.3%. These regional parties were the DMK of Tamil Nadu, the 
Jharkhand party of Bihar, the All Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC) 
of Assam, the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, the Akali Dal of 
Punjab, the Muslim League of Kerala and the Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD) of 
Uttar Pradesh. In 1971, the Telengana Praja Samity polled 14.4% of the 
state vote in Andhra Pradesh, the APHLC 10.9%, the Vishal Haryana Party 
9%, the newly formed Utkal Congress in Orissa 22.7%, the BKD 12.6% and 
the Akali Dal 30.8%'^. Myron Weiner considered the performance of the 
regional parties as "one of the most surprising but unnoticed features" of the 
1971 elections.''' 
These trends at the state level were not seriously analysed or 
thought worthy of consideration until in recent years when these regional 
parties have emerged as national players. This may have been because of too 
much preoccupation with the national party system to the exclusion of state 
politics. Commenting on the 1967 elections and the period after that, 
Kothari argued that though the 1967 election did present a major step in the 
direction of an increasingly competitive polity ... and a more differentiated 
structure of party competition", the congress retained, even after 1967, its 
central role in "maintaining and restructuring political consensus". The 
Congress still formed the "centre of Indian politics" because it occupied the 
centre of the ideological spectrum in Indian politics.'^ Morris Jones also 
concluded after the 1971 LokSabha elections that "the end of the dominant 
Aditya Nigam, "India after the 1996 Elections: Nation, Locality and 
Representation", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No. 12, December, 1996, p. 1162. 
Ashutosh Varshney, The Indian Paradox: Essay in Indian Politics, Sage 
Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 228. 
Rajni Kothari, "Continuity and Change in The Party System", Asian Survey, 
November, 1970, p. 937-98 
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party system had been too readily proclaimed in 1967" and that "now it is 
back".'^ 
It is true that at the centre there was no alternation of power 
between the Congress and other opposition parties during this period. But it 
has also to be realized that the dismantling of the Congress system, which 
enjoyed a position of pre-eminence rarely founded elsewhere, could not be 
achieved overnight. The first signs of change appeared at the state level and 
overlooking these charges would amount to a gross distortion of the nature 
of the party system. There was a category of states in which the Congress 
party could maintain its dominance in 1967 and was able to form a 
government such as Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Assam, Gujrat and 
Kamataka. In states like Orissa, Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, a 
bipolar situation emerged. In all these states a region based party competed 
for power with the Congress. In Orissa, a stable coalition of Swatantra Party 
and Jan Sangh kept the Congress out of power. In Kerala, since 1967, power 
has alternated between the Congress and communist coalitions, while in 
West Bengal, after period of instability in the mid 60s, the Left Front 
coalition led by the CPI (M) has remained in power. In Tamil Nadu, the 
DMK was able to capture power, indicating the emergence of a two party 
system. The states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan and Punjab fall in the 
third category where neither the Congress could form a Government nor a 
strong opposition party emerged. As a result, these states went through a 
period of coalition governments and instability was various opposition 
parties tried to occupy the political space left vacant by the decline of 
*17 
Congress party. 
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The defeat of the Congress in the 1977 parliamentary elections 
drastically altered the basic structure of the party system in significant ways 
and also gave a decisive blow to the authoritarian experiment of emergency 
rule. According to Ram Joshi and Kirtidev Desai, the electoral change of 
1977 "brought about and ends of the 'Congress system' and in its place 
ushered in a rather nebulous two party system. The Janata Party polled 
41.82% of the vote nationally, which was 7% ahead of the Congress and 
gained 298 seats as compared to 153 of the Congress. The Congress host 9% 
of the popular vote in comparison to its 1971 record. In North India, the loss 
was as high as 20% or more whereas in earlier elections the Congress gain 
or loss had stabilized in the range of 2% to 4%, 1977 was the highest vote 
loss suffered by the congress. On the other hand, the votes of the Janata 
party constituents almost doubled to 43.17% as compared to 1971 (23.5%) 
and 1967 (22.6%) elections.'^ The massive shift of votes was also 
accompanied by a sharp reduction in the advantage of vote-seat distortion 
enjoyed by the congress in the past. 
However, we would like to argue that the 1977 election did not 
herald the beginning of a two party system at the national level. Ram Joshi 
and Kirdiden Desai themselves said that the situation after the 1977 election 
was "still ftizzy and fluid and the shape of the emerging party system was 
not yet clear". At best party situation which was the result of the merger of 
major opposition parties into the Janata party and the alliance with the Akali 
Dal, the DMK and the Marxist Communist. Such a structural polarization of 
electoral competition became, on the one hand, a catalyst for massive vote 
shift and, on other hand, the principal cause for bringing down seat-vote 
distortion which had favoured only the Congress in the past. 
'* Ram Joshi and Kirtidev Desai, "Towards a More Competitive Party System in 
India", Asian Survey, November 1978, pp. 1091-1116 
" Ibid., p. \092-93. 
^° Ibid., p. 1091 
42 
The massive electoral victory of the Congress in the 1980 and 1984 
general elections led Myron Weiner to describe them as "reinstating 
election. The older electoral coalition was reassembled by Congress party, 
21 
Congress rule both at the centre and in most of the states was restored". In 
1980, the Congress won 43% of the vote and 353 seats. It won a majority of 
parliamentary seat in all major states except West Bengal and Kerala. In 
1984, the party won 402 seats, which even exceeded the number gained in 
the 1950s or in 1971. The two elections do appear to restore one-party 
dominance at the centre as well as the states. However, the fact that the 
Congress within a span of five years suffered an irreversible decline leads us 
to question whether the 1980 and 1984 elections were really rein stability 
elections. 
The Janata Government that was in power fi-om 1977 to 1979 was a 
hastily assembled coalition of disparate political groups, united mainly by 
their opposition to Indira Gandhi and the emergency. The experience of 
emergency phase had convinced the opposition parties their very existence 
was in danger. The first step in the formation of the Janata Party was 
dictated by the instinct of survival of the opposition parties. The constituents 
of the Janata party were the Congress (O), the Jan Sangh, the Bharatiya Lok 
Dal, the socialist party and the Congress for democracy. As a result of the 
heterogeneous composition of the party and the friction between t three 
leading figures - Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram and Charan Singh - the 
natural divisions among the members began to emerge. Second, though the 
Janata government promised a break from congress policies, the actual 
performance of the Janata party did not reveal any new directions in critical 
sectors of national life. The implementation of land reforms was neglected 
and the industrial policy resolution was no different from the Congress party 
resolutions of 1948 and 1956. C.P. Bhambhri is of the opinion that the 
Janata party showed incapacity to provide purposeful leadership in politics 
Mynn Weiner, "Congress Restored: Continuities and Discontinuities in Indian 
Politics", Asian Survey, April 1982, pp. 339-335. 
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and failed to reconcile competitive social interests in India. This is 
contrary to the views held by Rajni Kothari, Ram Joshi and Kirtidev Desai, 
who believe that the Janata party had a framework of policies around 
Gandhian, decentralization of power and values of liberal democracy and 
that the party provided new policy directions in Indian politics. 
ind Table 2" Position and performance of the Congress 
Year 
1952 
1957 
1962 
1967 
1971 
1977 
1980 
1984 
1989 
1991 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2004 
Total 
seats 
489 
494 
494 
520 
518 
542 
529 
514 
529 
534 
543 
543 
543 
543 
and the 'Second party' 
Congress 
Performance 
% 
of 
vote 
45.0 
47.8 
44.7 
40.8 
43.7 
34.5 
52.7 
49.1 
39.5 
36.4 
28.8 
25.8 
28.3 
26.5 
Seats 
won 
363 
371 
361 
283 
352 
154 
353 
404 
197 
244 
140 
141 
114 
145 
%of 
seats 
74.2 
75.1 
73.1 
54.4 
68.0 
28.4 
66.7 
78.6 
37.2 
45.7 
25.8 
26.0 
21.0 
26.7 
since 1952 
Relative position of the Congress compared to the 
"second" party 
Second 
party vote 
10.6(SP) 
10.4(PSP) 
lO.O(CPI) 
9.3(BJS) 
10.4(INCO) 
41.3(BLD) 
19.0(JP) 
7.7(BJP) 
17.8(JD) 
20.1(BJP) 
20.3(BJP) 
25.6(BJP) 
23.8(BJP) 
22.2(BJP) 
Diffe 
rence 
63.7 
64.7 
63.1 
45.1 
57.5 
-12.9 
47.8 
70.9 
19.5 
25.6 
5.5 
0.4 
-2.8 
4.5 
Second 
party 
seats 
16(CPI) 
27(CPI) 
29(CPI) 
44(SWA) 
25(CPM) 
295(BLD) 
41(JNPS) 
22(CPM) 
143(JD) 
120(BJP) 
161(BJP) 
182(BJP) 
182(BJP) 
138(BJP) 
DifFe 
rence 
347 
344 
332 
239 
327 
-141 
312 
382 
54 
124 
-21 
-41 
-68 
7 
% 
Of 
seats 
3.3 
5.5 
5.9 
8.5 
4.8 
54.4 
7.8 
4.3 
27.0 
22.5 
29.7 
33.5 
33.5 
25.4 
DifFe 
rence 
71.0 
69.6 
67.2 
46.0 
63.1 
-26.0 
59.0 
74.3 
10.2 
23.2 
-3.9 
-7.9 
-12.5 
1.3 
Source: Data Unit, Lokniti-CSDS, Delhi. 
Note: Actually Congress was the second party in the 11"", 12'*', and 13"" Lok 
Sabhas. BJP has greater strength than the Congress during the period. 
However, the purpose of the table is to show the performance of the Congress 
vis-a-vis other parties, BJP is shown as the second party for the 1996, 98, and 
99. 
22 C.P. Bhambhri, Janata Party: A Profile, National Publishing House, Delhi, 1980. 
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When the Janata government comes apart, the elements that had 
formed it also splintered. The result was a confusing arrays of fragmentary 
parties, many of which were little more than personal cliques presided over 
by individual politicians. In such a circumstance, the Congress appeared to 
be the only coherent national party and this image helped it to take 
advantage of the strong popular reaction against the Janata government and 
win the 1980 elections. 
James Manor has identified five factors that led to the landslide 
victory of the congress in 1984, though he conceded that the impact of first 
two factors has been probably overestimated. First, there was the sympathy 
factor after the murder of Indira Gandhi. Second, there was the failure of 
opposition parties to provide a credible alternative to the Congress. Third, 
Rajiv Gandhi Youth and lack of a political part enabled him to represent 
himself as a figure of stability and continuity, on one hand, and as a figure 
of renewal and change, on the other. Forth, there was a widespread belief 
that national unity was in danger. This fear was exacerbated in the minds of 
the people due to the assassination of Indira Gandhi and was exploited ftilly 
by the Congress. Finally, there was a related Hindu backlash that was 
encouraged by the Congress. These factors made the 1984 elections "distinct 
from most of the national and state level elections since 1972. Those earlier 
elections toned to be decided on concrete issues and, particularly, on the 
quality of the incumbent government's performance. The 1984 election was 
decided at the level of anxieties, images, evocations and symbols. '^' 
" James Manor, "Parties and the Party System", in AtuI Kohali (ed.), India's 
Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, Orient Longman, 
Hyderabad, 1991, pp. 86-87. 
'^^ Ibid., p. 87. 
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By the end of 1980, Congress rule in most of the Indian states 
become an exception rather a rule. The party machinery of the Congress 
began to decline and decay in a number of states. As a result, the opposition 
parties began to build regional bases in states where the Congress was weak. 
In some states the principal opposition in the Congress came from regional 
parties while in some cases it came from all India parties - the regional 
parties portrayed the Congress as incapable of understanding and meeting 
the social and political needs of the people of a particular region and hence 
they focused on specific local and regional problems. In a sense, these 
parties marked the "transition from traditional class politics to democratic 
politics.^^ The Telugu Desam party in Andhra Pradesh and Assam Gana 
Parishad in Assam are an example of such regional parties. In Kerala and 
West Bengal, the CPI (M) continued to play the role of dominant "regional 
party". In Kamataka and Orissa, the Janata Party and Janata Dal respectively 
- both all Indian parties with a base in these two states - emerged as the 
principal opposition parties to the Congress. In other words, the decline of 
the Congress provided space for the emergence of distinct party systems in 
the states, from one-party system to a bipolar consolidation. These changes 
which took place in the 70s and 80s laid the basis for the emergence of a 
region based multiparty system at the national level from the late 1980s. 
This is because the consolidation of bi-polarity at the state level does not 
add up to anything like a two-party system at the centre. 
The reasons for the shifts in the regional base of the Congress were 
because of charges in the social base of the party in a number of states. This 
was the result of two factors. The first was interval and arose out of Indira 
" S.N. Sadasivam, Party and Democracy in India, Tata McGraw Hill Publishers, 
New Delhi, 1977, p. 116. 
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Gandhi's attempt at centralizing all power in her hand. Mrs. Gandhi ushered 
in a "new political process" that created a pyramidal decision making 
structure in party and govemment.'^ ^ Although this prevented threats to her 
personal power, it tended to centralize decision making, weaken 
institutionalization and create an overly personalized regime. The measures 
adopted by Indira Gandhi had a long-term impact on the Congress as well as 
the larger party system. After Nehru's death power in the Congress had 
become more decentralized and factionalism had began to penetrate every 
level of the party. Indira Gandhi's centralizing tendencies further hastened 
the process. The centralization of power within the party did not mean that 
factionalism ceased to be a problem. Instead dissident factors began to 
mobilize from below to challenge the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi's nominees. 
Many Congressmen left the party and the emergence of Congress splinter 
groups in many states confirmed the organizational decline of the party. 
Charan Singh, Devi Lai, Kumbha Ram Arya, Nathu ram Mirdha, who 
formed the Lok Dal or the Congress(s) were all erstwhile Congressmen who 
walked out of the Congress to maximize their share in the government 
resources by forming political parties which could compete against the 
congress. 
The second factor that brought about charges in the social base of 
the Congress is the process of democratization and rectification in the Indian 
polity. The fiinctioning of the democratic process overtime politicized more 
and more sections of society, including dalits, tribals and other backward 
castes. These groups started questioning the dominant positions occupied by 
upper caste/class within the Congress. As a result, the congress devised 
^^  Stanley A. Kochauck, "Mrs. Gandhi's Pyramid: The New Congress", in Henry 
Hast (ed.), Indira Gandhi's India, Westview Press, Boulder, 1976, p. 104-105. 
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Strategies to give representation to these groups to gain their support. In 
Gujarat, the Congress fixed a proportion of seats to be given to the 
Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis and Muslims (KHAM). In Karnataka also 
the social base of the party shifted from the dominant Vokkaliges and 
Lingayats to the poorer and disadvantaged caste groups. However, the party, 
despite its effort to broaden its social base, began to lose the support of 
certain sections. An increasingly assertive peasantry, which had initially 
used traditional caste, kinship and patron-client links organize electoral 
support for the Congress, began to look for alternative structures and 
mechanisms through which asset its authority. While the Panchayati raj 
system was being established during the 1950s and the state and local 
bureaucracies were growing, the rural rich had opportunities to expand their 
capacities and increase their access to resources through Congress control of 
the Panchayati raj network. For same time, this could satisfy the aspirations 
of the rural rich for more power and wealth. .But with the organizational 
breakdown of the Congress, they began to mount more demands on the 
system and to organize pressures in ways not amenable to incorporation in 
the traditional bargaining networks within the Congress. This is exemplified 
by the forination of Bharatiya Karanti Dal, a party of agrarian interests, 
representing the peasant proprietors. 
From 1989 to 2004, the period since 1989 has decisively brought to 
an end the one-party dominant system of the previous era. The political 
preferences of the Indian people expressed most vividly in electoral 
behaviour are undergoing mutations, and each political party seems 
compelled to question itself constantly and reformulate its agenda. In this 
" J.R. Wood, "Congress Restored? The KHAM Strategy and Congress (I) 
Recruitment in Gujarat", in J.R. Wood (ed.). State Politics in Contemporary 
India: Crisis or Continuity, Western Press, Boulder, 1984, pp. 197-228. 
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scenario of fluidity, the declining fortune of the Congress is the most 
striking feature. Its earlier setbacks in 1967 and 1977 general elections were 
to some extent grounded on specific issues like rising prices in 1967 and the 
excesses of Emergency in 1977. What the Congress faces today is not a 
specific situation which is transient by its very nature, nor is it only 
factionalism within the Congress that has brought the party to its present 
state. There is a more significant and pervasive transition in the offing in 
which people are becoming more and more assertive of their rights. 
In the midst of continuing social and economic change and, political 
plurality in the states, India bid farewell to the Nehruvian model. The Nehru 
model contained key features like democratic socialism, non-alignment, 
planned economy, federal consensus, a pluralistic and multiethnic 
secularism and integration. During the early 1990s the convulsions 
generated by the Mandal Commission report, which decided to give 27% 
reservations to the Other Backward Castes in central government and the 
consequences of the buildup of the Ram Janam Bhoomi Babri Masjid issue 
led to the demise of the Nehru model. It is no accident that the liberalization, 
Mandal and Mandir issue exploded upon the secure at the same time, for 
they are closely related aspects of the same political and social process. All 
three issues emerged out of the breakdown of the Nehruvian vision. Of the 
Nehruvian legacy - democracy, secularism, socialism and non-alignment the 
first alone remain intact. 
The 1989 results were an ambiguous judgment against the dynastic 
rule and the results "reflected a call for change". The voter adjudged the 
Congress (I) to be incapable and inadequate, but did not give enough 
strength to the National Front or the Janata Dal. That is why we had at the 
centre a minority government which was pushed this way and that -
sometimes towards the communists and sometimes towards the BJP. Better 
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known as the "crutch government", the National Front managed to bring the 
two perennial foes of Indian politics - the BJP and the Left to support it 
"from outside", neither of the two supporters could afford to share in 
governmental power as it would have been disastrous to their images. The 
issue of two foes supporting the National front was explained by the same 
logic. The Congress (I) had to be kept at bay by any means. The urgency of 
preventing the Congress (I) from forming a coalition government was 
perhaps an important, but by no means exclusive, factor in the formation of 
the crutch government. Another was the opportunity for the BJP and the left 
to "use" the minority government.^ * 
For the BJP, it was time to play a waiting game, its leadership 
beginning to believe that, with the sharing of power, directly or indirectly, in 
six states and, of course, at the national level, the party's chances had never 
been better. It was the firm conviction of the BJP that it could form a 
government at the centre after the next parliamentary elections if it could 
take advantage of the dissension within the National Front, the limited 
political influence of the Left, the conftased state of affairs in the Congress 
(I) and most important of all, the rising militant Hinduism, support from the 
left, however, was based on short-term strategy. Its leaders realized that left 
support was vital to make the National Front stronger than its numerical 
strength in Parliament suggested. By a stretch of imagination, the left had no 
chances of making it to Delhi on its own. However, the prevailing 
circumstances put it in a better bargaining position and the BJP found it 
prudent to reap as many benefits as possible by supporting the government. 
On his part, Singh resorted to his "method of conflict management" to play 
*^ Rajni Kothari, "End of the Nehru Model", The Times of India, New Delhi, 
January 29, 1991, p. 3. 
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with the various complexities, and contradictions of the opposition camp. 
The mutual antipathy of the "crutch", the interests involved in their support 
for the National Front, common hatred of the Congress (I) and Singh's own 
image as "the man of the moment" made up the jigsaw puzzle. Like a 
juggler, he finally found a solution in the National Front government which, 
needless to say, benefited him the most. 
In precise terms, what it means is that the National front derived its 
legitimacy from the fact of being a centrist political formation made of 
diverse forces (including most regional parties) and upholding the principle 
of national consensus. The Congress (I) leadership transgressed the 
permissible limits of political assertion. It caused the breakdown of national 
consensus which had been its principal achievement. The National Front had 
acquired the lead position as a centrist political formation to make up for the 
default of this role by the Congress (I). 
What followed as an outcome of this model was the decline of V.P. 
Singh Janata Dal was a party of casting personalities that included Chandra 
Shekhar, himself a claimant for the prime ministership, a bitterly 
disappointed one-one excluded even from the cabinet. Another contender for 
power, Devi Lai, struck a last minister deal with Singh and became Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Agriculture. Similarly, the Chautal issue, 
Mandal issue, Mandir issue, withdrawal of the BJP support, split in the 
Janata Dal were factors which were responsible for V.P. Singh's failure. 
Finally, he lost the vote of confidence and submitted his resignation. 
In 1990 President R. Venkataraman invited Rajiv Gandhi, the 
Leader of the largest party in the Lower house, to form a government. As 
expected Gandhi decided to give preference to the building of his party's 
strength for an election at a time of his own choosing and gave his support 
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to Chandra Shekhar. Chandra Shekhar took over the reins of government 
with Congress support from outside. 
On 5 March, 1991 the Congress(I) withdraw its support. Chandra 
Shekhar resigned and advised the President to call for elections. The entire 
country was aghast at the sorry state of affairs, watching the machinations of 
various parties new and old in search of a fresh mandate with utter dismay. 
Various aspirants to seats of power and prosperity were scampering like 
rates from one party to another. There was no sense of dignity and self-
respect. 
In that climate of unprincipled jogging for power, all the parties 
were trying to be everything to different sections of society. The Congress 
did not make its stand clear on the Babri Masjid issue. It did not favour 
Babri Masjid's demolition but at the same raised no objection to building to 
Ram Mandir at the disputed side. On the Mandal issue also, it showed 
reluctance in rejecting it outright. The BJP, on the other hand, expressed its 
desire to shift the Babri Masjid from the disputed side as against its earlier 
adamant stand of its total demolition. The Janata Dal was extremely 
vociferous over the mandal and protection of minority rights. 
Then a midterm election was held. But the mid-term election in 
• 1991 again brought about a Hung Parliament 1991 was symbolic of the flux 
in India politics. Nothing could be said with any degree of certainty on what 
the votes really desired. The Congress (I) was not given the status it 
deserved for being given an absolute majority. Nor was the BJP treated with 
the kind of respect it deserved - assuming the role of a ruling party. The 
Congress continued to be the largest party in Lok Sabha though its strength 
was reduced. The BJP, in contest, emerged as a rising crescendo gaining its 
previous strength. The left and the National Front were the worst suffers and 
the SJP was virtually wiped out as a flash in the pan. 
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The outcome of the 1991 elections can be seen as the emergence of 
the Congress as marginally the single largest party mainly owing to the 
sympathy factor. Secondly, the rising crescendo of the BJP was due to 
positive votes on the Ram Mandir issue and anticorruption race. Thirdly, the 
left faced redundancy due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
poverty of their ideology. Fourthly, the performance of the Nation Front was 
the worst due to its sectional appeal and flirtation with fundamentalist 
Muslims. Lastly, there was the growth of regional parties and their 
interaction with the parties at the national level. As told, the cumulative 
effects of these factors were perceived as likely polarization and increased 
articulation of the new constellation of forces in the changing Indian 
political spectrum. 
The 1996 Lok Sabha elections witnessed the emergence of the BJP 
as the largest single party in another hung Parliament, followed by the 
congress and the Janata Dal - in that order. A United Front of over a dozen 
non BJP and non-Congress parties was formed after the elections which 
formed a minority government led by H.D. Deva Gowda (JD) in the trial of 
the failure of the two weak BJP minority government led by Vajpayee to 
gain parliamentary floor. The United Front minority government included, 
among others - AGP, TDP, DMK and TMC that split from the Congress just 
before the elections when the national leadership decided to resume the 
party's alliance with All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagan by Chief 
Minister Jayalalita after a period of strained relationship between the two 
parties in disregard of overwhelmingly express opposition of the Tamil 
Nadu unit of the Congress. The four regional parties promptly formed a 
federal front with in the United Front. One more regional Party, the National 
Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, also subsequently joined Front 
Government after elections in the state and resumption of political processes 
after the decade long terrorist violence. The Congress and CPI (M) extended 
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parliamentary support to United Front Minority government without joining 
the cabinet. 
In the spring of 1995 the Congress appeared to be keen to replace 
the United Front government by a government of its own, in coalition with 
different set of more likeable allies. Having failed in the gambit, it sought a 
face saving device in dictating the change in the leadership of the United 
Front from H.D. Deva Gowda to I.K.Gujral (both from the Janata Dal) on 
the plea of the insensibility of the former to the interests and perceptions of 
the Congress. The fate of the United Front again hanged in balance in 
November 1997 in the wake of the leaked Jain Commission inquiry interim 
report on Rajiv Gandhi's assassination with the Congress insisting on the 
removal of the indicated DMK from the front while the Front itself abiding 
by the ruling party in Tamil Nadu. Gujral finally resigned in November-
end. 
The formation of alliances and coalition governments at the 
National and state level ushered in a new phase in party competition and 
cooperation. The 1998 midterm Lok Sabha elections took place in the 
backdrop of continuing government, instability and the trend of party system 
fragmentation. 
The BJP seemed to be less affected by fragmentation and had at 
belatedly succeeded in forging new alliances and seat sharing arrangement 
with parties like the AIDMK in Tamil Nadu, Lok Shakti in Kamataka, the 
Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, the TDP (Laxmi Parvathi) in Andhra 
Pradesh, the Biju Janata Dal in Orrissa, and the Lok Tantrik Congress in UP, 
in addition to its established alliance partners like the Shiv Sena in 
Maharashtra the Akali Dal in Punjab, the HVP in Harayana and Samata 
Party in Bihar. However, the kind of ideological compatibility that exists 
between the BJP and the Shiva Sena is not likely to be replicated in other 
cases, the notable example being that of the Samata Party which has gone on 
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record expressing its reservations against the BJP's alliance with the 
AIADMK in view of the corruption tinted image of Jayalalitha and also its 
proposal for the uniform Civil Code, Article 370 and the construction of the 
Ram temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya. 
Jayalalaitha dramatically withdraw her party's support from the 
coalition government on April 17, 1999 after months of lobbying for the 
reinstatement of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat earlier sacked by the Government 
for allegedly showing signs of defying the principle of cabinet control of 
armed forces. Her real grudge however was the reluctance of the 
Government to slow down judicial proceedings against her in corruption 
related cases. 
The 1999 mid-term elections were held after a day of few months 
due to the Kargil war during which the Vajpayee Government continued in 
the care-taker capacity. The electoral campaign as well as the outcome of 
the 1999 elections marked the continuity with federal coalitional governance 
within the framework of a multi-party system. There was some trend 
towards bipolar concentration of political forces between, the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the BJP and the Congress led alliance. 
The third force was greatly reduced in its importance due to fragmentation 
and decimation of the Janata Dal. 
On the eve of elections the Congress suffered a major split that 
resulted in the formation of the National Congress Party (NCP) led by 
Sharad Pawar, P.A. Sangma and Tariq Anwar. A belated attempt to unite the 
Third Force was made by NCP and Samajwati Party led by Mulayam Singh 
Yadav. Pawar and Yadav, besides bringing their parties closer, also tried to 
form a common front with some other likeminded parties including the left 
and RJF. However, this effort of reviving a Third Front of non-BJP and non-
Congress parties did not fructify. The electoral outcome in 1999 again 
brought the BJP led NDA to power. 
Tables'" Election in India, 2004 \ .^ . 
Lok Sabha : 20 and 26 April and 5 and 10 May 2004 (^7^%) 
Main Political Parties 
National Democratic Alliance 
- Bhartiya Janata Party 
- Telugu Desam 
- All India Ann Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
- Janta Dal (United) 
- Shiva Sena 
- All India Trinamool Congress 
- Shiromani Akali Dal 
- Biju Janta Dal 
- Nagaland People's Front 
- Mizo National Front 
United Progressive Alliance 
- Indian National Congress 
- Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
- Nationalist Congress Party 
- Rashtriya Janata Dal 
- Telengana Rashtra Samithi 
- Pattali Makkal Katchi 
- Lok Jan shakti Party 
- Jharkand Mukti Morcha 
- Marumalarchi Dravida 
Muslim League Kerala State 
Committee 
- Republican Party of India (A) 
Jammu and Kashmir People's 
Democratic Party 
Left Front 
- Communist Party of India-Marxist 
- Communist Party of India 
- Revolutionary Socialist Party 
- All India Forward Bloc 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Samajwadi Party 
Janata Dal (Secular) 
Rashtriya Lok Dal 
Asam Gana Parishad 
Jammu & Kashmir National 
Conference 
AH India Majlis-e-Ittahadul Muslim 
Kerala Congress 
National Loktantrik Party 
Samajwadi Janata Party (R) 
Indian Federal Democratic Party 
Bharatiya Navshakti Party 
Sikkim Democratic Front 
Non-partisans 
Nominated members 
Abbreviation 
NDA 
BJP 
TDP 
ADMK 
JD(U) 
SHS 
AITL 
SAD 
BJD 
NPF 
MNP 
UPA 
INC 
DMK 
NCD 
RJD 
TRS 
PMK 
LJSP 
JMM 
MUL 
RPl(A) 
JKPDP 
LF 
CPI-M 
CPI 
RSP 
AIFB 
BSP 
SP 
JD(S) 
RLD 
AGP 
JKNL 
AIMIM 
KEC 
NLP 
SJP (R) 
IFDP 
BNP 
SDF 
LJSP 
-
Percentage 
35.3 
22.2 
3.2 
2.3 
2.0 
1.9 
1.7 
1.0 
0.9 
0.2 
0.1 
34.6 
26.8 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
7.6 
5.5 
1.4 
0.5 
0.2 
5.1 
4.3 
1.5 
0.6 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
4.2 
-
^NQ.dafj§ats^' 
184 
138 
5 
-
7 
12 
2 
8 
11 
I 
1 
217 
145 
16 
9 
21 
5 
6 
3 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
59 
43 
10 
3 
3 
19 
^d 
4 
3 
2 
2 
0 
4 
2 
Source: http:/www.electionworld.org/India 
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The NDA Government included as many as 24 parties when it was 
first formed, although about half a dozen parties subsequently deserted it at 
various points in time. This did not affect the Government. The Congress led 
UPA that emerged as the single largest formation in 2004 elections included 
15 parties in its cabinet coalition, in addition to four Left parties. The 
coalition partners of the UPA included INC, RJD, DMK, NCP, PMK, TRS, 
JMM, LJSP, MDMK, AIMIM, PDP, lUML, RPI (A), RPI (G) and KC (I). 
The Left parties were the CPI, CPM, RSP and AIFB. 
Sum up, developments of the past one and a half decade indicate 
that coalition phenomenon is gaining ground in Indian polity. However, 
scholars and political observers have expressed skepticism about their 
stability, viability and Govemability at the National level. Owing to these 
determined traits, the phenomenon of coalition seems unhealthy for a quasi-
federal struclure as in vogue in India. Though this phenomenon helps the 
states to fulfill their aspirations of autonomy yet the vital issues like unity, 
national security etc. are prone to get adversely affected if the Centre is 
weakened. Coalition is equally injurious to economic reforms and 
development. However, it ought not to be forgotten that political 
environment in India is dictated by factors like caste, community, religion, 
region, language, creed, personality and charisma. Besides, India's vast 
geographic size, socio-cultural diversity and multiple problems facing the 
polity have cumulatively thwarted the growth of a healthy two party system. 
Consequently, there is a strong possibility that bipolar coalition system 
becomes a long term feature of India politics. 
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE 
The electoral process involves much more than periodic acts of 
voting and competition among polifical parties for forming the government. 
It involves also some enduring rules and structures which must ensure 
57 
procedural certainty. Procedural certainty may then be regarded the 
principle of uncertainty of electoral outcome. Thus electoral governance, 
comprising of a set of related activities including, the making, 
implementation, and adjudication of rules which determine the framework 
within which the uncertainty of electoral outcomes unfold, forms an 
important aspect of understanding and comparing principles of equality and 
democratic participation in different political and socio-historical context. 
These are analysis of major areas of electoral problems and political 
disfunctionalities: 
Role of Money in elections 
Money and muscle power have dominated the elections in India. 
Muscle power itself is largely dependent on the monetary clout of a 
candidate. Thus, the root cause of a large number of ills can be traced to 
money power as money festos' as picturesquely described by V.P. Singh, 
S.L. Shakdhar, former CEC, had also highlighted the danger of 'captive 
politics' on the analogy of the saying he who pays the piper, calls the tune. 
Funding of political parties by business and industry has always been 
a hush-hush affair. Almost all such transactions are in black money and 
cash. Against this background, it is interesting to note the proposal of Tata 
Sons to set up an electoral fund for donations to political parties. The 
objective is to make political contributions in a manner that is transparent, 
on-discriminatory and non-discretionary in order to create a donation where 
business and industry can be carried on more economically and efficiently. 
The money would be distributed in two phases. In the first phase two parties 
^' See Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler, "The Comparative Study of Electoral 
Governance-Introduction", International Political Science Review, Vol. XXIII, No. I, 
pp.5-27. 
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(no individual contributions) which hold more than 5 per cent of seats at the 
start of elections. In the second phase, two parties which secure more than 5 
per cent seat. Up to 5 per cent of each company's average net profits during 
the preceding three previous years will be disbursed in this manner. 
It is widely recognized that the huge sum of money required to fight 
elections is the root cause of political corruption. Due to vast geographical 
area of a constituency, with almost a million voters, a candidate has to 
spend huge money to contest the elections. A good part of this money 
comes from the business houses who expect quid pro quo in the form of 
opportunities to make black money and other favours. At present an elected 
representative is to remove from the people and this creates the space and 
scope for using both money and muscle power. A candidate is forced to 
purchase votes through a host of intermediary brokers debasing the whole 
system. 
The nexus between black money and election spending has been 
established at least since 'the early 1970s, if not even earlier. One of the 
recommendations of the Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (Wanchoo 
Committee) Report, received in 1971, was the demonetisation of high value 
currency notes. When the then Union Finance Minister, Y.B. Chavan, went 
to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to seek her approval for implementing the 
recommendation, she asked Chavan only one question: Chavanji, are no 
more elections to be fought by the Congress Party? Chavan got the message 
and the recommendation was shelved.^ " 
The National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, in its report. 
Aspects of Black Money in India, has shown the influence and role of black 
°^ Madhav Godbole, Unfinished Innings - Recollections and Reflections of a Civil 
Servant, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 87-88 
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money in the Indian political system. '^ The ridiculously low ceilings on 
maximum permissible expenditure by a candidate, laid down from time to 
time (currently Rs. 15 lakh for Parliament and Rs. 6 lack for an Assembly 
election), are observed more in the breach. A newly elected legislator begins 
his tenure by knowingly and willfully filing a false affidavit that the 
expenditure incurred by him does not exceed the ceiling land down by law. 
In its judgement in Gadak Y.K. vs. Balasaheb Vikhe Patil in November 
1993, the Supreme Court observed that the 'prescription of ceiling on 
expenditure by a candidate is mere eyewash and there is no practical check 
on election expenses for which it was enacted to attain a meaningful 
democracy. This provision has ceased to be even a fig leaf to hide the 
reality. There is no ceiling on the expenditure which a party may incurs on 
its candidates. 
Huge unaccounted expenditure by candidates is perhaps the most 
serious issue in any programme of electoral reforms. The estimates of such 
expenditure vary from constituency. The election and the prestige attached 
to winning the seat. But, leaving aside these exceptional cases, the average 
expenditure of a serious candidate for a Parliament election in 1999 was 
estimated at Rs. 2-3 crore. According to another estimate, it was Rs. 1.3 
crore in the 1998 elections. Where does this money come from? Partly, it 
comes from the candidate, his friends, supporters and well-wishers. But, a 
big chunk of it comes from the political party which sponsors him. 
Therefore, it is necessary to go into the question of financing of not only the 
candidates but more importantly, of the political parties. 
Let us first take the question of foreign money. The issue was first 
raised on Parliament as far back as 1968. Chitta Basu, in a discussion during 
N. Shanker Acharya, Aspects of the Black Economy in India, National Institute of 
Public Finance and Policy, 1986. 
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the question hour in Rajya Sabha, had referred to a news item from The 
New York Times published in The Economic Times. Of 14 June 1967, the 
US Central Intelligence Agency had given substantial sums of money to 
right wing parties and candidates. The government had admitted that the 
Intelligence Bureau had been asked to prepare a report on the use of foreign 
money in the general elections held in 1967. 
The question of foreign money come up again on 12 April 1979 
when Kanwar Lai Gupta raised the matter regarding reported disclosure 
made by former US Ambassador about Indira Gandhi having received US 
money. The matter came up for detailed discussion in the House in May 
1979. The reference was to certain disclosures by Moynihan in his book A 
Dangerous Place. 
A reference must be made to an unstarred Question No. 1523 tabled 
by Jyotirmoy Bosu in Lok Sabha regarding the statement of former Prime 
Minister, Charan Singh, on withdrawal of huge sums by Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi from a Swiss bank for elections in 1980. As was to be 
expected, the then Finance Minister, R. Venkataraman, denied the 
allegation. However, the remaining part of his written reply was more 
significant. He said: 'The policy of the present government is not to collect 
any information about expenses incurred by any of the political parties for 
contesting elections or sources from which they have financed such 
expenditure'. It can be seen how far the Indira Gandhi government had 
traveled between 1968 and 1980 on the funding of elections in the country. 
The Government had decided to close its eyes to the problem and had 
become totally oblivious to the hazardous legacy it was leaving behind for 
the country. 
It was shocking to see that the same nonchalant attitude to this 
grave problem continued in the I.K. Gujral government in the case 
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pertaining to the donation of Rs. 3.75 crore received by the Congress Party 
from abroad, during the term of Sitaram Kesari as the party treasurer, 
between 1993 and 1995. Additional solicitor general of India, Abhishek 
Manu Sanghvi, told the Delhi High Court, in public interest litigation, that 
the central government had not taken any final decision on the applicability 
of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) in this case.^ ^ This was 
in spite of the explicit provision in Section 4(i) of FCRA. In fact, later, in 
the affidavit filed by the government it asserted that donation received by 
the Congress Party from abroad were legal. What is surprising is the opinion 
of three former chief justice of India. All these say these donations do not 
fall under the FCR. The much touted FCRA has been a dead letter in so far 
as funding of political parties from abroad is concerned. This weapon of 
FCRA has been used almost exclusively by the Centre against academic 
institutions and NGOs in the name of their compromising the independence 
and integrity of the country. 
It may be relevant in this context to refer to what S.P. Hinduja, one 
of the richest Indian businessman in the world, had to say on this subject. 
He has disclosed that Indian politicians collecting money abroad, ostensibly 
for party funds, were stashing away large portions of it in foreign banks for 
their personal use - even way back in the early 1970s, the economy had to 
be drained of as much as Rs. 250 crore to provide just one-tenth of that 
amount for the elections. Almost 25 years later, perhaps, even our richest 
businessmen are finding it difficult to generate enough black money to feed 
the insatiable hunger of our politicians.^ '* It is not surprising that successive 
governments at the Centre, belonging to almost all major political parties, 
^^  The Indian Express, 30 July 1997 
" The Indian Express, 2 August 1997 
^* The Economic Times, 8 February 1996. 
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are reluctant to go deeper into the funding of elections. Even way back in 
1972, the joint committee on amendments to electoral law had come to the 
conclusion: 'The committee have also considered the recommendations 
made by the EC in their reports to the effect that the political parties might 
also called upon to account for the expenses incurred by them for the 
election campaign of their candidates. After careful scrutiny, the committee 
has come to the conclusion that due to various practical difficulties, it is not 
possible to pursue such a course. 
At the heart of the matter is the maintenance and audit of accounts 
of the political parties. The present situation in almost all parties is best 
described by a popular saying concerning the Congress party during the 
long tenure of Sitaram Kesri as its treasurer. It used to be said, No Khata No 
bahi, jo Kesri Kahe wahi sahi (there is neither any ledger nor any notebook, 
what kesri says alone is true). 
It is interesting to see that in spite of explicit provisions of the 
Indian Income Tax Act, the Income Tax Department did not take any action 
against political parties for the infringement of the provisions of the Act. 
Finally, common cause, an NGO in Delhi, field a PIL in the Supreme Court. 
As it came to light in the context of this writ petition, the Income Tax 
Department had noted on the relevant file on 31 March 1993 that, it is 
hereby assumed that they (the political parties) do not have any income to 
declare; accordingly the proceedings are hereby dropped! 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court decision on the above PIL was a 
major step forward in the crusade for a clean public life. The Court, inter 
alia, decides as under: 
' ' Lok Sabha Secretariat, Joint Committee on Amendments to Electoral Law, Part 1, 
Government of India, New Delhi, January 1972, p. 65. 
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> That the political parties are under a statutory obligation to file 
return of income in respect of each assessment year in 
accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The 
political parties... who have not been filing returns of income 
for several years have prima facie violated the statutory 
provisions of the Income Tax Act. 
> That the income tax authorities have been wholly remiss in the 
performance of their statutory duties under law. The said 
authorities have for a long period of failed to take appropriate 
action against the defaulter political parties. 
> A political party which is not maintaining audited and 
authenticated accounts and has not filed the return of income for 
the relevant period, cannot, ordinarily, be permitted to say that it 
has incurred or authorized expenditure in connection with the 
election of its candidates in terms of Explanation 1 to section 77 
oftheRPA. 
Such is the state of governance in the country, so insensitive are the 
political parties to public opinion and such is the utter disregard for the 
explicit orders of the highest court that Common Cause had to file yet 
another petition in the Supreme Court to get the previous orders of the Court 
on maintenance of accounts by political parties implemented expeditiously. 
During the hearing of this petition it came to light that, 'except one party, 
all others had declared 'nil' return. They were seeking to convince the court 
that without any income. They were able to manage the party affairs. Not a 
small achievement!^^ 
*^ The Times of India, 12 January 1999. 
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At long last, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), more out of 
fear of being hauled up before the court for contempt action than any 
genuine respect for law, has issued orders for compulsory scrutiny of all 
pending and forthcoming returns filed by political parties. It has also 
decided that assessments should be made only after an in-depth study of 
'in 
returns under section 143(3). It remains to be seen how effective the 
implementation of these order is. 
Understandably, while larger parties broadly supported the proposal, 
the small parties and communist parties scoffed at the idea. The Communist 
Party of India (Maxist) (CPM), in fact, returned the donation sent by the 
Tata Electoral Tnist. Most other industries and business houses were cool to 
the suggestion. 
The successive report on this critical issue during the last three 
decades have failed to grasp that what is at stake is not just the purity and 
integrity of elections, but, more importantly, combating the evil of black 
money, improving the credibility of democracy and cleansing public life of 
the cancer of corruption. 
Criminalization of Politics 
Criminalization of politics and politicization of criminals has 
become a shocking reality of national life. Criminals are no longer satisfied 
with supporting certain candidates in elections. They now aspire to occupy 
the seats of power themselves. Some have even floated their own political 
parties. For example Arun Gawli, a dreaded crime lord, has floated his own 
political party by the name of Akhil Bharatiya Sena. 
The criminalisation of politics means the overt and covert use of foul 
and unfair means for securing victory at the hustings. This also means 
" The Economic Times, 27 August, 1999. 
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taking help of muscle power in the election. Another aspect of this 
criminalization of politics is involvement of plaint officials in poll riggings. 
This is secured through the use of transfer and posting of the officials. 
So far as politicization of crime is concerned it means patronage and 
protection by political masters to crimes and criminals in lieu of services 
rendered by the latter to the former in the furtherance of their political 
ambitions. So it involves the competitive use of anti-social forces for the 
mobilization of party funds, for the management and manipulation of 
elections, for organizing meetings and conferences, and even for the 
elimination of political opponents. 
The patronage and protection by political masters to anti-social and 
hood hum is extended by way of thwarting legal processes and also by way 
of granting licenses, permits, and various contracts etc. to them. It is here 
we find a thin line of divide in the realm of legal from illegal. All types of 
intrigues, gimmickries, manoeurings, and manipulations have become the 
norms in the game of power. It is here that good governance has become the 
worst victim. 
The most important element in criminalization of politics is that a 
good member of gang leaders and criminals of all hues, who were 
previously helping their mentor in the elections, now managed themselves 
to enter the legislatures either as an independent or on party ticket, and 
usurped social acceptability. So politics remains no longer decent 
professions as notorious criminal, history sheeters, smugglers, murderers, 
mafias, and terrorist are swarming in politics, they are prowling in search of 
prey and plunder. Formerly, they were on the periphery of Indian political 
life; now they have moved considerably towards the centre to manipulate 
the gears and levers of political manners. The Election Commissioner gave 
the figures that there are some serious charges against at least 40 members 
of the last Lok Sabha and about 700 of the over 4,000 M.L.As are history 
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sheeters or have been charge sheeted in criminal cases. Out of 13952 
candidates for Lok Sabha election 1996 nearly 1500 candidates were having 
criminal records. Criminals have also made in-roads in all political parties, 
whether at the national or regional level. 
Criminal-politician nexus is a vicious circle. Criminal and disgruntled 
elements, backed by money power, unite to see the politician get through 
the election and benefit throughout his elected tenure. The politician thus 
indulges in amassing wealth for himself and money power for coming 
electwns. He helps the criminals to enact their drama by creating a suitable 
socio-political and bureaucratic infrastructure. In this process, all well 
meaning norms get goodbye and a team of incompetent, corrupt and 
purchasable officials are brought up to the front. 
Winnability has become the sole criterion for selection of candidates 
by political parties.^^ Such is the level of cynicism on this subject that Bal 
Thackeray, Shiv Sena Chief, when asked by news reporters about a large 
number of criminals getting Shiv Sena tickets in the elections, had the 
temerity to say that these persons were political activists and if they were to 
be called criminals then Gandhi and Nehru would also have to be called 
criminals. A Kamataka MLA is facing charges of rape and extortion, he had 
contested the 1999 state Assembly elections from prison.'*^ 
But, it will be wrong to blame only the political parties. Criminals 
have often fought election as independent candidates and people have voted 
for them with open eyes. Pappu Yadav, who is facing a murder charge. 
38 
39 
40 
Gopal Prasad Singh, "Good Governance as Role of Bureaucracy; An Indian 
Experience", in M.D. Dharamdasani(ed.), Multi-Party Democracy in South Asia, 
Anmol Publication, New Delhi, 2001, p. 88-89. 
The Times of India, 18 April 1997 
Loksatta, 7 November 1999. 
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fought the Lok Sabha poll in 1999 as an independent candidate from Purnia 
jail and managed to get 66.3 per cent votes which were the highest in the 
state of Bihar.'*' The fact that Yadav was elected with a lead of over 2 lakh 
votes shows that the influence of caste continues to dominate in Bihar, as in 
several other parts of the country. For once, Bal Thackeray is right when he 
says, in India, people do not cast their vote, they vote their caste"*^  
There has been yet the growing menace of criminal elements entering 
the political arena. In 2004 Parliamentary election in U.P., 71 candidates 
had cases pending against them and 21 made it to the Parliament.'' Mitra 
Sen yadav, BSP Member of Parliament, has more than 3 dozen cases 
registered against him and he had been granted pardon by President of India 
in one of the murder case. Brij Bhusan Sharan won the election from 
Balrampur (UP) on BJP ticket despite cases against him under TADA and 
section 302 of IPC. In Bihar, Prabhunath Singh, Suraj Bhan Singh, Anuradh 
Prasad (Sadhu Yadav), Taslimuddin, Pappu Yadav and many others who 
have serious crime records have made it to the parliament and few of them 
were appointed ministers. 
In this way, it was felt that if the situation is allowed to deteriorate, 
voters are not men of character and proper leadership qualities. This 
41 
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The Times of India, 6 November, 1999. 
Outlook, 8 November 1999. 
Those who made it to the Parliament based on affidavit filed by candidate party 
wise: 
NDA - 37; 
BJP - 26, SS - 4, JD(U) - 2, BJP - 1 
UPA-37 
Congress - 16, RJD - 10, JMM - 3, NCP - 5, DMK - 2, LTSP -1 
Left-19 
CPI (M) - 5, CPI - 2, AIFB - 1 
Others- 19 
SP-11 , BSP-7 
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obviously affects governance. If this continues, democracy will lose its 
significance. A fractured electoral system certainly erodes the faith of 
people in democracy and alienates him from the process of decision-making 
and provides opportunity to criminal to rule. In July 1993, the Government 
of India established a committee at the administrative level headed by the 
then Home Secretary, N.N.Vohra " to take stock of all available information 
about the activities of crime-syndicate/mafia organizations which had 
developed links with and were being protected by government functionaries 
and political personalities."'*'' The Report submitted in October 1993 made 
the following sinister submissions among others: "Central Bureau of 
Investigation has report that all over India crime syndicates have become a 
law unto themselves... The nexus between the criminal gangs, police, 
bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the 
country. The existing criminal justice system which was essentially 
designed to deal with the individual offences/ crimes is unable to deal in the 
activities of the mafia." There is evidently little follow-up action on the 
report notwithstanding the Supreme Court directive to the government to 
report what steps have been taken to implement its recommendations. 
First- Past-The-Post System and Representation 
Indian electoral system is 'first-past-the-post' which takes place on a 
categorical ballot in single-member constituencies. It enables the candidate 
who gets the most votes (need not be majority of total votes polled) to win 
an election in a multi-cornered contest. This results, at times, in the victory 
of a candidate with a minority (less than 50% of voters polled) of votes. At 
the national level, it leads to disproportionatlity between the percentage of 
votes polled by political parties and number of seats won by parties. 
44 Ministry of Home Affairs, Vohra Committee Report, Government of India, 1993, p. 1. 
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The Law Commission took note of the fact that the FPTP system 
prevailing in our country had given rise to several inequities and distortions 
in our electoral process particularly on account of the multiplicity of the 
political parties. There are certain States in India where there are three or 
four recognised political parties, more or less evenly balanced. In such a 
situation what is happening is that the winning candidate is receiving, in 
many cases, 30 per cent or less of the valid votes cast. The remaining 70 per 
cent or more votes polled (cast in favour of the defeated candidates 
including independents) are practically going waste, without representation, 
and without a voice in the representative bodies, namely, Parliament and the 
State Legislatures. It was thought advisable to provide a voice and a 
representation to the wasted votes, which indeed very often constituted a 
majority of the total votes cast. 
In the general elections of 1952, 1957 and 1962 the Congress party 
had bagged 75% of seats each in Lok Sabha with 45%, 48%, and 45%of 
votes respectively. In 1967 and 1971 the Congress has won 54% and 68% of 
total seats with a vote share of 40% and 44% respectively. The case is 
repeated in 1977 when Janata Party got 55% of seats with 43% of votes. 
When the Congress Party returned to power in 1980, it got 67% of seats 
with 43% of votes. Even when Rajiv Gandhi led the Congress party to its 
best ever performance in 1984, it got only 48% of votes but mustered a huge 
share of seats (77%). Since then no political party could get an absolute 
majority on its own, but the disproportionality between vote share and seat 
share continued. 
This being a serious flow of the Indian electoral system, majority of 
Indian voters lives with a feeling that they are not represented in the 
parliament. The system does not take care to see that the minority (social 
and political) groups, women and other marginalized sections are 
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adequately represented in the legislature. This badly affects the quality of 
representation in Indian democracy. 
It is more evident from the following tables which describe the 
percentage of voter support that the elected MPs got in the 2004 general 
elections at the national level. It is astonishing to see that there are MPs who 
got elected with the support of less than 30% of the total votes polled. As 
many as 322 out of 539 newly elected MPs have been returned with less 
than 50% of the voter support. It indicates that nearly 60% of the Lok Sabha 
does not represent the majority in their respective constituencies. 
Table-4"'; Votes polled by winners as percentage of voters 
in the Lok Sabha elections 2004 at the national level 
Groups 
Below 20% 
21%-30% 
31%-40% 
4I%-50% 
51%-60% 
61%-70% 
Above 71% 
Total 
No. of winners 
00 
16 
93 
213 
175 
36 
03 
539 
Source: Election Commission of India- General Elections, 2004 (M'** Lok Sabha) 
When we take the case of the total population, the situation is still 
worse. There are two MPs who have won with the support of less than 10% 
of the total electorate while there are 91 MPs who are returned with 11 % to 
20% support. This table indicates that only six MPs in the 14'^  Lok Sabha 
have got the endorsement from more than 50% of their respective 
electorates. This is the plight of Indian parliamentary democracy. 
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rth. Table-5 : Votes polled by winners as percentage of electors 
in the Lok Sabha elections 2004 at the national level. 
Groups 
Below 10% 
ll%-20% 
21%-30% 
31%-40% 
41%-50% 
51%-60% 
61%-70% 
Above 71% 
Total 
No. of winners 
02 
91 
219 
185 
36 
04 
02 
00 
539 
th Source: Election Commission of India- General Elections, 2004 (14 Lok Sabha) 
The perceived drawbacks of the present electoral system necessarily 
need to be corrected. 
Defections and Anti Defection Laws 
Defection may be generally defined as a abandonment of loyalty, 
duty or principle, or of one's leader or cause. In parliamentary political life, 
the term has come to connote change of party affiliation or allegiance by the 
member of legislature.'*^ It is not only in India. It is widespread across the 
world. Older established democracies like the USA, Britain and Canada etc. 
are not immune to the phenomenon of defection. The new democracies like 
the practice of floor-crossing. In India, during the heydays of the Nehruvian 
one-party dominant congress system. The politics defection was at best a 
non-issue. But the 1967 elections not only signaled the beginning of the end 
Subhash C. Kashyap, Anti-Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges, Universal 
Law Publishing, Delhi, 2003, p. 1. 
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of Congress South Africa are also struggling with the issue of defection and 
trying to curb hegemony but also the arrival of new actors and new norms of 
politics notorious known as "Aya Ram Gaya Ram" especially during 1967-
1974. In March 1968, under the Chairmanship of Y.B. Chavan, the then 
Union Home Minister, a parliamentary committee was formed to tackle the 
problem of defection and instability of government. The Chavan Committee 
was an all party committee. Pandit Hridya Nath Kunzru and Jay Prakash 
Narayan being the only non-party members. 
JP joined the committee because he was increasingly getting 
worried about the pernicious effects defection had brought on to political 
ethics and the democratic process in India. He called defection as "the new 
evil" that could ruin the political system, destroy the stability of 
government, and damage the character of the people's representative. On the 
whole, the evil, JP thought, was so serious that it could erode "the equality 
and substance of the democracy". JP suggested a drastic remedy; to 
disqualify the defectors from the legislatures concerned and then seek a new 
mandate from the voters. Reflecting on the coalition governments between 
1969 and 1972, JP wrote: 
Party labels and ideologies lost all meanings and brisk 
market flourished in which legislators were sold and bought 
as cattle. Money or minister ship was the main baits and the 
highest bidder ultimately won.^*^ 
He appreciated the arrival of the "vernacular political elite with clay 
feet" but also blamed the entire political class or having played footloose 
with the game called "defection". Seeing the harm done by defection, JP 
favoured a law or even a constitutional amendment to check the increasing 
^ Verinder Grover, Political Thinkers of Modern India, Jay Prakash Narayan, Deep 
& Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1990, vol. IX, pp. 304-5. 
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degradation of political life. On the basis of the recommendation of the 
Chavan Committee, the Congress Government introduced a constitution 
amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha on May 16, 1973. The Bill could not pass 
because the Lok Sabha was dissolved soon. JP criticized the Congress and 
some members of the opposition for derailing the good work done by the 
committee. Another bill on the subject was introduced in the next Lok Sabha 
on August 28, 1978 but it also ran into trouble as some ruling and opposition 
party members opposed it. The Bill was soon withdrawn. 
History, however, took a cyclical turn and the ball once again 
returns to the Rajiv Gandhi -led Congress party. After launching a vitriolic 
attack on the "culture of corruption" that had come to dominate all pores 
centenary celebrations in Bombay, Rajiv Gandhi pushed successfully for the 
enactment of the Anti-Defection Act in January 1985. The 52 Constitution 
Amendment amended Articles 101, 102, 190 and 191 regarding vacation of 
seats and disqualification from membership of Parliament and the state 
legislature and added a new Schedule (Tenth Schedule) to the Constitution. 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule recognized genuine splits and 
mergers in the parties. 
The 52"'' Amendment not only faced legal and constitutional 
challenges in the years after its passage but also encountered a ftmdamental 
charge as to whether it succeeded in preventing the corrupt practice of 
defection in the legislatures. Although it survived the constitutionality test 
by the Supreme Court of India, critics increasingly termed the Tenth 
Schedule of the Constitution as a big flop because it suffered from serious 
defects and in fact encouraged defection by particularly smaller groups since 
1985. 
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On balance, although the Anti-Defection Act of 1985 successfully 
limited the scope for individual defections, under para 3 (split provision) 
and 4 (merger provision) of the Tenth Schedule, it also opened the 
floodgates of defection enbloc, particularly in State Assemblies. Even 
Parliament was not spared from the spectre of wholesale defection. In 
November 1990, the Lok Sabha speaker Rabi Ray recognized the breakaway 
group of Janata Dal headed by Chandra Shekhar, which consisted of 54 Lok 
Sabha members of the Janata Dal Parliamentary party, leading to the 
installation of the minority Chandra Shekhar Government at the centre. 
Reformers have noted that since 1985, there have been more defections than 
before because wholesale defection of more than one-third of the political 
party's strength in a House is declared by law a split, not defection. 
Concerned over the growing decline of political morality in the legislatures, 
a Member of Parliament sarcastically characterized the existing law on 
defection as being concerned "more with mathematics than with ethics". 
Seeing the growing hue and cry over cases of defection aided by the 
increasing marginalisation of the BJP in various State Assemblies, 
particularly U.P. and Bihar, the NDA Government decided to bring a 
legislation to amend the Tenth Schedule ostensibly to plug the loopholes in 
the existing Anti-Defection Act. The statement of objects and reasons of the 
91^* Amendment states that demands have been made from time to time in 
certain quarters for strengthening and amending the Anti-Defection law as 
contained in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India, on the ground 
that these provisions have not been able to achieve the desired goal of 
checking defections. The Tenth Schedule has also been criticized on the 
ground that it allows bulk defections while declaring individual defections 
as illegal. The provision for exemption from disqualification in cases of 
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splits as provided in paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution 
of India has in particular, come under severe criticism on account of its 
destabilizing effect on the Government.'*^ 
The NDA Government also cited the report of the Dinesh Goswami 
Committee on electoral reforms, the Law Commission of India's report and 
the report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution (NCRWC) in favour of amending the provisions of the Tenth 
Schedule. The NDA Government got the Constitution Amendment passed in 
both the Houses by the end of December 2003. The Bill received 
presidential ascent on January 1, 2004. Amending Articles 75, 164 and 361 
of the Constitution of India. 
A recent amendment to the anti-defection law enshrined in the 
Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in the year 2003 has abolished the earlier 
distinction between defection (by less than 1/3"* of the membership of the 
party) and split (by at least 1/3'^ '* of the members). Any violation of party 
discipline by any number of members is now publishable by the loss of 
membership of the House. 
The 91*^ Constitutional Amendment stipulates that the federal and 
state governments cannot have a Council of Ministers that exceeds 15 per 
cent of the strength of the legislature. The Act states that in Article 75 of the 
Constitution, after clause (1) the following shall be inserted: 
(J A) The total number of Ministers, including the Prime Minister in 
the council of Ministers shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the total 
numbers of the House of the People. 
(IB) A number of either House of Parliament belonging to any 
political party who is disqualified for being a member of the House 
47 See, The Comtitutin (91 Amendment) Bill, 2003 as passed by the Houses of 
Parliament and assented to on January 1, 2004. 
^ ^ i ^ ' »i* 
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under paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule shall also be disqualified 
to be appointed as a Minister under clause (1) for duration of the 
period commencing from the date of his disqualification till the date 
on which the term of his office as such member would expire or 
where he contests any election to either House of Parliament before 
the expiry of such period, till the date on which he is declared 
elected, whichever is earlier. 
Considering the peculiar demographic and political character of 
smaller states, the Act amends Article 161 stipulating the notwithstanding 
the 15 per cent cap, the number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister in 
a State, shall not be less than twelve. So in smaller states, the cap on the 
Ministries is twelve. And to bring uniformity across the country as far as the 
size of the Council of Ministers is concerned, the Act proposed a curious 
constitutional downsizing provision that where the total number of Ministers 
including the Chief Minister in the Council of Ministers in any state at the 
commencement of the constitution (Ninety first Amendment) Act, 2003 
exceeds the said fifteen per cent, or the number specified in the first 
provision, as the case may be, then the total number of Ministers in the state 
shall be brought in conformity with the provisions of this clause within six 
months from such date as the President may be public notification appoint.'*' 
The 91^' Constitutional Amendment also inserts a new provision in 
the existing Article 361 banning defectors from holding any remunerative 
political post under the Government of India or the Government of a state 
till they contest and win a new election. Most importantly, the Act scrapes 
paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, the so-called most controversial aspect 
of the existing Anti-Defection Act. 
The 91^' Amendment has only perpetuated the existing infirmities 
and flaws in the 42"** Amendment. The new Anti-Defection Act serves the 
'' Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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extremely limited purpose of barring the disqualified legislator from holding 
office of profit, limiting the size of the Ministry and scrapping the so-called 
controversial provision for merger, critics point out that it fails to address 
various flaws in the existing Act of anti-defection. Following are the some 
of the serious criticisms of the 52"'' Amendment and Anti-Defection Act in 
general.^" 
> The Act does not define many crucial terms such as "political 
parties", "splits" and "mergers" as pointed by critics of the 52"'' 
Amendment. The original Tenth Schedule did not mention the words 
"expulsion" and "unattached members", which have been widely 
used by the presiding officers in the legislatures to circumvent the 
law on defection. 
> The 91^' Amendment continues to disqualify members on the 
grounds of votes or abstention from voting in the House contrary to 
my carry any direction of the party. The supremacy of the party 
whip has serious anti-democratic consequences as it establishes the 
tyranny of the most powerful function or few leaders of the party 
over the ordinary members of the party. 
> Another serious shortcoming in the Act is that the distinction 
between "independent member" and "nominated member" has been 
left unattended. The original Tenth Schedule states that the 
independent member, if he joins the party after his election, will 
immediately lose his seat. However, a nominated member is allowed 
to join the party within six months of his nomination as a member. 
So an independent member's decision to join the party remains 
50 Subhash C. Kashyap, Supra note 45, pp. 1-117 
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fettered, though theoretically being independent he is master of his 
own self. So the space for libertarian and independent minded 
legislators continues to be severely restricted. 
> The provision of presiding officers of speakers in the legislature to 
arbitrate and adjudicate on cases of defection has been criticized on 
various legal and political grounds. In most cases of defection, the 
role of presiding officers has been constructed controversial, to say 
the least this has to only cause havoc with the Act but also lowered 
the constitutional dignity of the presiding officers. Plus, as speakers 
presiding officers are notorious party creatures in India, this 
provision runs against the spirit of natural justice. Despite the 
popular demand that power to decide on disqualification under the 
Act should be given to the Election Commission, the present Act 
prefers the principle of political justice rather than impartial legal 
remedy. 
> Paragraph 7 of the original Tenth Schedule had barred the 
jurisdiction of the courts to review the decision of the presiding 
officers. However, since the judgment of the Supreme Court in the 
Khito's case (1993), the presiding officer's decision to disqualify 
member remain subject to judicial review by courts on jurisdictional 
or other vitiating grounds like failure to observe natural justice. The 
present Act should have defined the role of judicial intervention in 
cases of defection. 
> Although the recent amendment limits the size of state Ministries, it 
neither consults states nor reserves the Act for ratification by at least 
a majority of the states. So in a sense, the 91^' Amendment is anti 
federal in spirit and reaffirms the supremacy of the national 
legislature over the state legislatures. 
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Thus, the NDA Government not only ignored popular sentiments 
but also various expert committees' recommendations with regard to many 
controversial parts of the existing Anti-Defection Act. 
LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR AND GOVERNANCE 
Legislature is one of the most important prestigious institution of 
the Governance whose main function is to formulate policies through 
legislation to promote the welfare of the people after a thorough deliberation 
and discussion as well as review of the functioning of executive which is 
subordinate to legislature. Legislators through understanding the needs of 
people and through intellectual exercise can promulgate such legislation 
which can be a good pillar for good governance. Legislature can do its job 
efficiently provided there is smooth functioning of legislature as the work is 
of highly intellectual nature and affects the every aspect of human life. 
Deliberations in the legislature require a peaceful and co-operative 
environment for the integration of viewpoints of all the members. People 
expect the legislature to come out with solutions of the problems being faced 
by them. In addition, the cost incurred on legislative bodies is enormous and 
the time wasted is money and talent wasted. 
To quote Dr. Ambedker, "I feel, however good a constitution may be, 
it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work, happen to be 
a bad lot... The working of the constitution does not depend wholly upon 
the nature of the constitution. The constitution can provide only the organs 
of State such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The factors 
on which the working of those organs of the State depends are the people 
and the political parties, they will set-up as their instruments to carry out 
their wishes and politics. Who can say how the people of India and their 
parties will behave"?^' 
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. XI, No. 11, November 25, 1949, p. 975. 
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Recently, there has developed a tendency for persons with criminal 
backgrounds winning the elections and occupying the seats in the most 
sacred house of the nation through their muscle and money power. This is a 
trend which can engulf the institution and make the role of legislature 
insignificant. We need highly talented people in legislature. Since upon their 
vast knowledge depends the quality of legislation and good governance. 
The sight of criminals entering parliament, Legislative assemblies and 
local governmental institutions is now rather common. The National Police 
Commission (1977) admitted presence of the creeping evil when it 
observed: 
The manner in which different political parties have 
functioned, particularly on the eve of periodic elections 
involves free use of muscle men and dadas (hoodlums) to 
influence the attitude underlined by the report submitted in 
the wake of Panchayat (or village council) elections in 
Bihar. The report painfully observed that the process 
demonstrated once again that there can be no sanity in 
Bihar as long as politics continue to be based on caste and 
gangsterism. 
According to the computation made by the Election Commission 40 
MPs of the last Lok Sabha and 700 MLAs were criminals and had criminal 
records. According to another calculation, 10 per cent of the total 
candidates, numbering 14000 in the 1996 elections, had criminal records. 
Recently (1998), a journal (Outlook) compiled a list of such shoddy 
candidates, who have criminal proceedings against them, even though it was 
not an exhaustive list The process is going on unabated as the criminal 
politicians receive protection by the political parties of the land and even 
more surprisingly by the police and the state administration. As a result, 
'^  The Second Report of the National Police Commission, Government of India, 1979, 
p. 21 
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even routine courtesies and norms are systematically flouted. In the Twelfth 
Lok Sabha, some 10 to 15 Members of Parliament are reported to be 
carrying fire arms on their person to parliament. In such a situation, voters 
are left with Hobson's choice; they have in many cases to choose between 
the scoundrels. Voters are not yet given the right rejection of all candidates 
and saying, "None deserves my vote."^^ 
As many as 10 ministers in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 
ministry and 93 Lok Sabha MPs face criminal charges ranging from murder 
to rape, besides extortion and even attempt to commit suicide. A study by 
the Banglore-based Public Affairs Centre (PAC) says many MPs from 
almost all political parties are involved in crime. According to it, one out of 
12 MPs have cases that could attract penalties amounting to imprisonment 
for one year or less while one out of two ( over 50 percent) have cases that 
can lead to imprisonment of five or more years. There is a regional 
concentration in terms of criminal cases. 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh comprise 28 
percent of all MPs but account for over 50 percent of MPs with high penalty 
criminal cases. "A large proportion of the less educated MPs have criminal 
cases against them (compared to) colleagues with higher education. Whether 
there is any causal connection between education, assets and criminality is 
not clear. Criminal cases are also found to be more among MPs in the age 
group 36-45. 
The work and conduct of the legislature both at the Union and State 
Levels is increasingly becoming a matter of great shame for the legislators 
as well as the citizens who elected them. It has taken a more serious turn as 
" The Pioneer, July 10, 1998. Also Quoted in Shriram Maheswari, "Political Reforms 
for True Governance", in T. N. Chaturvedi, Towards Good Governance, Indian 
Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1999, p.58. 
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citizens are viewing their performance on T.V. The legislature passes the 
law relating to good governance like Right to Information Act, 2005, 
Consumers Protection Act, 1986 and other important bills which are 
supposed to smoothen the life of the people. What can be the impact of the 
legislature when the members composing it are highly indiscipline, and 
possess no moral conduct and values? This is not specific to any party and 
individuals. The same behaviour is observed from the opposition to 
whatever party it may be. 
B.G. Varghese '^* observes that unfortunately, both sides of the house 
have been guilty of unconscionable behaviour at various times. Those 
witness to these ugly scenes from the visitor's gallery or who watch the 
proceedings on television and read newspapers must increasingly fear a 
continuing erosion of parliamentary credibility to a point when the country 
will cease to take Parliament seriously. 
Parliament must set an example for good governance as this is the 
most powerful organ of the Government and represent the entire country. 
Their concern for the nation would imbibe confidence and strength among 
executive and judicial organs of the Government Criminalization of politics 
is degeneration for Governance. 
Several days are lost in pandemonium and forced adjournments. 
This costs the nation money, as running Parliament is not an inexpensive 
business. May be if all MPs are docked their daily allowance for every part 
day lost to forced adjournments, and double that on the second occasion 
during the same session, and so on progressively, disruptive tactics might be 
curbed. 
^^  The Tribune, 17 August 2006. 
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Such disruption precludes discussion of matters of great importance 
and interest, year after year. The report of the National Minorities 
Commission has not even been tabled in Parliament, along with the 
government's mandatory action taken report, for almost ten years! That of 
the Commissioner for Scheduled Tribes is three years behind schedule. Yet 
Parliament is singularly unconcerned. What message does this send? If 
legitimate systems are blocked, people will turn to illegitimate avenues of 
expression and grievance redressal. The Naxalite problem has been spawned 
by decades of masterly inactivity by the governance. The writing is on the 
wall and parliamentarians and parties must take note before it is too late. 
Parliamentary committees too could take expert advice on key issues as 
means of improving legislation or formulating policy. 
GOVERNANCE A N D CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS 
Federalism in India is at once similar and distinct from other federations 
like that of America; distinct in that it is not a group of independent States 
coming together to form a federation by conceding a portion of their rights of 
government, but a distributed entity that derives its power from a single source 
- the Union. Sovereignty and the powers of governance are distributed and 
shared by several entities and organs within the Indian constitutional system." 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, who chaired the Drafting Committee of the 
Constituent Assembly, stressed the importance of describing India as a 'Union 
of States' rather than a 'Federation of States.' Introducing the draft Constitution 
in the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar said: .. .the description of India as 
a Union, though its Constitution is federal, does no violence to usage...what is 
important is that the use of the word 'Union' is deliberate...The Drafting 
'^ Report of National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, A 
Consultation Paper on Article 356 of the Constitution, 11, 2.1, Government of India, 
2002. 
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Committee wanted to make it clear that though India was to be a federation, the 
federation was not the resuh of an agreement by the states to join in a 
federation. Not being a resuh of an agreement, no state has the right to secede 
from it. Though the country and the people may be divided into different states 
for convenience of administration, the country is one integral whole, its people 
a single people living under a single emporium derived from a single source... 
The Drafting Committee thought it was better to make [this] clear at the outset 
rather than leave it to speculation...^ ^ 
The Constitution provides for three lists, union list, consisting of 
items where the centre alone can make legislation; state list, consisting of 
items solely assigned to states and concurrent list where both the centre and 
states have the right to make concurrent legislation. The residuary powers 
were vested with the Centre. If one look at these three lists, one finds that 
major items were allotted to the centre and the states were reduced to an 
insignificant position. The discussion does not include financial aspects of 
the federation as it outside the preview of the topic studies. 
Indian federalism is not a static entity. It has been evolving over the 
years from a predominantly parliamentary system during the era of the 
dominance of the Indian National Congress to a considerably federalized 
system under a multi- party system with coalition Governments since 1989. 
Followings are focus on the controversies/ problems of Article 356 of centre-
state relations and governance: 
Given a formidable power of the Centre, one would expect that 
Article 356 would be used sparingly and with great caution after 
considerable deliberation. But such has not been the experience. In fact this 
'^  Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, p. 43. 
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article has been the bone of contention continuously insofar as in over 100 
instances majority governments, duly elected legislative Assemblies of 
States, were dismissed by the Centre. Initially, this provision was correctly 
invoked to either dismiss unstable or corrupt governments, which promoted 
M.V. Pylee, an authority on constitutional law, to conclude, "in practice, the 
emergency provisions have proved to be a protective device for responsible 
govemment".^^ 
The subsequent experiences, however, proved beyond dispute that 
this process has been thoroughly politicized and perverted in that several 
state governments controlled by a party (or parties) opposed, thus, arbitrarily 
taking over the state governments on political grounds. In just a two year 
span, first during the Janata rule in 1977 and later the Congress (I) 
government in 180, in six out of nine cases, state governments which were 
duly elected to power and continued to enjoy majority support in their 
respective states were dismissed by central governments which were duly 
elected to power and continued to enjoy majority support in their respective 
states was dismissed by central governments controlled by the opposition. 
Or, to put it differently, the new government at the centre had conveniently 
gotten rid of these state governments that were approved by the previous 
opposition government at the centre in what appears to be a political tit-for-
tat move.^^ 
Perhaps the most blatant abuse of this power occurred in 1992 when 
the Congress (I) government at the Centre dismissed the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) government in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) consequent to the 
" M.V. Pylee, India's Constitution, Asian Publishing House, 1967, p. 347. 
'^  Krishna K. Tummala, "The Indian Union and Emergency Power", International 
Political Science Review, 17 October, pp. 373-384. 
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serious law and order problem following the demolition of the Babri mosque 
in Ayodhya. While this was understandable, the central government did not 
stop there. It dismissed three other state governments in Madhya Pradesh 
(MP), Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh (HP) as well, which had nothing to 
do with the demolition of the mosque, nor with any other law and order 
problem. The only common thread was that they were all BJP governments. 
Not unexpectedly, the MP Chief Minister, Sunderlal Patwa, went to court 
challenging his dismissal. That state High Court ruled in his favours stating 
that "the consequences which flow from the Proclamation under Article 356 
are drastic", and that "this extraordinary power should not be permitted to be 
used or abused to achieve political ends".^ ^ 
Two more egregious examples in this context were the one under 
the United Front rule in 1997 and the other under the BJP rule in 1998-99, 
both byproducts of coalition politics. The first was in UP and the second was 
in Bihar.^ " The BJP challenged the Proclamation in UP and the Allahabad 
High Court ruled in its favour by quashing President's rule. The Supreme 
Court however, stayed that order, and said that the Assembly should not be 
dissolved so that a political solution could be found. Consequently a 
coalition government was formed by the BJP and the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP). As this coalition appeared to be falling apart, the United Front 
government recommended President's rule under Article 356. But the 
President declined, and returned the recommendation for a re-appraisal by 
the United Front government. The government withdrew its 
recommendation. 
" Sunderlal Patwa V. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 MP 214. 
^ Krishna K. Tummala, "Constitutional Government and Politics in India: The 
Case of Uttar Pradesh", Asian Journal of Political Science, 1998; 6 December, 
pp. 79-97. 
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With the demise of the United Front condition, a new general 
election was called in 1998, and the BJP came to power at the Centre by 
forming a coalition government. And it was its turn, with the Bihar 
government occupying center-state. This state was under the rule of Rabri 
Devi of Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), who was appointed as Chief Minsiter 
by her husband Laloo Prasad Yadav who himself was the previous Chief 
Minsiter but had to resign under a plethora of corruption scandals which 
came up in the courts.*' But knowing the pressures to invoke President's 
rule, Rabri Devi in her turn, in a preemptive strike, went to the Legislative 
Assembly and won its confidence. The BJP government at the Centre, 
nonetheless, under the pressure of one of its coalition partners, 
recommended the dismissal of her government in September 1998. Again, 
the President returned the recommendation for reconsideration, and the BJP 
government backed down. But in February 1999, as the law and order 
problem got worse in the state what with the massacre of several of 
backward class people, the BJP government recommended for a second time 
the dismissal of the Rabri Devi government, and the President obliged. 
While the Proclamation was ratified by the Lok Sabha by a very thin margin, 
its fate in the Rajya Sabha was almost a foregone conclusion as the BJP had 
only 45 seats out of the total 245 seats. To avoid a loss of face, the BJP 
decided to revoke the Proclamation on 9 February 1999 - the first such 
experience in Indian history. Rabri Devi was restored to power. 
Taking cognizance of the misuse of Article 356, the Supreme Court 
of India laid down the following norms in its 1994 Bommai judgement.*^ 
Exercise of Emergency Powers is subject to judicial review, even after 
'^ India Today, 5 October 1998, p. 15. 
" S.R. Bommai et al. V. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994, SC 1918. 
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Parliamentary ratification; the President has to be "satisfied" that there is a 
breakdown of constitutional machinery, not necessarily based on the report 
of the Governor alone but also "otherwise"; his discretion to use these 
powers thus is not absolute but qualified in that grounds and reasons for 
reaching "satisfaction" supported with material, and the gist of events be 
provided; the Governor of a state must invoke Article 356 only as a last 
resort; the State legislature may not be dissolved until the Parliament ratifies 
the Proclamation, Parliamentary disapproval of a Proclamation of 
Emergency itself does not restore the dissolved Assembly, but a new 
election will (or, the Court may restore it); when a government enjoys the 
majority in the legislature, to impose President's rule in a situation of mal-
administration of the state will be constructed as extraneous to the purpose 
of Article 356; and a central government, even if it is elected with a 
landslide majority, cannot dismiss a state government solely on the basis of 
the fact that it is of a different party so long as it is working in consonance 
with the Constitution. Contrarily, an Emergency may be declared when 
attempts to subvert the constitution are noted even when the government in 
question was to profess to work under the Constitution. But no one paid any 
attention. The misuse of Article 356 goes on routinely. Gujarat is a recent 
case in point.^'' 
Narendra Modi's BJP government in the state of Gujarat was 
indicated by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) for its 
"comprehensive failure" to stem the communal carnage since 19"^  February 
2002 (that Modi used communal tensions for political advantage during his 
later successful election in December 2002 is beyond dispute). 
Consequently, even some of the members of the National Democratic 
63 HindustanTimes 31 May 2002. 
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Alliance (NDA) - the coalition cobbled together by Prime Minister Atal 
Behari Vajpayee of the BJP-demanded that the Modi government be 
dismissed. But the Vajpayee government not only did not yield, but went on 
to absolve Modi of any responsibility. Once more, partisan politics prevailed 
over Constitutional principles and good governance. 
In Bihar, the February 2005 elections were fought by three formations. 
No single formation cobbled sufficient seats to take oath as government. After 
Governor Singh recommended President's rule, the decision was taken by the 
central government. The United Progressive Alliance government in New 
Delhi, in turn, needed the President's assent on imposing President's rule. 
President A P J Abdul Kalam Okayed it late on March 7 evening, placing the 
state under the governor. 
Kamatka was under Central rule for 34 days from October 9 to 
November 12, 2007 after the fall of JDS-BJP coalition government headed by 
H D Kumaraswamy and state Assembly was kept under the suspended 
animation but a decision has been taken to dissolve it when government 
approaches parliament. The report of the governor has been approved by the 
cabinet and a recommendation has gone to the President. President Pratibha 
Patil signed the proclamation bringing the state under Central rule after 
accepting Governor Rameshwar Thakur's recommendations in this regard and 
advised such a course of action. 
The usage has become so common that demands for the invocation 
of Article 356 can be heard any time that a disgruntled politician waiting in 
the wings would call for the dismissal of the government of the day in the 
state. The controversy and the misuse of the Constitution, there have been 
several demands for the deletion of article 356 from the Constitution 
altogether. As of now, Article 356 stands in its original form, and the above 
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examples prove its blatant misuse for partisan purposes, thus thoroughly 
corrupting the original intentions of the Constitution. 
In Indian political system, the question of reviewing the matters of 
political nature has been based on from the British legacy as established in 
the Government of India Act, 1919 and 1935. Till the doctrine of un-
justifiable political question was followed in the context of the application 
of Article 356 (President's rule in the state), and ultimately the demand for 
the abolition of Article 356 and another view is retaining the same, but with 
certain modification so as to prevent its misuse or abuse. Ultimately, no 
national consensus has yet emerged about its use except the pronouncements 
of the courts. 
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India became independent and inherited a well-organized 
administrative apparatus from the British. The Constituent Assembly in 
India did not show much sustained concern towards administrative matters. 
The Drafting Committee itself had refrained from inserting and detailed 
provisions with regard to the services in the Draft Constitution because, in 
its opinion, these should be regulated by acts of appropriate legislature 
rather than by Constitutional provisions. It was probably felt that the 
constitutional and political changes were of major significance, and that the 
administration being basically instrumental in nature would automatically 
undergo the requisite transformation under the political impact.' 
Despite its imperial roots, the Indian political leaders chose to retain 
the structure of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) presumably because of its 
efficient role in conducting Indian administration in accordance with 
prescribed rules and regulations supporting a particular regime. However, 
during the discussion in the Constituent Assembly, the house was not 
unanimous regarding the fate of the ICS. The argument opposing its 
continuity was based on its role as an ally of imperialism. 'The Civil Service 
as the Steel Frame enslaved us and they have been guilty of stabbing the 
nation during our freedom struggle. We should not, therefore, at the 
argument goes, 'perpetuate what we have criticized so far. Vallabh Bhai 
Patel was probably most vocal in defending the ICS and its steel frame. 
Since they were "patriotic, loyal sincere and able', Patel was not in favour of 
tempering with bureaucracy especially when the country was reeling under 
chaos towards the close of British rule. As early as 1946, he convened the 
M. Yasin and Srinanda Dasgupta, Administrative Structure and the Constitution 
Making India; Administrative Change, January December, 2002, p. 89. 
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provincial Premiers' conference to evolve a consensus on the future of the 
All India Services (AIS) in view of their long association with public 
administration, offers belonging to the AIS are most well-equipped to deal 
with new and complex tasks. Not only are they useful instruments, they will 
also serve as a liaison between the provinces and the Government of India 
and introduce certain amount of brashness and vigour in the administration 
both of the centre and the provinces.^ Later, while speaking in the 
Constituent Assembly, he categorically stated that you will not have a united 
India if you do not have a good all India service which had the independence 
to speak out its mind and enjoyed a sense of security. He also attributed the 
success of the constitution to the existence of an all India service by saying 
that, 'if you do not adopt this course, and then do not follow this 
Constitution. This Constitution is meant to be worked by a ring of service 
which will keep the country intact... If you remove them, is nothing but a 
picture of chaos all over the country.^ Nehru, who was very critical of the 
ICS for its role in the sustaining the imperial rule in India, seemed 
persuaded and supported its continuity for the security and stability of 
India... including copy with the slaughter and its aftermath in Punjab, 
curbing opposition in Hyderabad, and containing it in Kashmir.'' Patel's 
views translated into Article 311 of the constitution of India that stated that 
no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except 
after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges and given a 
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.^ So, an 
Quoted in S.R. Maheshwari, Indian Administration, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 
1984, p. 211. 
The Constituent Assembly Debates, 1949, Vol. X, pp. 48-52. 
The Constituent Assembly Debates, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 793-795. 
B. Shiva Rao (ed.) The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study, Indian Institute 
of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968, pp. 713-23. 
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instrument that consolidated the imperial rule in India with so slight use of 
force survived completely different political circumstances primarily 
because there was continuing support for it first from the British government 
and then the Congress government^. Furthermore, its continuity did not pose 
any threat to the dominant classes that resigned supreme following the 1947 
transfer of power. The new civil service for all practical purposes was, as a 
former bureaucratic comment, therefore the continuation of the old one with 
the difference that it was to function in a parliamentary system of 
government, accepting the undoubted primacy of the political executive 
which in turn was responsible to the people through their elected 
•7 
representatives in the legislature. 
Indian civil service system is a mediating institution that mobilizes 
human and other resources in the service of the affairs of the state in a given 
territory. Civil services constitute the backbone of administration. The 
success of administration depends upon the quality and caliber of public 
service. It is concerned with the management of public programmes, 
assisting in the formulation of public policy, and interacting not only 
executive, legislative and judicial officials at all different levels of 
government but also with the people. It is the core of modem government 
possessing great legal coercive powers and influence over the society that it 
administers in the name of the sovereign state. In the words of D.G. Karre^, 
7 
Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India, Rupa Publishing, Kolkata, 1997, pp. 
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"public service is not some impersonal, idealistic concept, 
such as the nation, the state or the sovereign, but it is the 
collection of all the individual citizens. When any of the 
agents of government are addressing themselves in any 
capacity to the citizens, they are approaching this master, 
who has set limits to his own and to the services powers so 
that the legitimate rights and interests of all citizens should 
be promoted to the greatest possible extent. This 
disadvantage section of the community ought to be 
approached with more than average consideration. Not only 
do they share in the total sovereignty of the people but they 
are a special responsibility of the whole Nation that is in 
particular of all citizens other than themselves. Thus, in a 
democracy, the civil services constitute a significant factor 
in the smooth functioning of the governance". 
During the time of East India Company and British Raj, the main 
functions of the bureaucracy were regulatory—maintenance of law and order 
and collection of revenue. While the government of India, after independence 
was committed to a welfare state and development through planned economy 
besides integrating a populous nation with great diversities of religion, caste, 
culture and language. The widespread poverty and backwardness of the 
country, after centuries of exploitation and neglect was slated to be eliminated 
as fast as possible with the state as the only instrument of development. The 
poor had expected a great deal from the government. The government had to 
take up a number of new ftanctions. Numerous agencies and institutions in the 
field of development were created and many existing ones were expanded. This 
led to the greatest expansion of the administrative machinery at all levels of the 
government. 
The Indian constitution has detailed provision relating to the civil 
services covering matters like recruitment and conditions of service. Parliament 
is empowered to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service subject to 
the provisions of the constitution. The civil servants hold office at the pleasure 
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of President of India and they cannot be removed or dismissed by an authority 
subordinate to that by which they were appointed. Further, before their 
removal/dismissal they must be given ample opportunity to show cause against 
the proposed action. Corresponding to the descending order of the 
responsibility to be performed the civil service is classified into Group 'A', 
Group 'B' , Group ' C and Group 'D'. Group 'A' constitutes the service of 
higher civil servants including the All India and Central Services. The 
generalist all India and central services are recruited through common 
competitive examination conducted by Union Public Service Commission. 
Group 'B' is basically class of first line supervisors and like Group 'A' 
includes a number of services each separate and distinct with little inter-
communication. Group ' C includes clerical jobs whereas Group 'D' comprises 
messengers, peons and others doing smaller jobs. The All India Services which 
are common to both Central and State Government, with a ultimate control are 
unique arrangement in India, inherited by British colonial government. This 
includes Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service and Indian Forest 
Service. The All India Services and Group 'A' central services provide the 
leadership to rest of the services both in Central and State governments. 
PARUAMENTARY/MINISTERIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY AND 
GOVERNANCE 
The conventional democratic wisdom is "to think of the 
bureaucracy as an instrumental apparatus for the execution of policies 
established through 'political', non-bureaucratic institutions".^ As the 
aphorism goes, the political executive, with legislative approval, lays down 
Fred W.Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View", in 
Joseph Lapalombara (eds.), Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1963, p. 331. 
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the policy, and the bureaucratic executive implements it. Bureaucrats are, of 
course, supposed to offer free and frank advice, and in the process may 
differ from their Minister, but once a policy is politically determined within 
the framework of the law of the Constitution, officials must faithfully 
execute them. In new democracies especially, this assumption may not 
always be taken for granted, even in countries like India and the Philippines 
with relatively developed parliamentary institutions. "The relative weakness 
of political organs means that political function tends to be appropriated, in 
considerable measure, by bureaucrats. Intra-bureaucratic struggles become a 
primary form of politics." For this reason, Riggs defers from the view of 
Carl J. Friedrich offered in the latter's monumental work on democracy and 
constitutionalism. The latter argues that the emergence of constitutionalism 
in the West was preceded by a substantial development of bureaucratic of 
the State that was subsequently brought under control. The former, however, 
argues that in new democracies in the Third World premature or too rapid 
expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to 
inhibit the development of effective politics. Riggs goes on to deduce the 
corollary thesis that separate political institutions have a better chance to 
grow if bureaucratic institutions are weak.'° 
The British theory and practice about the relation between Ministers 
and civil servants was outlined by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe (later Lord 
Kilmuir) in the House of Commons on 20 July 1954: "The position of the 
civil servants is that he is wholly and directly responsible to his Minister. It 
is worth stating again that he holds his office at pleasure, and can be 
dismissed at any time by the Minister; and that power is nonetheless real 
because it is seldom used. The only exception relates to a small number of 
10 Ibid, p. 331-335. 
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senior posts, like permanent secretary, deputy secretary, and principal 
financial officer, where since 1920, it has been necessary for the Minister to 
consult the Prime Minister, as he does on appointment." Sir David went on 
to elaborate four different categories of situations where difference 
principles operate. First, where a clear order of the Minister has been carried 
out by the civil servant in accordance of the policy laid down, the former 
must politically defend the latter. Second, where the civil servant acts 
strictly within the parameters of the policy lay down, the civil servant 
entitled to ministerial protection. Third, where an official makes a mistake, 
or causes some delay, but not on an important issue of policy, and not where 
a claim to individual rights is seriously involved, the Minister acknowledges 
the mistake, and he accepts the responsibility, although he is not personally 
involved. He states that he will take corrective action in the development 
and he would not in these circumstances, expose the official to public 
criticism. However, in the fourth contingency where a reprehensible action 
of the civil servant is taken without a prior knowledge and which the 
Minister disapproves, then there is no obligation on the part of the Minister 
to endorse what he believes to be wrong, or to defend what are clearly 
shown to be errors of his officers. Sir David sums up by remarking that "it 
is part of a Minister's responsibility to Parliament to take necessary action 
to secure efficiency and the proper discharge of the duties of his 
department."" 
The classic case of the relationship between the Union Finance 
Minister T.T. Krishnamachari and the Principal Finance Secretary H.M. 
Patel in the Nehru era gives a glimpse into the evolving constitutional 
practice in India regarding the foregoing. The case arose out of a decision 
C.P. Bhambhri, Bureaucracy and Politics in India, Vikas, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 
80-81. 
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by the Government to invest the government-controlled Life Insurance 
Corporation's Rs. l,26,86,100/-in private companies controlled by H.D. 
Mundhera in 1956. This episode throws light on Minister-civil servant 
relations, the Parliament and the Press, party financing, etc. The issue that 
surfaced in newspapers created a furor in the Parliament. An inquiry was 
ordered by the one-judge inquiry commission chaired by Justice M.C. 
Chagla of the Bombay High Court. Subsequently inquiries were also 
conducted by a Board of Inquiry under the All-India Services (Discipline 
and Appeal) Rule, 1955, and the Union Public Service Commission. The 
crucial testimonies of the Finance Minister and the Finance Secretary before 
the Commission contradicted each other. The Chagla Commission observed 
"...where the Minister was aware of what Mr. Patel had done on 24 June or 
not, when he did come to know of these transactions, he never repudiated 
the action of Mr. Patel. Therefore clearly there is acquiescence on the part 
of the Minister in the part played by Mr. Patel in bringing about the 
transaction of 24 June."'^ 
In general terms, the Chagla Commission laid down the rule of the 
thumb: 
"The doctrine of ministerial responsibility has two faces. 
The Minister has complete autonomy within his own sphere 
of authority. As a necessary corollary he must take full 
responsibility for the actions of his servants. It is true that 
this may throw a very great burden on the Minister because 
it is impossible to expect that in a highly complicated 
system of administration which we have evolved the Minister 
could possibly know, every action taken by his subordinates, 
let alone give his consent to them. But it is assumed that 
once the policy is laid down by the Minister, his 
subordinates must reflect that policy and loyally carry it out. 
Quoted in Ibid., p. 134. 
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If any subordinate fails to do so, he may be punished or 
dismissed but, however, vicariously, the responsibility of his 
action must be assumed by the Minister.... 
As it happened, the drama ended in the denouncement of the 
resignations by both the Minister and the Principal Finance Secretary. An 
important additional dimension of the episode is highlighted by the political 
scientist C.P. Bhambhri that the driving force seems to be Mundhra's 
financial contributions to the (Congress) party funds. The Government 
helped him when he was in financial difficulties by using LIC as a 'milk 
cow'. For businessman contributions to party funds constitute an investment 
for the return of favours from the Government,''* 
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURAL CONTROVERSIES/PROBLEMS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
Minister Vs. Civil Servants 
The inter-relationship between the political (ministers) and the 
permanent (government officials) executive in India (as elsewhere) 
bureaucracy has been a matter of debate and controversy. It has been believed 
by the purists that the function of bureaucracy is to tender an expert and 
impartial advice to the political masters and then implement their decision 
without a demur. The ministers are the representatives of the people and, 
therefore, know the aspirations of the people. However, they are not experts in 
legal, administrative or financial matters. The bureaucracy is expected to be 
politically neutral but faithful in the political executive. Bureaucracy 
emphasized by the purists is its anonymity and passiveness. It is argued that the 
responsibility of all decisions and policy initiatives being that of the political 
'^  Quoted in/6/J., p. 135. 
" Ibid., p.m. 
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executive, the bureaucracy should really walk behind the scene without 
claiming any credit for its actions. The other side of the coin is that the 
bureaucracy should never be criticized in public and, in fact, should be 
defended by political masters. The political masters should own the entire 
responsibility for the actions of the bureaucracy. Of course, the political 
masters are entitled to all the credit. 
The public, however, scarcely believes that the bureaucracy, 
particularly at the top level, is all that helpless in shaping policy decisions and 
their implementation. Most people believe that without the explicit or implicit 
support of the bureaucracy, peculiarity of the top level is all that helpless in 
shaping policy decisions and their implementation and the political masters 
cannot take wrong decisions. Thus, while the ministers may or may not defend 
the bureaucracy, the public criticizes both the politicians and bureaucrats alike. 
There have been stray instances when bureaucrats have broken away 
from their normal line of discipline and come out in open to defend themselves 
in public or to criticize the politicians and their role has become a centre of 
controversy. In this situation, some thinkers have advocated that bureaucracy 
should play a pro-active rather than a passive role. What it means is that instead 
of simply tendering their considered advice and then implementing the 
decisions of the political bosses without a demur, the bureaucrats should try to 
obstruct (of course, within the rules and regulations) wrong decisions and 
expedite positive policy initiatives which are likely to benefit the public. It is 
argued that the bureaucracy has a responsibility to uphold the Constitution also 
(as, indeed, every citizen of India has) and there it should not be a silent 
spectator if gross damage is being done to public. Indian Constitution 
specifically makes a mention of the Civil Service- a feature that is almost 
unique to the Indian political system. Therefore, it is argued that Indian 
bureaucracy owes allegiance to the Constitution and should not feel subservient 
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to the political system but play a pro-active role in public interest. Of course a 
properly recruited and well-trained civil service is essential for the doctrine of 
pro-active bureaucracy to work. 
In USA, an alternative system existed called the spoils system in which 
the bureaucracy had to have a commitment to the political ideology of the party 
in power. This meant that a very large number of civil servants were recruited 
afresh every time a new government came to power and, of course, an equal 
number quit the service. Each party had its own committed bureaucracy. 
Gradually, USA has been moving away from the spoils system, relying more 
on neutral bureaucracy. Now, the number of changes in civil service which take 
place on change of the government is much smaller and is confined to top 
positions. Strangely, Indian seems to be slowly moving towards a committed 
bureaucracy to an increasing extent. In the late sixties, the need to have 
committed bureaucracy as essential to implement the policies of the 
government effectively was talked about in the official circles. However, the 
predominant thought in India has been that the bureaucracy should be 
committed to the government and not to the ruling party, otherwise it cannot 
provide the much needed continuity when government change. 
The situation becomes more complicated when the civil service becomes 
politicized. Now, the bureaucrats are ever keen not so much as to give the best 
possible advice, but the most palatable advice to their political masters. This is 
a very dangerous situation, because in many cases, the ministers may not come 
to know all the pros and cons of the decisions they take. Sometimes, a crucial 
piece of information may be held back from the ministers if it is likely to be 
unpalatable. This would be most unfair to a well-intentioned political 
executive. Actual situation is much worse, of course, when the political 
executive is also dishonest and corrupt. This kind of collusion between the 
politicians and bureaucracy can really spell disaster for the country. 
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Article 311 of the constitution protects a government servant against 
arbitrary action and he cannot be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank 
without due process of law. The idea behind this special constitution 
protection is that the civil servants should perform their duty without fear or 
favour. Unfortunately, this special provision has not helped the civil 
servants maintaining their independence and impartiality because, political 
basses prepared to go to any lengths to accommodate the civil servants. The 
political boss has been able to make the civil service toe the line because of 
his power which enables him to effect transfers, without promotions and 
carry out suspensions. Postings and transfers are the normal process in 
personnel administration and no should ordinarily criticize them. They 
broaden the horizon and provide a variety of experiences. 
These are an integral part of the career service. But these processes 
are often used vindictively - for punishment, or for reward posting to a 
hardship area or to a far-off, God-forsaken place is viewed as punitive 
measure. This is case with very frequent unrelated transfers. Moreover there 
are 'wet' posts involving patronage, power and perks which are given to the 
pliant civil servants. By controlling postings and transfers, politicians can 
make the civil servants subservient. A minister these days prefers a civil 
servant who is prepared to carry out his commands regardless of moral 
consideration. Indeed, the civil servant is the greatest culprit in this respect. 
He has mastered all the rules and regulations and can prepare a case 
favourable to the minister's viewpoint in order to curry favour. 
The Shah Commission (1978)'^ which had investigated the 
excesses during Emergency, observed that a large number of officers -
district magistrates and commissioners of police misused the powers 
Shah Commission, Third and Final Report, Chapter XXIV 
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acquired by the government under MISA (Maintenance of internal Security 
ActO and obediently carried out the instructions emanating from politicians 
and administrative heads issued on personal or political considerations. The 
commission observed 'The public servants have not infrequently unduly 
exaggerated the fear under which they were functioning during 
Emergency in a member of cases the officials were almost anticipating 
the wishes of those in authority, however illegal, immoral and incongruous 
with the basic tenets of administration, such conduct on their part may have 
been in a large number of cases it appears that unscrupulous and over 
ambitious officers were prepared to curry favour with the seats of power 
and position by doing what they thought the people in authority desired. The 
commission sermonized that if the administrative machinery is to be 
rendered safe for our children, the services must gave a better account of 
themselves by standing up to the basic values of an honest and efficient 
administration. 
Government servants are subjected to frequent transfers on political 
consideration seriously impairing the efficiency of public services. In UP 
during six year period from 1991-96 over 3,000 IAS/IPS officers had been 
transferred. A study by T.N. Dhar'^ former member of IAS, covering 15 to 
25 years span showed that the average tenure of a district magistrate was 18-
24 months in 13 districts, 12 to 18 months in 37 districts, 6-12 months in 11 
districts, between 3-6 months in 3 districts and less than 3 months in another 
3 districts. In 1997, BJP/BSP government transferred 48 of the 69 DM's and 
50 SSP/SP's within 15 days of its taking office. T.N. Dhar'^ observes, "the 
'^  T.N. Dhar, "Indian Administrative Service in Uttar Pradesh; Past and Present", 
Indian Journal of Public Administration, New Delhi, July-September 1997, pp. 
637-61. 
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transfer industry is periiaps the only flourishing industry in the largest 
populated state of India. It is used as a means of taming the bureaucracy, for 
partisan action and for furthering the cause of a political party or political 
individual in power. The prevailing perception is that bureaucrats are used 
as pawns or tool by the party in power to settle score with its rivals. Those 
considered to be loyal, pliable and convenient are utilized to focus resource 
use on the programs of the ruling party's preference in terms of locations or 
predetermined sets of beneficiaries. Some say senior officers are used for 
raising party funds and money is exchanged before granting plum postings." 
Dhar says the civil servants are partly responsible for administrative 
malaise, as for some cadre officers, seeking a political umbrella, became, at 
first a convenient choice. Favourable treatment like cosy and privilege laden 
posting, out-of-turn house allotment, allocation of a car from state quota, 
quicker promotion, foreign assignments or visits, training stints abroad - all 
these possibilities were luring and capable of being achieved through 
compromise and genuflection. In turn, the beneficiary hoped to succeed in 
enlisting powerful political supper. With the passage of time, officers began 
covertly or overtly, to be identified with particular political leaders/parties, 
caste and class factions and group interests. What were lost were integrity, 
independence, objectivity, fairness and impartiality that constitute the 
essential strength of the service. At time politicians and civil servants 
became ungrudging partners in manipulative shady deals. In administration, 
one could observe the growing lend of venality, self-interest and self-
aggrandizement, severe decline in professionalism, more sycophancy, loss 
of neutrality, and absence of transparency. Thus a kind of spoil system 
emerged, that in the parliamentary democracy we follow, is destructive of 
essential qualities of sound administration, namely continuity, credibility, 
fearlessness and impartiality. 
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Frequent transfers of senior officers has been severely criticized by 
public spirited men, media as well as the IAS and IPS service associations. 
But this does not seem to have any effect on State Governments. The Indian 
Express observe, 'Whether in Maya's UP or Rabri's Bihar, Modi's Gujarat 
or Amrinder's Punjab, the steel frame is showing signs of wear and tear as 
bureaucrats lose their independence in a paralyzing power struggle with the 
political classes across regimes'. In her third terms of office, heading the 
BSP-BJP coalition Government, the former chief minister of UP, Mayawati 
affected transfer of 1,200 IAS officers in a period of six months, from May 
to December 2002. The district magistrates were moved in 64 of the 70 
districts; in 27 districts DM's have been moved twice over. In Noida and 
Greater Noida 12 officers had taken charge as CEO, the post of Labour 
commissioner four. She also suspended a divisional commission, two DIGs 
and two SPs. This paralyzed the state administration and demoralized the 
bureaucracy and created a crisis of confidence in the elite service. The 
problem of short tenures is not peculiar to the state governments though it 
has greater visibility. According to a study made by the department of 
personnel the average tenure of 82 non-technical secretaries to the 
Government of India was less than one year and only six secretaries were on 
their job for more than two years as on July 2000. 
The responsiveness of civil servant and his capacity of even handed 
treatment of all sections of the public, depends to a substantial extent on the 
degree to which he has a sense of continuity in the official position. An 
irrational and abrupt transfer led to frustration and demoralization of 
officers and prevents building of expertise. There is need for creation of an 
institutional arrangement for better personnel management. In a conference 
of chief ministers held in May 1997, a proposal for constituting civil 
services boards in the states which should handle senior level postings and 
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promotions was mooted. The board will be chaired by the chief secretary 
and the secretary personnel will be member secretary and will function in 
the lines of central establishment board at the centre which assists the ACC 
in making senior level appointments. The proposal could not, however, 
make much headway. The experience shows that even at the centre, these 
boards have hardly inspired any confidence amongst the civil servants. 
Their functioning has been partisan, arbitrary and ineffective. Madhav 
Godbole^* a former civil servant traces the decline of civil services morality 
to successive prime ministers from the regime of Indira Gandhi onwards. 
The concept of committed services propounded by her did permanent 
damage to the fabric of the services. During the regime of some subsequent 
prime ministers, there was vicious hold of large business houses, astrologers 
and Godman on the promotion, postings and transfers of senior civil 
servants. The prime minister has become a new centre of power. The 
acquiescence of senior civil servants is bought over by granting extension of 
service or giving cushy post retirement jobs in tribunals, regulatory 
authorities and commissions of enquiry. 
P.D. Malviya*^ a former director general of National Police 
Academy says that it is time to question political transfers at the behest of 
politicians. In the police force it undermines the authority of the head of 
police and weakens internal discipline of the force and its effectiveness in 
maintaining law and order. Due to political meddling the Provincial Armed 
Constabulary (PAC) in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar Military Police became 
ineffective and their impartiality suspect and paramilitary forces from the 
1 Si 
Madhav Godbole, "Bureaucracy at Cross Roads", Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 560-66. 
P. D. Malviya, "Administrative Culture: Some Negative Aspects", Indian Journal 
of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 213-15. 
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centre had to be called, whenever, there was apprehension of caste or 
communal trouble in these states. Blaming the services to allow politicians 
to exercise unbridled power he says,' He does not regard political principle 
as his concern, rather, since arbitrary exercise of power is the very essence 
of the feudalistic culture, he is concerned to see that no curbs and restraints 
are placed on the arbitrary exercise of power by his boss and that himself 
can bask under the reflected glory'. 
Political Executive and their Accountability, the central issue in 
governance, is that the prime minister or chief minister or a minister act in 
an arbitrary and partisan manner in regard to the appointment, posting, 
promotion and transfer of civil servants. There is a high degree of 
centralization of power in appointments in government and all powers are 
concentrated in the department of personnel and the prime minister. Senior 
level appointments run into thousands every year and it defies logic why the 
prime minister should exercise power of appointing all these functionaries 
in the vast Governmental machinery. It is common knowledge in 
bureaucratic circles that the officials in Prime Minister Office (PMO) 
middle in the appointments leading to great deal of heart burning and 
dissatisfaction in the services. There is a similar concentration of power in 
the hands of the minister whose approval is required for appointment to 
every senior post falling under the jurisdiction of their ministries, including 
posts in academic bodies such as universities, ICSSR, ICHR, etc, which 
have autonomous councils to guide their functioning. The ministers often 
interfere with the appointments wanting to have their own men for key 
posts. The whole system of appointment and posting in Government has 
become some sort of spoil system. The single largest factor in degeneration 
in public life and administration has been the appointment of under serving 
persons to high constitutional positions who would think nothing of 
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violating the twisting its express provisions, leave alone not acting 
according to its true spirit.... It is necessary that the president is not bound 
by the advice of executive alone while making such appointments. 
Generalists vs. Specialists 
This again is a controversy that has plagued the bureaucracies the world 
over. Each country has tried to find its own solution to the problem. In India, 
the genesis of the problem can be traced back to the days of Lord Comwallis 
who is credited with laying the foundation of the civil services in India. The 
Britishers needed English knowing Indians and general awareness to man the 
lower ranks of the bureaucracy. No specialist knowledge was required. This set 
the precedent for Indians from the pure stream of Arts and Humanities and later 
on Sciences and Commerce (though not to the same extent) making it to the 
civil services. Professionals and Specialists (medicos, engineers, etc.) very 
rarely thought of a career in the bureaucracy. However, this has changed over 
the years. As governance has become more complex, need has been felt of 
'candidates with a more specialised background. This is because civil servants 
with a generalist background have increasingly been found unequal to the task. 
The recruiting bodies such as the UPSC have also been encouraging aspirants 
with a specialist background, viz., medicos, engineers, lawyers, chartered 
accountants, etc. The controversy is mainly centered on the fact that one school 
of opinion holds that a person with a general background (especially in 
Humanities/Social Sciences) is better suited for the task of civil administration 
as s/he can take an overall, macro view of the tasks and the issues at hand. The 
other school, however, holds that in the present globalised era with a lot of 
emphasis on I.T. (information technology) and on issues of economic and 
commercial significance, a specialized background is more conducive to 
effective and productive administration. The solution perhaps lies in effecting a 
grand mix of the two approaches and in India, this has been attempted. For 
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instance, the department of science and technology has often been headed by 
professional scientists rather than career bureaucrats, even though one has to 
mention that the bureaucrats have resented this. 
The task of policy making in the government is complex and needs 
specialist knowledge of the subject. Under the existing system all senior 
appointments in the ministries are monopolized by the IAS officers who are 
generalists. The hold on policymaking by a group of people who have no 
expertise in the area is regarded as the single biggest factor for poor 
administration in the country of most expert committees and knowledgeable 
persons. 
The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) which made a 
comprehensive study of reform measures needed to tone-up the 
administration observed as early as 1969. We can no longer be satisfied with 
the development of a broad genius like that of a professional civil servant, 
rather we must try and develop a professional economic administrator, a 
professional social administrator and so on. Effective administration 
requires matching each job with the man possessing the needed qualification 
and competence. The commission emphasized, 'Future administration has to 
be oriented towards specialization and an important objective of personnel 
administration should e to create and nurture the needed specialization'. 
The ARC observed that posts in the public administration presently 
occupied by the higher civil services can be classified into two categories, 
viz. posts in the field and posts in the headquarters. The field posts are held 
by members of the functional services which are charged with a technical 
qualification is required (such as various engineering services) as also which 
The Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Personnel Administration, 
Government of India, 1969, pp. 10-14. 
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specialize after entry in a particular area (such as income tax and accounts). 
Most of the organized services of the central government are already 
functional. The notable exception is the IAS whose members begin their 
career in the districts but later come to occupy posts that fall within different 
functional areas. The IAS is presently designed as a general purpose service, 
its members are manning the higher posts in different functional areas in the 
states, in the field offices as well as headquarter organizations of the central 
government. The service has its prototype the well known ICS. Consequent 
on an unprecedented increase in number, variety, and complexity of state 
activities a general purpose service should remain content with considerably 
diminished scope and utility. Today each function is important and requires 
a competent personal that should normally and for most part of their career 
operate within a particular function. The commission observed, 'If the 
higher posts in different functional areas are encoded within one service, as 
has happened in the case of IAS posts in the states, qualified and competent 
persons will not be attracted to all the needed functions and hence the 
growth of well organized services in the emerging areas of administration is 
likely to be inhibited. In the changing context, therefore, the old concept 
underlying the formation and role of the IAS would require readjustment. 
We recommend that a specific functional field must be carved out for the 
IAS. This would consist of land revenue, exercise of magisterial functions 
and regularly work in the states in fields other than those looked after by 
officers of the other functional service'. The Commission suggested that 
other posts such as Director of fisheries, agriculture, industries, registrar of 
cooperative societies, etc. and the posts in the secretariat for which other 
cadre qualify, should not be assigned to the functional areas of the IAS in 
the states. The Commission thus wanted the general purpose IAS to be 
converted into a functional service with its sphere confined. 
I l l 
The ARC laid utmost emphasis on filling up positions in the 
Secretariat which is the nerve center of the government. Making a bold 
departure from the prevalent practice, it recommended a scheme of reforms. 
which envisages entry into middle and senior management levels in the 
central secretariat from all the services. Where the regularly constituted 
services are already in existence to attend to specific functions, the middle 
and senior level positions in the corresponding areas in the Secretariat 
should formally be occupied by the members of the corresponding 
functional services. And in the non-functional areas the middle level 
personnel should be drawn, through the device of a mid-career competitive 
examination, from all the sources on the basis of equal opportunity for all. 
The Commission suggested eight disciplines for specialization: economic 
administration, industrial administration, agriculture and rural development 
administration, social and educational administration, personnel 
administration, financial administration, defence administration, internal 
security and planning. An officer of class I service (all India and central) 
possessing experience of eight to twelve years should be eligible for 
appointment to the post falling outside his functional area. The selection 
should depend on the outcome of a written test to be conducted by the 
UPSC, an interview, an assessment of the previous record. The scheme was 
intended to tackle the central problem of higher administration namely 
getting the best man for each job. 
But the report of a high powered body like the Administrative 
Reforms Commission was examined by the committee of secretaries which 
turned down the package of reforms proposed by the commission.^' One of 
S.R. Maheshwari, Administrative Reforms in India, Macmillan, New Delhi, 
2002, pp. 126-42. 
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the reasons advanced was that generalists rather than specialists were in a 
better position to advice ministers who themselves had no expertise. The All 
India Confederation of the Central Government officers termed it as a move 
on the part of the IAS to grab all positions of power in the central 
government and questioned the propriety of the same IAS officers judging 
commission's recommendations. The views of the secretaries committee 
were not put up before the cabinet. It is unfortunate that one of the most 
progressive measures for reforming the government working made far back 
in 1970 was scuttled. 
S. Venkitaramanan , former Governor of the Reserve Bank and an 
ex-IAS officer points out that a generalist lacking specialization may be at 
severe disadvantage when dealing with vital subjects such as international 
trade, monetary policy, public debt management, commercial borrowing, 
foreign exchange management, etc. He says Indian officials are at severe 
handicap and play on an uneven field when they have to deal with their 
counterparts in the outside world or multinational/multilateral negotiators 
who are trained specialists. He cites the instance of international teams of 
power negotiators who come to negotiate, surrounded by a galaxy of 
consultants who have honed up on all possible variations of how to get the 
maximum out of India. 'There is urgent need to carve out of the Indian civil 
services, a group which can specialize to man. The key ministries, they 
should be trained intensively in the subjects whose mastery is needed for the 
complex task of economic government. He cites the Japanese and the French 
systems which have specialists in finance, trade and industry where the 
^^  The Economic Times, 13 July, 1995. 
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mandarins who once enter a ministry after a tough selection stay on in the 
respective ministries without a job rotation. 
Surendra Nath^^ has recommended that for positions dealing with 
policy formulation and implementation, 'there should be an extensive 
selection and only those who can demonstrate a credible record of actual 
performance and possess the necessary knowledge and skills required for 
higher responsibilities, should be promoted. Promotion should be based on 
merit and competition rather than simple attainment of benchmark'. The 
committee has recommended for an empanelment to the post of the joint 
Secretary and above under the central staffing scheme, UPSC should be 
involved in the empanelment process which should include an interview. 
The empanelment committee should be chaired by the UPSC chairman and 
should include at least two eminent professionals. 
The IAS Dominance: The IAS today dominant all policy making 
posts in the central ministries, even in areas like Finance where specialist 
officers are available from the central class I services. In the states, the IAS 
officers, besides holding all key secretariat posts, occupy the field posts of 
director of most technical departments and head of state public sector 
undertakings. Over the years the strength of the IAS cadre has grown 
substantially to around 5,000 from a level of about 600 in 1950-51 (in 1950-
51 there were in addition 300 ICS officers). The IAS service rules are so 
framed as to maintain their supremacy creating resentment among other 
23 Department of Personnel Administrative Reforms, Report of Committee to 
Rreview the System of Performance Appraisal, Promotion and Empanelment for 
Officers of the All India Services and Group A Services, Government of India, 
(Chairman: Lt. Gen. Surendra Nath), 2003. 
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services including the defence forces. The IAS officers get time bound 
promotions, including for top level posts of the joint secretary, the 
additional secretary and the secretary, unlike other services where the 
promotion is related to availability of vacancies. If posts are not available, 
use is made of the provision of creating ex-cadre posts under the IAS cadre 
rules. In order to keep hold on the central Secretariat, recourse is taken to 
what is known as the central deputation reserve, which has been fixed at 40 
per cent of the senior duty posts in the states, thus certain number of posts 
have to be earmarked for the IAS officers from the states irrespective of 
their merit. In order to maintain their hold on senior appointments, an 
informal arrangement is made that the officers of the central services should 
put in two additional years of service in their respective cadre for becoming 
eligible to the post of the joint secretary and above. The rule which 
apparently has no legal basis, it bars even outstanding officers of the central 
services from holding top level posts that of the additional secretary and the 
secretary as by the time their turn canes, they are either in higher grade in 
their own cadre are nearing retirement. 
A perspective commentator '^* observes, 'Let us not talk of 
administrative reforms in this country as long as the IAS controls the 
personnel policy ... and the IAS has sabotaged all expert recommendations 
for administrative reforms'. The key posts of the cabinet secretary, the 
secretary personnel and establishment officers are invariably held by the 
IAS officers who are not able to rise above narrow partisan interest and 
indiscriminate against other services. The cabinet secretary is held of the 
civil services and expected to ensure its independent functioning without 
fear or favour. In July 2001, the government amended the rules by inserting 
^^ The Economic Times, 28 Nov. 1995 
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a new provision under FR 56, so that it could grant extension of service up 
to two years to the cabinet secretary. This was an unusual decision, first to 
have an age of retirement of the cabinet secretary different than other 
members of the civil services and second, government keeping discretion 
with itself to grant extension. How can a cabinet secretary who depends on 
the government's bounty to get extension of service maintain independence 
and protect other members of the civil services? 
Nirmal Mukherjee former cabinet secretary and a member of the 
elite ICS core traces the genesis under which the ICS came into being as an 
All India Service. British India was ruled by a governor general under whom 
the governors ruled the provinces and the districts officers ruled the district. 
The business of governance was centralized and unitary. The key 
functionaries of all three levels of the pyramid - the center, the provinces 
and the districts, had to be knit together in a common structure for the 
common purpose of preserving the Raj. When India became independent, 
Sardar Patel pleaded strongly for the retention of all India services on the 
ground of maintaining unity of the country, although several states were 
opposed to the idea. Subsequently, some states wanted all India services like 
the IAS and IPS abolished, and expressed the same before the Sarkaria 
Commission on center-state relations and other forums. Mukherjee says that 
the whole context under which the IAS functions today has changed. India is 
a federal democracy with power getting decentralized to the panchayats and 
the municipalities and observes, 'Basically for a service recruited and 
controlled by the center to supply officers for the key posts in the states and 
for the states to accept the arrangement because the said posts are reserved 
Nirmal Mukherjee, "Restructuring the Bureaucracy", Economic and Political 
Weekly, 17-24 December, 1994, pp. 3193-3194. 
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for such officers is a position wholly incompatible with our federal 
democracy'. Lamenting on the deterioration in the standard of service 
Mukherjee says that the IAS is sinking under the weight of its own 
numbers'. The service has fallen steeply in public esteem, because for too 
many IAS officers are seen to be corrupt or in league with the politicians or 
in many states communal or casteiest. It's very reason for existence as an 
elite body no longer holds true'. He argues for abolition of the IAS as it has 
outlived its utility. The end result would be central, state and local 
government bureaucracies under the control of elected rulers at each level so 
that autonomy for the states and self-government would be imbued with 
meaning. 
Similar views have been expressed by Abid Hussain a 
distinguished former member of the IAS. He says that, 'the present situation 
is that the structure of the All India services would appear to be 
incompatible with the development of full fledged representative democratic 
government at the district level. In plain words, that law and order has also 
to be brought within the ambit of elected district council which should be in-
charge of development activity. It may well mean the disappearance of the 
post of district collectors an institution traditionally venerated by the 
advocates of the All India Service'. Advocating specialization by the IAS 
officers he says, 'Above a certain level above the present joint secretary to 
the Government of India level - the posts should be manned by persons 
drawn from different services and sources and even from industry corporate 
houses, NGO's and the posts of secretaries should not be near monopoly of 
the IAS officers'. Hussain further elaborates that it would be na'ive to expect 
IAS to change the pattern of governance. They have a vested interest in 
Abid Hussain, Some Ideas on Governance in Fifty Years of Indian Parliament, 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 531-33. 
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preserving the status quo and also lack the vision and imagination to devise 
new and innovative policies. It is evident that without restructuring and 
redefining the role of the IAS, no major administrative reform in governance 
can take place. 
Higher Degree of Centralized Personnel Management 
The staff policy of the Central Secretariat, which is its nerve center 
holds key to efficient functioning of the administration. The main fiinctions 
of the Secretariat are: policymaking, framing rules, principles of procedure, 
preparation of the budget of the ministry and financial control, guiding, 
directing and evaluating the work of executive agencies and assisting the 
minister in his parliamentary, legislative and public activities. The secretary 
is the administrative head of the ministry and principal adviser to the 
minister. He is assisted by the additional secretary and the joint secretary. 
The secretariat hierarchy runs as follows: secretary additional secretary, 
joint secretary, director, deputy secretary, under secretary, section officer, 
assistant UDC, LDC, all staff up to the level of section officers are members 
of various Central Secretariat Services (CSS). There is also a nucleus of 
staff of the CSS at the level of the under secretary and at higher levels. The 
superior positions in the Secretariat are manned by officers selected from 
the IAS and the central services group A, in what is known as tenure posting 
- which implies serving the secretariat for a fixed number of years and 
thereafter going back to the present cadre. 
Under the Transaction of Business Rules 1961, all senior 
appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) consist of the prime 
minister, the home minister and the concerned minister under whose 
jurisdiction the appointment falls. According to the central staffing scheme 
for posts of the rank of the deputy secretary, the directory and the joint 
secretary, the ACC is assisted by the Central Establishment Board (CEB) 
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which consists of the cabinet secretary as the chairman, the secretary and 
one secretary to the government of India as member, establishment office as 
the member secretary and the secretary of the administrative ministry as co-
opted member. The ACC's approval is required for all board level 
appointments of central public sector undertakings(PSU), appointment and 
promotion of officers of the rank of the joint secretary and above of the 
organized central services and chief executives of all autonomous bodies. 
ACC handles a large volume of appointments every year. To an idea, in one 
year 2001-02 the volume of appointments handled by ACC was follow: 323 
officers were appointed to the posts of the joint secretary and below under 
the central staffing scheme; 348 appointments were made of CMD's and 
functional directors of PSUs including banks; 86 appointments were made 
of chief executives of autonomous bodies; 128 appointments of 
chairman/members of various tribunals; 120 appointments up to the level of 
additional general managers in railways besides, 1670 officers were 
approved for appointment to posts of the level of the joint secretary and 
above in the organized central services. The ACC approves not only initial 
appointment but has reserved for itself power to great extension of 
deputation tenure, as well as any change in the original terms of 
appointment, such as pay-fixation. As the prime minister is the chairman of 
the ACC he is personally expected to approve appointment of put up to him. 
It is simply not possible for the prime minister to have an application of 
mind and judge the merit of an appointment when hundreds of cases are put 
up to him. In practice, officials in the Prime Minister's office (PMO) go 
through the proposals and convey his approval. This has lead to the 
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Annua! Report, 
Government of India, 2001-02, pp. 1-3. 
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unhealthy practice of PMO becoming a new center of power, its officials 
interfering with ministerial/civil services board's recommendations. The 
existing system also causes considerable delay in appointment with key 
posts often lying vacant for months. The existing system of appointment 
needs a thorough overhaul. There is need to do away with ACC and 
entrusting the responsibility of making selection of top level posts to the 
Union Public Service Commission(UPSC). 
The department of personnel is the nodal ministry dealing with 
policy in respect of personnel matters. Due to common criteria prescribed by 
the ministry, there is a great deal of uniformity in the civil services, which is 
not conducive to effective management of diverse departments of the 
Government with complex functions. Advocating greater delegation of 
powers, the Fifth Pay Commission^^ observed, 'There is need for greater 
freedom in personnel matters within the existing system subject to specified 
budget on pay and allowances. Individual departments should be allowed to 
determine the structure of their cadres within the existing pay scales without 
the intervention of the ministries of finance and personnel. They should also 
be authorized to work out incentives applicable to their employees, within 
the parameters of general guidelines, like increments, lump-sum payments, 
productivity linked bonus, etc. The departments should also enjoy greater 
freedom in respect of personnel who are specific to such departments and 
are not to be found in other ministries'. The commission observed that the 
department of personnel should be confined to laying down general policy 
guidelines in respect of matters like recruitment, promotion, deputation etc. 
^^  Ministry of Finance, Report of the Fifth Pay Commission, Vol. I, Government of 
India, January 1997, Para 14.6, p. 156. 
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The centralized control of the Department of Personnel is playing 
havoc with the discipline of young probationers recruited to the central 
group A services through civil services examination conducted by the 
UPSC. Some probationers do not take training seriously as they appear in 
the civil services examination to improve their rank and to switch to other 
services like the IAS and customs and central excise. Cadre authorities such 
as the railways and audit and accounts to which the probationers belong, 
have no authority to bar such probationers from switching services. In case 
these probationers join another service, time and money spent on their 
training and salary paid to them goes waste. Most ministries have a 
centralized system of governance with all powers concentrated in 
Secretariat/headquarters with very little delegation to various directorates, 
field outfits and autonomous bodies functioning under them. Delegation of 
authority is critical to effective fiinctioning of the government and cutting 
down levels and the time taken in arriving at a decision. Centralized control 
leads to inefficiency, delay and wastage, as one set of rules cannot be 
equally applicable to thousands of diverse situations which obtain in a 
country of India's size and complexity. The Administrative Reforms 
Commission had argued for greater delegation as it helps speedy decision 
which is the essence of good administration. It laid down two criteria: in 
making delegations the approach should be that powers to be delegated be 
the 'maximum possible' in the circumstances then minimum necessary. 
Wherever any modifications or changes have been made in the delegations, 
there should be done through amendments to the rules themselves and not 
• 29 
through executive instructions. 
^' Administrative Reforms Commission, Delegation of Financial and Administrative 
Powers, Government of India, 1969, p. 3. 
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Administrative Laws, Rules and Procedures 
One of the biggest problems facing the Indian administration is 
plethora of laws, meaning statutory laws passed by competent legislature, 
many of which have become outdated and are impractical to apply, but the 
government is unable to rescind, change or modify them, creating all round 
confusion and hardship to the common man. The position of Administrative 
laws, that is, subordinate legislation comprising of rules, regulations, 
statutory orders and administrative instructions issued on the strength of 
authority conferred by a statute is more alarming, and the individual 
ministries issuing them do not even have a complete up-to-date set of them. 
A government appointed commission to review administrative law observed, 
'The commission could not have access to a complete set of subordinate 
legislation in the form of rules, regulations, administrative instructions, 
issued under different central Acts, by individual ministries and department. 
The problem is compounded due to the fact that in terms of certain laws, 
like Essential Commodities Act, as many as 13 Ministries have issued over 
150 orders. In sheer disgust the commission left the job of collating and 
rationalizing administrative laws. However, commission took the 
responsibility of reviewing statutory laws and came to some rewarding 
findings and recommendations. 
The Commission found that the government does not even have a 
complete list of central statutes. The legislative department had given the 
commission a list of 1,079 statutes. The commission collated the 
information and found that there are nearly 2,500 statutes on the books. In 
case of laws passed by the states the commission had the following 
Department of Administrative Reforms, Report of the Commission on Review of 
Administrative Laws, Government of India, Vol. I, September 1998, 
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observation to make. 'There is not even a rough estimate available about the 
number of laws operating as the state laws. In one state the numbers of state 
laws are of the order of 1,100. Thus there might be 25,000 to 30,000 laws of 
the states'. Even the figure of 2,500 central statutes, mentioned by the 
commission, seems an underestimate. Bibek Debroy, points out that there 
are 3,279 central statutes on the statute book, up to the year 1999 of which 
he is in possession of complete texts, the earliest one issued in the year 1836 
with 139 statutes going back to the nineteenth century. 
The Commission made a painstaking job of reviewing the statutes 
and recommended repeal of over 1,300 statutes as follows: (a) 166 Central 
acts (including 1 pre-nationalisation acts and 20 validation acts); (b) 315 
Amendment acts; (c) 11 British statutes still in force; (d) 17 war time 
permanent ordinances; (e) 114 central acts relating to the state subjects; (f) 
77 Appropriation Acts passed by the Parliament. The commission noted that 
in the concurrent list such as labour welfare, land acquisition, levy of stamp 
duty, registration of instruments, states have enacted their own laws for the 
enforcement and pleaded for the harmonization and unification of various 
laws, 'Different aspects of particular sectors like industries and trade are 
fragmented among the departments in the same Ministry or among different 
Ministries. There is little effort to converge laws and regulations 
administered by different departments, in order to address the problem of the 
industry and users in a focused manner'. As a result of the Commission's 
recommendation the government has taken up the job of reviewing the old 
laws. 404 obsolete acts have since been repealed and repeal of 1,383 laws 
are being considered by the government.^^If there are impractical laws on 
Bibek Debroy, In the Dock: Absurdities of Indian Law, Konark Publishers, 
2000, pp. 4-6. 
^^  Indian Express, 2 February, 2004. 
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the statute book, it gives handle to public functionaries to apply the law 
selectively and cause harassment to the public. Bibek Debroy, points a care 
where a five star hotel in Delhi, was prosecuted under Sarais Act of 1867 for 
not giving free drink water to a passes by, as it was not willing to bribe the 
Municipal staff. There is an urgent need to eliminate the old and 
dysfunctional legislation and harmonize and unify the statutes. There is also 
need for some set provisions in the laws, similar to those in USA, so that a 
statute becomes invalid after the expiry of a particular period of time. 
One pervasive feature of the Indian bureaucratic machine is the 
existence of a large number of rules relating to service conditions as well as 
operational matters such as fundamental rules, supplementary rules, general 
financial rules, delegation of financial power rules, treasury rules, account 
code and conduct rules. They have been framed during the British rule and 
bear a heavy imprint of colonial mindset with emphasis on checks and 
balances, lack of trust and suspicion. Numerous clarifications, 
administrative instructions and guidelines have been issued making them 
bulky, confusing and often incomprehensible. Even the ministry of finance 
and the department of personnel which issues innumerable clarifications on 
these rules every year is unable to keep pace and has now entrusted their 
publication to a private publisher, who brings out unauthenticated copies, 
which most government departments are forced to use in the absence of an 
official publication. One can imagine the chaos which the system leads to. In 
most of the government department these rules are interpreted and applied 
by junior functionaries in what is called babus, senior officers have neither 
time nor inclination to wade through them. Take for example, a person on 
temporary duty in another office, more than 8 km from his headquarters, if 
he spends a full day, is treated as an hour and can draw a Daily Allowance. 
Audit parfies of the office of the Director General of Audit, spend couple of 
months every year doing audit of offices located beyond 8 km from their 
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office, and draw a daily allowance without going out of station. The rule 
made during the British region possibly because the city limits did not 
extend beyond 8 km, continues on the rule-book. Employees take full 
advantage of the provision and draw hefty amounts are D.A. in full 
knowledge of CAG and the ministry of finance. The system of 
allocation of budget is critical to efficient functioning of office. Under the 
existing system budget allotted to a department/ organization/office is 
divided into numerous accounts giving ceiling limits within which it can be 
spent in what is known a line item Budgeting. 
Thus, much of the problem arises due to rules and procedures have 
not been updated, modernized and brought in tune with day to day realities 
in which the public services function. 
Colonial Mindset Behaviour 
The mindset of the government functionaries is the biggest problem, 
particularly higher civil service. They feel that they are the rules and the 
public their subject whom they can treat the way they please. They have not 
take responsibility to solve the common man's problem. There is a lack of 
accessibility of key officers, whether it is at the district or in the secretariat. 
The general public perceives bureaucrats particularly those holding senior 
positions as arrogant, superstitious, snobbish, and indifferent to the needs of 
people, they are expected to serve. They are interested in power and throw 
their weight around at the cost of helpless public. This mindset has played 
havoc with the public services with the common man paying the price. 
Sunanda K. Datt Ray^ ,^ journalist portrays a public perception about 
governance, 'My worst nightmare in India is having to deal with the 
authority. Municipal councilors and government secretaries are dragons 
^^  Sunanda K., Datta Ray, " Gods that Failed", Outlook, 18 August 2002, pp. 80-84 
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breathing fire and brimstone; electricity board officials and people in charge 
of water and sewage give me shivers. I would rather be without telephone 
than report its death and risk a snarl or a shrug... Consequence is measured 
in terms of exceptions. The important Indian does not queue at the airport 
check-in counter, he does not submit to security checks at official functions, 
he does not provide ration card or passport as identification. It is not a 
question of inconvenience, it is a question of izzat. Not only is he above the 
rules that govern the ordinary mortals but he must be seen by the world to be 
so blessed'. Putting the blame for the state of affairs on the public officials, 
he concludes, 'A barren civil service must bear the blame for perpetuating 
an archaic view of society. Trained in absolute paternalistic mould of the 
nineteenth century administrators who were charged with running the 
country with no question of accountability, except to their official superiors, 
but lacking their drive and dedication, it rarely rises above the level of 
routine clerk'. He laments, 'Every time I see the whirling red light atop 
some petty bureaucrat's battered ambassador, I am reminded again of how 
important the trappings of office is for small men who lord over our caste-
ridden society. Officials of limited understanding and imagination aspire to 
no higher distinction than to be able to drive through the red lights in full 
view of what they imagine is an awestruck multitude. 
Much of the problem of bureaucracy arises due to its colonial 
legacy. Since independence, there has hardly been any change in its culture, 
work style, structure and organization. A few hundred ICS men of what was 
known as steel frame governed the country by iron first grip on the 
administrative machinery. They were supported by a vast army of the 
educated Indians holding clerical and middle level jobs, whose loyalty was 
bought by clever mix of crumbs of power and opportunity of illegal 
gratification. They survived by servility, doing ji-huzoori and chamchagiri 
of the imperial masters. The public force mostly composed of the Indians, 
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whose echelons were corrupt, terrorized natives and kept them under 
submission, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister in the Interim 
Government at the center, told the Congress Party in 1946: "The civil 
services were fossilized to bygone and obsolete methods and refused to 
move with the times... It remains to be seen how long we can function in 
these circumstances. The experience of the past three or four months has 
shown us that the conduct and attitude of the officers have not changed".^'* 
So, after Independence, it would be abolished the old administrative 
system lock and barrel and developed a people friendly model of governance 
suiting our conditions. Instead it retained the decrepit system with its thick 
layer of hierarchy. Senior officers shut themselves in their offices 
surrounded by a retinue of Pas and liveried peons keeping themselves aloof 
from their own subordinate staff and took decision through file, with 
copious noting through numerous layers it passed, always starting from the 
bottom rung of the hierarchy - the clerk or the babu. The Indian successors 
to the British masters acquired all the evils of the old system - arrogance, 
treating public with contempt and servility to their immediate superiors. 
Thus they revealed in bullying and bossing over those who are below and 
excessively week towards their superiors. 
Gunnar Myrdar , the Nobel Prize winning social scientist observed 
that the independence brought rapid advancement for the Indian members of 
the civil service, the police and the army in the upper ranks of these services 
due to the departure of the British. The Indian office holders moved into the 
lavish palaces of the former viceroys, and state governors and were given 
civilian and military staff whose functions were purely ceremonial. The 
'^* The Indian Annual Register, July-December, 1946, Vol. XI, pp. 289-99. 
'^ Gunnar, Myrdal, Asian Drama, vol. I, Penguin Books, England, 1998, pp. 273-74 
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right to ride in big cars marked with flags was eagerly sought as symbol of 
authority, and the official trips of governors and ministers were conducted 
with pomp and protocol. These manifestations widened the gulf between 
rulers and the ruled and to divert attention from fundamental reforms in 
Indian society. Such resplendence emphasised the new government's role as 
the successor to the British raj; it also encouraged the view that political 
independence had done little more than displace a foreign with a native 
privileged group'. 
CORRUPTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY AND GOVERNANCE 
Corruption has become intractable in administration owing to the 
growing incidence of corruption in higher places. This implies ministerial 
levels in government and leadership among the political class in general. 
The 'Tehelka' episode during 2001 exposed the nexus between officials, 
political function cries and the ministerial level or the secretariats under it. 
Integrity is an important element in enforcing accountability of the civil and 
defence services. The ministerial level has to discharge this responsibility in 
the government. The elected representatives perform the same task in the 
legislature and its committees. How can they elicit respect or generate just 
fear if their own integrity is in doubt? What is more, there is a general belief 
that incidence of corruption and misuse of authority is more widespread at 
that level than in the Civil Service. In' fact, the nexus between the corrupt 
civil servant and the corrupt minister has been believed in this country since 
the very beginning. The political masters are, therefore, accepted by the 
public as shielding the corrupt and adding to the general environment 
proliferating corruption.^^ 
Kamla Prasad, Indian Administration: Politics, Policies and Prospects, Dorling 
Kindersley, India, 2006, p. 311. 
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A commission was appointed by Lai Bahadur Shastri as Home 
Minister to report on prevention of corruption. The commission in its report 
concluded that, "there is large consensus of opinion that a tradition of 
integrity can be established only if the example is set by those who have the 
ultimate responsibility for the Government of India, namely, the Ministers of 
the Central and the State Government". It suggested procedures for (a) 
dealing with specific allegations against Central and state ministers; (b) a 
code of conduct for them; (c) a code of conduct for M.Ps and MLAs; and (d) 
a code of conduct for political parties. This was a wasted labour. Political 
leadership at that time and since has not shown any inclination to bite the 
bullet. An eminent opportunity to send a strong message to wrong elements 
in the ministries and also the civil service was, thus, allowed to lapse. 
Floodgates of corruption in high places became wide open during 
the regime of Indira Gandhi and her successors. She was seen to ignore the 
menace by stating that it was a global phenomenon. Within government, no 
action was taken against tainted ministers who appeared to get close to her 
commerce Minister L.N. Misra became a symbol of corruption in the public 
mind. This led to the public complaint for the first time that the 
fountainhead of corruption lay at the top. There was suspicion of 'extra 
constitutional authority' exercising official power and engaging in misuse 
for political and family benefits. This was highly damning when the loyalty 
test was introduced for senior civil servants if they wished to enjoy safety 
and property. States were quick to follow suit. Corruption at all levels grew 
by leaps and bounds. There was no longer an adequate check to arrest the 
tide. There were willing civil servants available to join in the race for 
political favour in promotion to prestigious positions and in making 
illegitimate gains. The moral authority of the government was so eroded that 
it was in no position to control the cancerous growth in the bureaucracy.^^ 
^^ Ibid, p. 3\2. 
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Since the late 1980, corruption in the political sphere has become a 
house-hold story. Bofors and the DKW deals under Rajiv Gandhi; Hawala 
telecom, and JMM pay off during the Narasimha Rao regime; the fodder 
scam of Bihar under Laloo Yadav; commercial contracts and land deals of 
Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu and others read like a politico-bureaucratic who's 
who. The action of the BJP coalition at the center in shifting corruption 
cases involving Jayalalitha from the courts dealing with them seemed to 
ignore corruption in favour of political expediency. The Apex Court finally 
undid this. Petrol-pump allotments under A.B. Vajpayee brought judicial 
intervention and the Apex court also dubbed the following government 
action as an effort to scuttle fair investigation. The collapse of UTI-US64 
saw allegations against the Prime Minister's office which could be quietened 
only after his threat of resignation. 
Recruitment scams in Punjab and Maharashtra Public Service 
Commission's; Land allotment scam in Delhi Development Authority; arrest 
of a high court judge in the DDA scam; complaints against judges in Punjab, 
Rajasthan and Kamataka expose the growth of graft in high places. The 21^' 
century has sounded a warning but without effective steps to reverse the 
trend. The fact remains that political attitudes are suspicious of all aspects of 
the matter, namely complaints, investigations, sanctions of prosecution, and 
placement and change of manpower engaged in dealing with complaints of 
corruption in high places. A judicial outlook of protecting itself as a 
sanctuary for the legal fraternity alone despite improprieties has added to the 
malady. In fact the judiciary has removed the executive from effective 
choice in appointments to the higher judiciary and the current exposures 
leave the politicians aside. Inter-institutional power politics and lure of 
consumerism have a role in the slide in integrity in high places in recent 
times. 
India has debated the institution ofLokpal for a long time. It has not 
been possible to finalize legislation. The institution of Lokayukta exists in 
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several states. In most of them they are weak and largely ineffective. In any 
case, they have not been able to discipline ministers. Prevention is the better 
part of cure but that is proving impossible. Establishing institutions is easy 
but to make them effective is the crux of the matter. Lately, courts have 
endowed the Central Bureau of Investigation with a lot of prestige. They 
have gone to the length of divesting government of the authority of effective 
direction and deployment. And yet, the complaint remains that it functions 
as a political arm of the ruling party at the center. It is also running the risk 
of being overburdened with work it cannot be manage. Centralization has 
not rendered good service to any part of the government, it has not delivered 
any better recently. Prosecution by the media has been the net outcome. In 
the states, the anti-corruption bureaus are even more ineffective. In Bihar, 
for instance, it mounts a drive on the eve of closure of the financial year to 
prevent misuse of funds at the last minute. Corruption remains unabated. 
The real problem is the lack of faith of the masses in the intensions of 
government and the political class in general to arrest the slide in integrity 
and commitment to punish the corrupt. 
Corruption at high places gets all the media attention it is the lower 
level graft which hurts the common man. An ordinary person has to face a 
great deal of inconvenience if he has to get a passport, a driving license or 
an electric connection. Departments such as police, Municipal Corporation, 
land records, sales tax, income tax, excise and customs are known to cause 
harassment to people and even routine work cannot be done without giving 
bribe to the lower level functionaries. The archaic rules and procedures are 
largely responsible for much of bureaucratic corruption as they have built in 
provision for delay and prevarication. S.S. Gill^^ has given at the heart of 
the centre of power, organizations such as DDA, MCD, electricity and 
S.S. Grill, The Pathology of Corruption, Haxper Collins, India, pp. 206-25 
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police have systematized corruption, where the official are involved in a 
betting, land grabbing, unauthorized construction theft of power and illegal 
plying of transport vehicles. Even when some determined citizens approach 
senior officers of the department for relief, the senior functionaries find 
themselves helpless against babudom and the work is not done till they 
caught up money. The conduct and disciplinary rules are so complicated, 
that even if officials are found dereliction their duties and causing 
harassment to citizens, no punitive action can be effectively taken against 
them. Thus the most invidious form of immoral behaviour on the part of 
bureaucracy in India is the phenomenon of corruption. The all-pervasive 
incidence of corruption in Indian administrative system presents a picture of 
corrupt officials wheeling and dealing in bribery, extortion, nepotism and 
misuse of official position. It has given rise to a public misperception that 
unless proven otherwise a government servant in all probability is a corrupt 
official. 
It must be noted however, that bureaucratic corruption in the Third 
World tends to differ from that of the industrialized countries in its scope 
and intensity. Where goods and services provided by the public authorities 
are for below the great demand for them, as in India, it is not uncommon to 
see people paying a small sum to minor official for reserving a seat in 
public transportation, for being admitted in a hospital, for getting a 
telephone connection or licence, or for meeting any other administrative 
need. Here, scarcity of public resources and almost unlimited demand by the 
community give rise to such corrupt and unethical practices. As the craving 
for material goods, benefits continue to increase, price for such goods and 
services rise. Public officials who are in charge of the provision or 
regulation of such services will continue to face temptation, and some may 
try to avail themselves of whatever opportunities their position provides 
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them. Their actions, in turn, tend to conform the prevailing public view that 
officials are generally corrupt. And, of course, nothing is so corrupting as a 
suspicion of corruption. 
Other factors causing corruption and unethical conduct among 
public servants are job scarcity, insufficient salary, and the ever-increasing 
powers being given to them by the State to regulate its economy and social 
affairs. The evolution of civil societies was marked by the regulation of 
human conduct and inter-personal and inter-institutional dealings within a 
framework of civil, criminal and other laws and the society at large was 
expected to conform to given value systems and codes of conduct. But the 
regulations and systems which were evolved to impact objectivity and 
fairness to the mechanisms of governance did not invariable achieve this 
objective. This increased regulatory authority creates various opportunities 
for money-making, as for instance in connection with development 
planning, permits, contracts for construction, granting import-export 
licenses, collecting customs and other duties and strict accounting for 
foreign exchange. Experience has shown that the exercise of regulatory 
authority has actually contributed to an increase in corruption in various 
spheres of administrative control and enforcement. 
Administrative corruption in India has also been encouraged by the 
pervasive spread of the soft-state syndrome, a rigid bureaucracy, exclusivist 
process of decision-making in an over-centralised government, abysmally 
low pay of civil servants and lack of stringent and effective internal control 
mechanism.'"' 
N.N. Vohra, "Corruption and the India Polity" Denouncement, December, New 
40 
Delhi, 1999, pp. 7-10. 
The Hindustan Times, 2 September, 1996 
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According to N. Vittal, the present central Vigilance Commissioner, 
Government of India, corruption flourishes in our system because of five 
basic reasons: 
> scarcity of goods and services, 
> red tape and complicated rules and procedures, 
> lack of transparency in decision-making, 
> legal cushions of safety we have built for the corrupt people under 
the very healthy principle that everybody is innocent till proved 
guilty, and 
> tribalism or biradari among the corrupt who protect each other. 
We say 'thick as thieves' not thick as honest people. Corruption is a 
low risk, high profit activity. He identify five major players in corruption -
the neta, babu, lala, jhola and dada - the corrupt politician, the corrupt 
bureaucrat, the corrupt businessman, the corrupt NGO and the criminal.""A 
consequence of a valueless policy governing the country has been the 
continuing erosion of the integrity of the civil services. To achieve their 
short-term objectives, the political executive has been deploying pliant 
functionaries, handpicked on considerations of their caste, community or 
political affiliations, to man key assignments. This has resulted in the cadres 
of the various civil services, including the police and judicial services, being 
demoralized and their functioning adversely effected. There are no more any 
role models - unknown persons of dubious distinction can get appointments 
to the highest posts in the country. 
Combating Corruption in Administrative Machinery: Being aware 
of the problem of corruption Government in India has from time to time 
"' N. Vittal, "Eliminating Corruption: Myth and Reality", Supra note 39, pp. 11-13. 
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adopted various means to check it. In the pre independence days, the British 
Government in India had in 1941 set up a special police force at the Central 
level, known as "the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DPSE), in order to 
check corruption confined to lower or middle level functionaries. This was 
given statutory status by enacting the DSPE Act, 1946. With the creation of 
the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in April 1963, the DPSE became 
a part of this larger anticorruption police organization. Meanwhile more 
legal powers to punish corrupt public servants were secured by the 
Government with the enactment of "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947". 
Again, a Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) 1998 was enacted which has 
replaced the PCA Act of 1947. These two instruments coupled with 
commission of Inquiry Act of 1952 were by and large considered adequate 
to cope up with the degree and level of corruption prevalent at that time. 
However, over the years there has been a sharp decline in the efficiency and 
efficacy of the CBI and questions have been raised about its impartiality and 
competence as an investigating and a prosecuting agency."*^ 
The Report of the Santhanam Committee (1964) and the 
Administrative Reforms Commission (1967) recommended the creation of 
the institution of Lokpal at the Centre and the Lokayuktas in the states to 
investigate alleged cases of corruption against ministers. While the various 
state governments in the last three decades have experimented with the 
constitution, abolition, and reconstitution of Lokayuktas, the Centre has yet 
to establish the institution of Lokpal (despite the five abortive efforts in 
1968, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1985 and 1998). The miserable failure of the 
Lokayuktas, who had often become the victim of politics and their total 
O.P. Sharma, "Combating Corruption in India the CBI Way: a Genuine Concern 
or Ad-hocism", in Noorjahan Bava, Development Policies and Administration in 
India, Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 103-22. 
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ineffectiveness to check the monstrous growth of corruption is too well 
known and needs no documentation. ^ 
The high level corruption in administration was supposed to be 
tackled by an Independent Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), created 
through a Government resolution of 1 February 1964, whose tenure kept on 
changing from initial 6 years to 3 years (1977) and again to 5 years (1990), 
making it weaker and more vulnerable. The jurisdiction of CVC was 
extended in 1986 to cover the staff and officers of the Public Sector 
Undertakings. Various Ministries and Government offices also established 
individual Vigilance Departments to keep a track on the complaints of 
corruption emanating in their officer. However, despite a large number of 
cases of alleged corruption investigated and reports submitted to the 
legislature, only a small percentage of cases have been recommended for 
prosecution.'*'* In pursuance of the directions of the Supreme Court in the 
Jain Hawala Case (Vineet Narain and others Vs. Union of India and Others) 
to confer statutory status upon the Central Vigilance Ordinance, 1999 on 8 
January 1999, but the bill replacing the above ordinance lapsed consequent 
to the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in April 1999. The Government has 
initiated action to reintroduce the Central Vigilance Bill in the present Lok 
Sabha (2000). ^^  
In addition to the above mentioned efforts and simultaneous use of 
the various Inquiry Commissions appointed by the Government during the 
last fifty years of the Republic, there has not been any concerted, 
43 
44 
45 
The Hindustan Times, 12 September, 1998. 
The Hindustan Times, 10 October, 1997. 
See Vivek K. Agnihotri, "Government of India's Measures for Administrative 
Reforms", A Note Submitted to the Indian Council of Social Science Research 
Symposium on Administrative Reforms, 3 January 2000. 
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coordinated, effective and continuous fight to prevent corruption or 
prosecute and punish the corrupt - a miniscule of successful cases of 
th 
prosecution and punishment notwithstanding. In 1997, on the 50 
anniversary of India's Independence the then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral 
made an earnest call from the rampant of the Red Fort to root out corruption 
and followed it up by the formation of a special cell in the Prime Minister's 
Office (PMO), which was to play the role a watchdog over the investigating 
agencies. However, it did not have much impact in bringing the black sheep 
in the bureaucracy to book. IN a survey carried out by The Hindsutan Times 
in certain key states like Tamil Nadu, Assam, Punjab, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, 
Jammu and Kashmir, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh, reports 
revealed that although an increasing number of Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) and Indian Police Service (IPS) officers figured in corruption 
cases, the wheels of justice were not moving fast enough to punish the 
guilty. Procedural delays, political patronage and resistance from within the 
bureaucracy appeared to be helping corrupt officials evade the long arm of 
the law.^ ^ 
GOVERNANCE A N D RESPONSES OF BUREAUCRACY: FROM POST-
INDEPENDENCE UP TO GLOBALIZATION 
Bureaucracy in independent India was called upon to outgrow two of 
its historical legacies, namely, the law-and-order/revenue-oriented role in 
colonial India, and its feudalistic and patrimonial role in princely States 
integrated with the Indian union. Bureaucracy after independence set about 
implementing the agenda of its political masters (as it is supposed to do). 
Following achievement of Independence, the Congress Party was broadly 
committed to democratic socialism, secularism and non-alignment (in its 
The Hindustan Times, 13 November, 1997. 
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foreign policy). The bureaucracy set about implementing this. Since the 
country was a fresh, newly independent nation free after centuries of colonial 
rule, initially there was a lot of enthusiasm amongst the political leadership as 
well as the bureaucracy regarding nation-building. Barring some black sheep in 
their ranks, the bureaucrats, by and large, exhibited high standards of 
professional and personal conduct. Of course, even then as now, they had 
'Burra Sahib' attitude but rarely were they accused of professional and 
personal misconduct (unlike now). Though professionally, the desire to get 
ahead was there, the desire for personal aggrandisement was rare. 
The idea most fundamentally, entailed that a bureaucrat should be 
hundred percent committed to the policies and programmes of the political 
party in power. By extension, this also implied ftjll commitment to the 
individual politicians holding power. A bureaucrat was not to be guided by any 
other consideration. This development was, essentially, a consequence of the 
belief in the Congress circles that the electoral debacle the party had suffered in 
1967 was in no small measure due to the fact that the civil bureaucracy had not 
faithfully delivered on the party's programmes, thus alienating the voters from 
the party. Whatever may be the merits of this argument, the idea of a 
committed bureaucracy gathered momentum and eventually, became a part and 
parcel of Indian public administration. This had very far reaching and basically 
negative consequences. Once the idea gained legitimacy, bureaucrats began 
currying favours from their political masters. Plum postings were offered to 
those who did the bidding of their political bosses, while those who insisted on 
following an independent line based on professional opinion were punished. 
Punishment took the form of arbitrary transfers, postings to insignificant 
departments and in some cases, even suspension from service. A system of 
rewards and punishments got institutionalised in due course of time with civil 
servants being rewarded and punished on the basis of their loyalty and 
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commitment to politicians or parties and not on the basis of their professional 
performance. As indicated above, over a period of time, the politician-
bureaucrat nexus grew into a powerful force immensely benefitting both the 
parties, but spelling a blow to the concept of development and citizen friendly 
administration. This was, in fact, the 'politicization of the bureaucracy' about 
which we hear so much laments now. 
The post- Independence objectives of the Indian political system were 
conceptualized in terms of State-led strategy of industrialization and the 
goals of civic community development in rural and urban India. It was in 
this context that public administration in India tried to address, in its own 
way, the objective of building up a new structure of administration with a 
thrust on "development administration" conceptualized by Edward Weidner 
as "an action-oriented and goal-oriented administrative system".''^ Much of 
this discussion about development administration was made in the context of 
the new task of socio-economic change and national integration, though the 
concomitant development of the early decades after Independence was also 
the establishment of a bureaucratic apparatus for controlling the expending 
scope of the public sector enterprises. Along with public enterprises, 
however, about 500 Bloc Development Officers in each newly created 
lowest level of administrative unit of the State were appointed and 
Panchayati Raj bodies of elected representatives were also set up. As 
decades rolled by, newer challenges of draught and growing mass poverty 
prompted additional strategies of development like the Green Revolution 
since the mid- 1960 and poverty Alleviation Programmes since the 1970s. 
Poverty alleviation measures like Antyodaya, Integrated Rural Development 
Edward Weidner quoted in Mohit Bhattacharya, Social Theory and Development 
Administration, Jawahar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 2002, p. 4. 
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Programme (IRDP), White Revolution (dairy and poultry farming), etc. were 
initiated with assistance from nationalized banks. Thus, in the Nehru and 
Indira Gandhi eras, the goals pursued in terms of "socialistic" development 
(conceived mainly as an interventionist State with a predominant public 
sector) on the one hand, and populist ''garibi /za/ao(understood mainly in 
terms of endeavour by the State to reduce the number of the population 
below the poverty line) were actively undertaken. 
A parallel - though not always, development was the addition of the 
businessman to the unholy combine of the politician and the civil servant. In 
the democratic socialist or the Nehruvian Socialist to be more correct, 
framework of development that India followed after independence, government 
permission or licence was required for every small and big thing necessary for 
setting up a business. The discretionary power rested with the bureaucrat who 
could grant the licence against favours granted by the concerned businessman 
or alternatively, withhold the permission on the concerned party's refusal to 
please the government official. Very often, the bureaucrat and the political boss 
to whom he reported shared in the spoils, as the ultimate sanctioning authority 
was the politician. This was the genesis of the notorious 'Licence-Permit-Quota 
Raj' which in about 20-30 years from independence completely derailed 
India's socialist pattern of development. The planning process, the mixed 
economy, all got off track because of the immensely powerful and corrupt 
troika of the officer-politician-businessman often contemptuously described as 
the ''Babu-Neta-Bania' syndrome. The ineffective and inefficient mixed 
economy brought about by the licence-permit-quota raj coupled with the 
politicisation of the bureaucracy remained the contexts of India's civilian 
bureaucracy till the onset of globalisation. The globalisation era going back to 
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the 1990s marked another watershed in the world of Indian bureaucracy, just as 
the 1967 elections had done. It is to this that we turn our attention now. 
The era of globalisation worldwide commenced about one and a half 
decades back; sometime around the mid to the late 1980s. What is accepted, 
generally, as globalisation today is actually the spread of the process of 
liberalisation of the economy on a global scale. By liberalisation of the 
economy is meant freeing a national economy from governmental control and 
letting it run as per the market forces. It is against this definitional context that 
we have discussed the bureaucracy in this section. In India (as indeed in many 
other countries), it was increasingly felt that the democratic socialist model of 
development had failed to deliver the goods. Of course, it is debatable whether 
there was something intrinsically wrong with the democratic socialist 
framework or it had gone wrong as regards the implementation part. Whatever 
may be the truth, the fact was that liberalisation of the economy entailing a 
slackening, if not total elimination, of governmental regulation over the 
economy gained currency. This process was of course actively encouraged by 
the US influenced bodies such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and 
the World Bank. Once liberalisation of the economy was accepted, changes in 
the bureaucracy were inevitable. In India (as elsewhere) in the last more than 
ten years, there has been a slackening of governmental rules and regulations, 
which certainly has been a welcome development. We may mention here that 
in this unit, we are not debating the merits and demerits of globalisation. You 
will read about lobalisation in unit 29. In this unit, we are only concerned with 
the impact of globalisation on the bureaucracy and that too in the Indian 
context. As already mentioned, in the era of globalisation or alternatively, 
Economic Reforms, there has been a doing away of the plethora of government 
rules and to this extent, the developmental process has been speeded up. 
However, it is still not clear if it has brought down corruption arising from the 
141 
acts of commission and omission of the Bureaucrat - Politician-Businessman 
combine. Even as the process of economic reforms consequent to liberalisation 
has been on, there have been consistent reports of India continuing to be 
amongst the most corrupt countries of the world. This naturally raises questions 
about the very rationale of liberalising the economy. Be that as it may, the 
process of liberalisation is currently very much on in the country. 
Subsequent to the structural adjustment of the economy consequent to 
liberalisation, there have been perceptible shifts in the attitude of the 
bureaucracy. When liberalisation first commenced, a lot of bureaucrats were 
openly hostile to it as they obviously felt that in a regime of slackening 
governmental control, the quantum of power wielded by them as well as their 
importance would come down. This has indeed happened. The 'redeeming" 
feature in that over the years, some bureaucrats have seen the writing on the 
wall, and become 'facilitators' rather than obstructers of development. The 
Indian media in the last few years has carried quite a few lead stories on the 
personal initiatives of the post-90s bureaucrats in the domain of citizen friendly 
administration. A lot of the comparatively younger bureaucrats have grown up 
in the new, liberalising India and are, therefore, more amenable to the new 
ideas of development. However, in so far as corruption is concerned, as we 
have already stated above, it is difficult to say whether it has gone down, up or 
remained at the pre-economic reforms level. 
By the end of the 1980s, both these components of development 
administration ran into a deep crisis For one thing, public sector 
undertakings fell prey to overstaffmg and irrational use of resources and 
incurred huge losses, while the private sector, despite heavy and often 
predatory regulations verging on corruption, performed much better. 
Besides, agriculture under private family cultivation also showed promising 
results in spite of inadequate investment by the State. These factors coupled 
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with a severe balance of payment crisis—imbalance between import and 
export—necessitated remedial action on the part of the India State. Neo-
liberal economic policies with accent on bureaucratic deregulation, 
privatization and globalization were introduced since 1991. To quote 
Kuldeep Mathur: "This paradigmatic shift now introduces a fresh challenge 
to public administration. It tends to reduce the scope of intervention, but at 
the same time expects a change in the quality of intervention in chosen 
sectors. The implication is that bureaucratic machinery is not the only 
instrument of policy implementation; there are alternative in the civil society 
in which cooperative endeavours or community based organizations can 
develop their own capability of resource management and use... The 
withdrawal of the State makes way for the voluntary sector. Indeed, the 
Eighth Plan makes a plea for a greater role of the voluntary sector as well as 
the market forces. In this new dispensation, then, the buzz words are 
bureaucratic accountability, decentralization, participation, and community-
based organizations or NGOs.""^ ^ 
The new ambience has created an opening for a number of new 
ideas regarding New Public Management (NPM), alternative development, 
sustainable development, good governance, etc. New Public Management 
signals a shift from conventional public policy to norms of private 
managements in terms of cost effectiveness. It also believes in clusters 
rather than pyramids of organizations for its structural framework. In 
addition, it emphasizes flexible and adaptive operational systems rather than 
rigid planning and conventional bureaucratic hierarchy.''^ 
Kuldeep Mathur (eds.) Development Policy and Administration, Sage New Delhi, 
49 
1998, p. 234. 
Mohit Bhattacharya, Supra note Al, pp.129-130. 
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In face of increasing demand from political class and citizenry that 
Government should be run like a business enterprise, administrators and 
academic experts of public administration are under pressure to practice and 
theorize State administration differently from the ways and means of 
conventional wisdom. The new thrust has at least two major prongs: cost-
effectiveness and autonomy from democratic pressure and oversight. To 
quote Richard C. Box: 
New Public Management seeks to separate politics (in the 
sense of decision making by the people or their 
representative) from administration, allowing (or making) 
managers to manage according to cost-benefit economic 
rationality, largely free from 'day-to-day democratic 
oversight... Such a separation resembles the old politics-
administration dichotomy and Herbert Simon's (1945-97) 
description of administrative decisions that are largely 
factual'. In this reformed management setting, the public-
private distinction is 'essentially obsolete' and management 
is generic across sectors... " 
However, while there is no gainsaying the imperatives of reforming 
a deficit-wrecked State and unprofitable public sector of the economy in 
India, it would be plain stupidity to roll-back the State, rather not to 
significantly extend further the role of the State in the social sector (e.g. 
education, health, public infrastructure, etc.) in India. The "Government in 
business" has largely failed in this country; Government in the social sector, 
where the private sector would be an unmitigated disaster from the points of 
view of public interest and social/ national integration, has not really yet 
started. Government spending in these sectors is shockingly and 
Richard C. Box, "Running Government Like a Business: Implications for Public 
Administration Theory and Practice", in Bidyut Chakrabarty & Mohit Bhattacharya 
(eds.) Public Administration: A Reader, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003, 
p. 234. 
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scandalously as low as between one to two per cent of the GDP. Private 
sectors stepping in these areas only cater to the needs of the super-rich. This 
will create an explosive social and political upheaval and destroy the 
framework of social harmony and national integration. Alternative 
development and sustainable development paradigms stress the importance 
of newer developmental concerns such as equity, quality of life, human 
development, gender and child justice, protection of environment and 
ecological balance, etc. 
The recent World Bank concern with management of development 
in the Third World countries has given rise to a growing literature on what 
is being called "governance" or "good governance". The Government is 
conventionally a structure while governance indicators: (1) accountability, 
(2) political stability, (3) Government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality. 
(5) rule of law, (6) control of corruption. The first two indicators 
operationalize "the process by which those in authority are selected and 
replaced". The next two indicators operationalize the quality, competence 
and independence of the civil service from political pressures and the 
credibility of Government's commitment to policies. The last two indicators 
summarize "the respect of citizens and the State for the institutions which 
govern their interactions."^'The 1990s witnessed a paradigm shift in Indian 
political economy, the two major dimensions of which are capsuled in the 
terms (a) neo-liberal economic policies with accent on privatization and 
globalization, and (b) political federalization with stress on decentralization 
of power and resources from the Centre to the States to the local political 
systems. A third dimension must also be lamentably mentioned here that 
World Bank, "World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3630" by Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Government Mattrers IV-
Governance Indicators for 1996-2004, Washington World Bank, June 2005. 
2>i 
145 
points to unprecedented levels of corruption and criminalization of the 
political system. 
The shift of emphasis from welfare liberalism to business liberalism 
requires adjustments on the part of the administration earlier attuned to the 
needs of a national administrative State to the new role of the State as the 
regulator of the emerging market economy nationally, regionally, and 
globally. Direct bureaucratic control by Government departments must be 
replaced by facilitatory regulation by independent, often semi-judicial, 
regulatory authorities in various sectors of national and provincial 
economies, e.g. Central or State Electricity Regulatory Authorities, Telecom 
Regulatory Authority, Security and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI),Competition Commission, Central Insurance Regulatory Authority 
(CIRA) etc., all of which have been created under parliamentary or State 
legislative statutes since 1991. Moreover, there is a growing emphasis on 
the need that in the charged context of marketization, public administration 
must be run like a business. Evidence of the expansion of market concepts 
in the public sector may be found in the literature and practice of public 
administration in an emphasis on a constellation of cost-cutting and 
production management concepts from the private sector, currently drawn 
together as new public management. These concepts include, among others, 
privatization, downsizing, entrepreneurism, reinvention, enterprise 
operation, quality management, and customer service. New public 
management seeks to put Venetian blinds against decision making by the 
people or their representatives in terms of political rationality to give a freer 
M.P. Singh, "Economic Liberalization and Political Federalization in India: Mutually 
Reinforcing Responses to Global Integration", in Harvey Lazar, Hamish Telford and 
Ronald L. Watts (eds.), The Impact of Global and Regional Integration on Federal 
System: A Comparative Analysis, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 2003. 
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play to economic rationality, considers public-private distinction obsolete in 
a bid to make management uniform across sectors. Furthermore, the 
growing integration of the Indian economy with global capitalism puts 
premium on new skills in international political economy and law and on 
tough negotiations at global economic forums like WTO, and regional 
trading blocks, etc. 
The federal trends in Indian politics have also placed imperatives 
on the All-India Services, in particular, and State public services, in general. 
to come to terms with decentralization of political power to States and local 
bodies. Since the All-India Services are designed to have a centralist 
mindset and a provincialist cadre allocation, they were naturally suspected 
by non-Congress State Governments when they were initially formed while 
the Congress still continued to hold the fort at the Centre. There were 
demands before the Sarkaria Commission^"^ on Centre-State Relations for 
the abolition of All-India Services, which the Commission did not concede. 
It is a measure of successful adaptation of these services to deepening 
democratization and federalization of the political system that such demands 
are no longer heard. As a matter of fact the All-India Services, having 
moved to and fro and worked for both orders of Government at different 
periods, proved to be well-informed intermediaries with a feel for the 
respective needs and problems of the Union as well as States. They turned 
out to be a factor for the smoothening of Centre-State relations at a time 
when divergent political perspectives of the two orders of Government 
could have increased the prospects of misunderstanding and conflicts. Both 
All-India Services and State services are yet to fully adjust to the prospects 
" Government of India, Report of Commission on Centre-State Relations, (Chairman: 
Justice R. S. Sarkaria), Ch. 8 
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of grassroots democracy heralded by the 73'^ '^  and 74"* Amendments (1993). 
relating to the Panchayat Raj and Nagarpalika Raj. 
Summing up, the measure of good governance is how far the 
government is able to improve the quality of life of people. Even the best 
designed policy achieves little if not implemented properly. Poor quality, high 
cost, and corruption affect the delivery of services adversely. A well 
functioning bureaucracy can provide sound policy inputs and deliver critical 
public goods and services at least cost. The citizens' satisfaction with the 
quality of administration in India remains low. The administration bears 
strong and comprehensive responsibility for assuring to the citizen, the day 
to day services that he requires and a secure and harmonious quality of 
life.^ "* The position on the ground unfortunately, is quite the opposite. 
Administration is not responsive, citizen friendly and deeply concerned 
about public welfare. The common man faces difficulty, harassment and 
corruption in his interface with the government to get simple jobs done, such 
as getting a driving licence, a passport, a ration card or an electric 
cormection. People have lost faith in the government and this has greater 
danger of undermining the very foundations of our democratic polity. The 
mindset of the government functionaries is the biggest problem, particularly 
higher civil service. They feel that they are the rules and the public their 
subject whom they can treat the way they please. They have not take 
responsibility to solve the common man's problem. There is a lack of 
accessibility of key officers, whether it is at the district or in the secretariat. 
The general public perceives bureaucrats particularly those holding senior 
positions as arrogant, superstitious, snobbish, and indifferent to the needs of 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government, Addison Wesley, 
London, 1992, pp. 118-19. 
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people, they are expected to serve. They are interested in power and throw 
their weight around at the cost of helpless public. This mindset has played 
havoc with the public services with the common man paying the price. 
Realising the gravity of the problem, Dr. Man Mohan Singh in his 
first address to the nation after assuming office of the Prime Minister 
observed, 
/ am convinced that the government, at every level, is 
today not adequately equipped and attuned to deal with this 
challenge and meet the aspirations of the people. To be able 
to do so, we require the reform of the government and of the 
public institutions.^^ 
" Report in the Indian Express, 25 June 2004. 
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POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORMS/INNOVATIONS AND GC^^|M||giM| 
POLITICAL REFORMS AND GOVERNANCE 
In the democratic society the shape and nature of governance 
largely depends on the political climate of the state. Presently in India the 
concept of political tolerance is by and large diminishing and, hence the 
governance of the state is not as good as it should be. Political institutions 
in general have suffered a precipitous decline and degeneration in India. 
However, the deinstitutionalization of the Congress system since the early 
1970s and lack of adequate institutionalization in other parties are the main 
reasons for endemic governmental instability. Very few parties take their 
own constitutions seriously. And this explains why personalized and 
dynastic considerations have come to play a dominant part in some of the 
parties. 
In the current scenario there are two major aspects of the 
malfunctioning of political parties. First, almost all the parties have tended 
to lose support at the grass root level to a certain extent. Secondly, even 
those parties that have registered some growth at the grassroots level, for 
example the BJP, have failed to measure up to a federal role where they 
could offer a political alternative as one-party majority government. Thus 
any strategy of political mobilization based either on primordial loyalties, 
personal charisma or economic reforms have failed to generate a party 
political process that could transcend ethnic and regional fragmentation in 
the Indian society. Hence the need to introduce electoral and party reforms, 
that could extricate the nation out of the morass of governmental instability 
which has become a prominent feature over the last decade. 
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The V. M. Tarkunde Committee on Electoral Reforms appointed by 
Jay Prakash Narayana in August 1974 did address to these problems, though 
partly. An important recommendation of this Committee was that there 
should be a law requiring all recognized parties to keep audited statement of 
accounts of their sources of income and details of expenditure, false 
accounts being a punishable offence. In May 1994, the committee headed by 
former Chief Justice V.R.. Krishna Iyer recommended that a law ensuring 
inner-party democracy in all political parties should be enacted. It also 
proposed the institution of a commissioner to examine and decide whether a 
party was promoting communalism or in any way undermining the 
Constitution. Parties in India have failed to perform the basic functions of 
government opposition on account of a number of reasons. As already 
pointed out above, very few parties take their own constitutions seriously. 
For this reason they have come under personalized and dynastic 
dominations. Another dimension of illegality of India parties is evident from 
the writ petition to the Supreme Court by the Common Cause', a registered 
society headed by H.D. Shourie. The public interest case arose out of the 
alleged violation of the provisions of section 13A of Income Tax Act and 
section 295 A of the Companies Act by political parties with regard to their 
income and expenditure. The Common Cause argues that these laws 
"'clearly indicate the legislative scheme, the object of which is to ensure that 
there should be transparency in the matter of sources of funds of the 
political parties and the manner in which the funds are spent. The laws put 
"all political parties ... under mandatory obligation to maintain accounts, 
issue receipts for voluntary contributions above the prescribed limit and of 
getting their accounts annually audited."^Of the major fifteen parties 
Common Cause, in the Supreme Court of India, Civil Extra-Ordinary Jurisdiction, 
Writ Petition No. 24 of 1995 New Delhi, p. 12. 
I bid, p. 13. 
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approached for confirmation none could claim that the legal requirements 
were complied with. The responses from the concerned government 
department confirmed the contention of the Common Cause^The Supreme 
Court's ruling on this petition was:"if a political party deliberately chooses 
to violate or circumvent these mandatory provisions of law and goes 
through the election process with the help of black and unaccounted money, 
they said party ordinarily, cannot be permitted to say that it has incurred or 
authorized expenditure in connection with the election of its candidates in 
terms of Explanation to Section 77 of the Representation of People Act 
(Para 19) . The Parliament subsequently circumvented the judgment by 
suitable amendments. 
The degeneration of the party political processes in the country is 
also what has commonly come to be known as criminalization of politics. 
There is probably no political party today that does not harbor a number of 
criminals holding party and even legislative/ ministerial posts, the figure in 
some parties running into double digits as revealed by press reports. In the 
1990s economic scams and political scandals have reached the proportions 
of an unending deluge. The octopus-like hold of politics and economy by 
business-politics-administrative crime nexus has reached a stage where even 
Joint Parliamentary Committee investigations have proved to be utterly 
ineffective, fruitless and farcical exercise. 
There has been widespread concern in India over a period of time 
about the growing menace of criminal elements entering the political arena. 
A number of committees were set up to streamline the electoral process. It 
was as early as 1974 that Jaya Prakash Narayan set up a committee on 
Ministry of Finance, Responses of the Department of Revenue Attached to the 
Petition, Government oflndia, 1995, p. 13 
Supreme Court, P.V. Narasimha Rao (A registered society) V. Union of India and 
Others, AIR, 1996. 
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Electoral Reforms under the Chairmanship of V.M. Tarkunda, which 
submitted its report in 1975. Besides, the Dinesh Goswami Committee 
Report, the Indrajit Gupta Committee Report and the Election Commission 
have also taken notable initiatives in making the elections free and fair. 
The reform agenda was once again reiterated when the Law 
Commission of India (1998) and the National Commission to review the 
working of the Constitution of India also sought to reform the electoral 
system by providing for the amendment of the Representation of People's 
Act, 1951, which now provides for disqualification on the ground of 
conviction for certain offences. The proposal is that on the framing of 
charges by a Criminal Court for any of the specified offences, the accused 
should remain disqualified till he is acquitted. The Election Commission 
suggested a series of steps including the filing of the declarations by 
political parties that they would not field candidates and give tickets to 
those who were convicted and sent in imprisonment even for a period less 
than five years in a cognizable offence. It was also suggested to empower 
the commission to de-recognise political parties who were found to field 
such convicts who were imprisoned for five years or more as candidates for 
Parliament or State Assemblies, after giving them an opportunity to be 
heard. The Commission felt that the nomination form should contain a 
column seeking information if the candidate had ever been jailed and its 
duration, pending criminal cases and whether the candidates has ever been 
charge-sheeted for any offence. In the event of any person providing false 
information or suppressing any information not only should the election be 
set aside, but it should be cancelled as well and the person be punished with 
imprisonment up to five years or five or both. The Election Commission on 
August 28, 1997 passed an order which prohibited convicted persons, 
regardless of whether an appeal is pending in higher court, from contesting 
elections. The EC felt that though section 8 of the Representation of 
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People's Act 1951 provided that any convicted would stand disqualified 
from contesting elections to parliament and Legislative Assembly for six 
years, those on bail or with an appeal pending, were being allowed to 
contest. The Commission had referred to Article 324 and judgments of High 
Courts on section 8 of the Representation of the People's Act. It had 
directed the States, Union territories and Chief electoral officers that 
disqualification of candidates under section 8 of the RPA would commence 
from the date of conviction, irrespective of whether the person was out of 
bail. It was under this provision that the EC has directed the returning 
officers to get affidavits from candidates declaring whether they were 
convicted by a court of law, and if so the date of conviction, the nature of 
offence, and the punishment imposed, and period of imprisonment on a 
prescribed form.^ 
In fighting criminalisation in the electoral arena, the Delhi High 
Court came out with a landmark judgement on November 2, 2000. The 
judgement was the result of the public interest litigation filed by Kamini 
Jaisawal on behalf of the Association for Democratic Reforms in December 
1999. ADR largely consists of teachers and alumni of ILM, Ahmadabad and 
Bangalore. The High Court observed that the Election Commission must 
gather information of candidates, assess their suitability for holding public 
office and publicise it widely. It directed the EC to use the police, IB and 
other agencies of the government together this information. In January 
2001, the Government of India formally appealed against the judgement in 
the Supreme Court.^ The Supreme Court pronounced its judgement on May 
2, 2002. It observed: 
Subhash C. Kashyap, "Disqualifying Conviction", The Pioneer, Assam, 
September 2, 1997. 
For detail See, "Trilochand Sastry, Electoral Reforms and Citizens Initiatives", 
Economic Political Weekly, March 27, 2004. 
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The Election Commission is directed to call for information 
on affidavit by issuing necessary orders in exercise of its 
power under Article 324 of the Constitution of India from 
each candidate seeking election to Parliament or state 
Legislature as a necessary part of his nomination paper, 
furnishing therein, information on the following aspects in 
relation to his/her candidature: 
> Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/discharged 
of any criminal offence in the past if any, whether he is 
punished with imprisonment or fine? 
> Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the 
candidate is accused in any pending case of any offence 
punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, 
and in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken. 
> The assets (immovable, movable bank balances, etc.) of 
a candidate and of his/her spouse and that of dependents. 
> Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any 
over dues of any public financial institution or 
government dues. 
> The educational qualification of the candidate. 
The focus of judgement was on the disclosure of information to 
enable the electorate to make their choice. The Court gave two months to 
the EC urged upon the Government to undertake the necessary amendments 
in consonance with the judgement. The Government did not show any 
interest in amending the law and asked the EC to seek more time from the 
court. When it became clear that the Government would not amend the 
rules, the EC issued directions on June 28, 2002 fully implementing the 
judgment.^ 
The Times of India, New Delhi, August 24, 2002. 
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Aggrieved by the Court directives, tiie Government drafted an 
Amendment Bill to the RPA Act and sent it the President to proclaim an 
Ordinance. The draft Amendment was widely criticized by every section of 
the society and finally on August 22, 2002, the President returns back the 
Ordinance to the Cabinet. The political parties, without exception put up a 
joint front and unanimously decided to send the Ordinance to the President 
in its original form. On August 24, the President signed the Ordinance. The 
Union Government then amended Section 33 of the Representation of 
Peoples Act , which stipulated "notwithstanding anything contained m any 
judgment" of any Court or any order of the Election Commission, "no 
candidate shall be liable to disclose or furnish any such information, in 
respect of his election, which is not required to be disclosed or furnished 
under the Act or the rules made there under". The amended RPA also 
provided that the candidates have to give details of any such criminal cases, 
in which cognizance has been taken by the Courts. It further stipulated that 
only elected candidates were required to give details of their assets and 
liabilities. It, however, did not make any provision for declaring their 
educational qualifications. 
The new Ordinance was challenged in Supreme Court by NGOs 
through public interest litigation. The Court declared the amendment as 
"unconstitutional and quashed section 33. In its judgment, the court had laid 
down that the voter expresses himself or herself while voting invoking the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression under Article 19(1) (a). To 
exercise this right, the voter needed information about the candidate. In 
effect, the court had expanded the scope of Article 19(1) (a). Article 13 lies 
Kaushik Poonam, "Criticises the Government for the Half-Harted Poll Reforms 
Measures", Tribune, September 6, 2002. 
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down that any law that denies or limits the scope of a fundamental right is 
unconstitutional. The Government argued that right to vote is merely a 
statutory right not a fundamental right. In March 13, 2003 order^ the Court 
declared that "... the Amendment Act is held to be illegal, null and void". It 
declared that "Right to vote is a constitutional right" and rejected the 
Government's argument that it is merely a statutory right given by 
parliament to voters. 
There were unexpected repercussions of the judgement. On July 5, 
2003, a meeting of all state Election Commissioners was held in Bangalore 
and decided to extend the judgement to local government as well. The 
Parliament removed a major anomaly providing that all expenses incurred 
on behalf of a c'andidate by his or her political party will be included while 
calculating whether the expenditure limits are met or not. 
To keep a further check on criminaiisation of politics the Supreme 
Court on 6"^  January 2005 has ruled that an exception in the election law to 
allow continuance of a MP or MLA even if convicted during his/her term 
could not be used to content the next poll.'° This order was delivered by a 
five judge Constitution Bench headed by Chief Justice of India R.C. Lahoti, 
while allowing a petition filed by Ramesh Dalai challenging the election of 
Nafe Singh of Bahadurgarh in Haryana. Under section 8(4) of RP Act 1951 
sitting MLA and MPs, if convicted and sentenced to two-year imprisonment 
during their tenure as member of the assembly or Parliament were allowed 
to continue if their appeal against the order of conviction was pending with 
a High Court. However, it was noticed by the Court that many of these MPs 
and MLAs were using this exception to convince the returning officer, while 
filing nomination for next elections that their conviction had been stayed 
' Writ Petition (Civil) No. 490 of 2002, No. 509 of 2002 and ND-15 of 2002. 
Representation of People's Act, Section (8). 
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under the exception clause and hence be allowed to contest the elections. 
Justice Lahoti writing on his behalf and on behalf of Justice S.V. Patil, B.N. 
Sri Krishna and GP Mathur, observed that the saving from disqualification 
was pre-conditioned by the person convicted being a member of a House on 
the date of conviction. "The benefit of such saving is available only so long 
as the House continues to exist and the person continues to be a member of 
it. The saving ceases to apply if the House is dissolved or the person ceases 
to be member of the House". The Court noticed the anomaly being practiced 
in the acceptance of nomination of persons who were convicted while being 
a sitting MLA or MP. 
Despite efforts by Supreme Court, Election Commission, Parliament, 
Criminalisation of policies could not be eliminated. Large number of 
candidates having criminal records is being fielded by various political 
parties and some of these are also getting elected to parliament and state 
Assemblies. In the H"* Lok Sabha for which election was held 2004 there is 
no sign of much improvement as number of candidates having cases 
pending against them have made their way to Parliament. 
Another dimension of political corruption is the so-called politics of 
defection, which since 1967 has turned to the legislatures and ministries as 
licensed casinos for political opportunitists and defectors. Huge sums of 
money change hands and plane-loads of legislators are flown to five-star 
tourist facilities to insulate them from temptations offered by other parties. 
Formerly known to have taken place only in state capitals, a similar vice for 
the first time surfaced at the national level in the notorious JMM bribery 
case adjudicated by the Supreme Court in 1998. The Supreme Court ruling 
in this case was: 
> An MP is a public servant under the provisions of the 
Preventions of Corruption Act 1998; since there is no 
competent authority under the provisions of the act to 
remove an MP from his office, the Court can take 
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cognizance of his offence without seeking sanction from 
any other authority. 
> However, the prosecuting agencies need to seek 
sanctions for proceeding in the framing of charges from 
the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the 
Rajya Sabha. 
> MPs charged with taking bribe for voting against a no-
confidence motion enjoy immunity from courts under 
Article 105 of the Constitution relating to the 
parliamentary privileges. 
> Bribe-givers enjoy no such immunity. 
> It is for the competent parliamentary authority to take 
proper action against offending MPs." 
A recent amendment to the anti-defection law enshrined in the 
Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in the year 2003 has abolished the earlier 
distinction between defection (by less than 1/3"^ ^ of the membership of the 
party) and split (by at least 1/3'^ '' of the members). Any violation of party 
discipline by any number of members is now publishable by the loss of 
membership of the House. It may bear pointing out that the Speaker's ruling 
in the matter is subject to judicial review. Also public interest litigation may 
be entertained by courts if competent parliamentary authorities fail to take 
proper action in the matter. 
The huge sum of money required to fight elections is the root cause 
of political corruption. Funding of political parties by business and industry 
has always been a hush-hush affair. Almost all such transactions are in 
Supreme Court, P.V. Narasimha Rao V. The State (CBI/SPE), (JMM Bribery Case), 
1998. 
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black money and cash. Against this background, the main question arises 
for consideration is whether the present system of funding of elections 
should continue or whether it is replaced by state funding of elections. The 
joint committee or amendment to electoral laws had recommended as far 
back as 1972 that, 'a process should be initiated whereby the burden of 
legitimate election expenses should be progressively shifted to the state. 
Very limited state funding of elections was also recommended by the 
Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms in 1990. The Committee on state 
Funding of Elections (Indrajit Gupta Committee), which submitted its report 
in December 1998, has, inter alia, recommended that: 
> State funding of elections is fully justified -
constitutionally, legally and also in the larger public 
interest. 
> State funding should be confined only to the parties 
recognized as national or state parties by the EC, and to 
the candidate set up by such parties. 
> Given the budgetary constraints and the present financial 
stringency, only part of the financial burden of political 
parties may be shifted to the state, for the time being. 
> Any state funding should be in kind, and not in cash. 
It can be seen that the recommendation is half hearted and makes 
only a token gesture to the proposal of state funding. In that sense, it is no 
better than the view propounded by the joint committee of Parliament in 
13 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Joint Committee on Amendments to 
Electoral Law, Part 1, New Delhi, January 1972,, p. 64. 
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Report of Committee on State 
Funding of Elections, Legislative Department, Government of India , December 
1998, pp. 57-58. 
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1972. The Committee has also not made any recommendation regarding the 
manner in which financial resources should be raised by the government of 
this purpose. The law Commission Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws, 
submitted in May 1999, too recommends that, in the present circumstances 
only partial state fund could be contemplated more as a first step towards 
total state funding but it is absolutely essential that before the idea of State 
funding (whether partial or total) is resorted to, the provisions suggested... 
relating to political parties and maintenance of accounts, their auditing and 
submission to EC are implemented... The state funding, even if partial, 
should never be resorted to unless the other provisions mentioned aforesaid 
are implemented lost the very idea may prove counterproductive and may 
defeat the very object underlying the idea of State funding of elections.' It 
is disappointing to see that even the Law Commission has failed to do any 
justice to the subject and has remained satisfied by making only a token 
gesture. The successive report on this critical issue during the last three 
decades have failed to grasp that what is at stake is not just the purity and 
integrity of elections, but, more importantly, combating the evil of black 
money, improving the credibility of democracy and cleansing public life of 
the cancer of corruption. 
An important development of the 1990s is the emergence of the 
Election Commission of India as an activist federal agency. The 
Commission under T.N. Seshan and his successors appear to have brought 
about a sea-change so far as the conduct of elections is concerned. In the 
elections in the 90s there is a visible impact of the Commission in curbing 
electoral abuses by the ruling and opposition parties, e.g. obliging the 
parties to adhere to a code of conduct formulated by the Commission but 
''* Law Commission of India, IKf" Report on Reform of the Election Law, 
Government of India, May 1999, pp. 118-190. 
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followed more in breach than in adherence in the past, reduction of election 
expenses by a more rigorous rendering of accounts, control over noisy, 
communal, and polluting campaigns, filling of affidavits regarding non-
involvement in criminal convictions and activities, and so on. The 
Commission has also considerably checked mass transfer of government 
officers with ulterior electoral purposes, misuse of government machinery 
by the party in power and announcement and inauguration of schemes for 
particular sections of the population too close to the electoral schedule to 
influence voting and so on. Moreover, the Commission also seems to be 
presenting more comprehensive and bolder proposals for electoral and party 
reforms to the government, but legislation and executive action has been 
lacking. 
The proposals made by the Election Commission to the government 
broadly covered a wide range of issues concerning delimitation of 
constituencies, conduct and administration of elections, and political parties 
and candidates. In more recent times, decay of parties and criminalization of 
politics have assumed alarming proportions and therefore need more 
attention. To begin with registration of political parties with the 
Commission, The Commission recommends measures to discourage 
frivolous party formations and deregistration of non-serious and defunct 
parties. Presently, parties are registered with the Commission under the 
provisions of Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act 1951. A 
total of 754 parties are so registered, of which 219 contested in the 2004 
Lok Sabha elections. The Commission has categorized these parties into a 
three-fold classification: (1) National parties, i.e., a recognized political 
party in four or more states; (2) state parties, i.e., recognized in less than 
four states; and (3) registered unrecognized parties, which is a residual 
Election Commission of India, Parties Contest Election, Government of India, 2004. 
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category. According to the latest notification of the Commission, a 
recognized political party must have continuously been active for five years 
and won at least four per cent of seats in the Assembly elections from the 
state. Else, it should have polled at least six per cent of the total valid votes 
in the last Lok Sabha or Assembly Elections in the state. Or else, such a 
party's total votes (excluding votes secured by the party candidates in 
constituencies where it bagged less than 1/12* of valid votes) must be at 
least four per cent of the total valid votes.'^ Even with these formulations, 
the Election Commission's criteria for recognition of political parties appear 
to be minimalist and fairly easy. But under the plurality or first-past-the-
post system of election, these criteria should not perhaps be made more 
restrictive. Presently, there is no specific provision for deregistration of 
parties. So parties once registered stay unscrutinization on the government 
for including a provision in the Representation of People Act (RPA) for 
deregistration of parties. 
The Commission could think in terms of devising more stringent 
requirements relating to their organizational structure. Indeed the 
Commission requires parties to submit copies of their constitutions and 
election manifestoes to it. Until T.N. Seshan's incumbency as the Chief 
Election Commissioner (CEC) this was a fairly ritualistic affair. Moreover, 
the Commission has since then started insisting on adherence to their own 
constitution by parties in constituting organs and holding regular 
organizational elections. The Commission could also begin requiring parties 
to adhere to their manifestoes and electoral promises at least during the 
mandate of an election contested on the basis of that manifesto, subject to 
adjustments within a coalition or minority government. Enforcement of 
'^  12* Lok Sabha Elections, 1998. 
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these rules and regulations will force parties to structure themselves 
1 7 
democratically, and define themselves more sharply in ideological terms. 
On the issue of donation by companies to political parties, the 
Commission is inclined to go along with the current law whereby a 
company in existence for more than three years may contribute an amount 
to party funds not exceeding five per cent of its average net profit. The 
Commission is against a total ban on company donations on the ground that 
political parties do need funds coming through certain channels for 
legitimate political activities. Besides, as trade unions and other 
organizations are allowed under the law of the land to contribute funds to 
parties, a ban on company donations would appear to be unjustified in the 
Commission requires is that " such contributions should be limited to a 
reasonable level and all transactions in this regard must be made in a 
completely transparent manner."'^ Moreover, the Commission also 
recommends to the government that parties must be required to maintain 
their accounts and get them audited by agencies specified by it. Further, the 
Election Commission also recommends that it be empowered to fix ceiling 
on election expenses before every general election and that expenditure 
incurred by a political party and other organizations be included in the 
election expenses of a candidate for purposes of ceiling on election 
expenses. Besides, the Commission is also in favor of some sort of state-
funding of elections to a certain extent. The Commission has indeed already 
worked out a scheme of allocation of free-time to parties on equitable basis 
" M.P. Singh and Rekha Saxena, "Highlighting a Rain-Shadow: Party and Electoral 
Reforms in India", Denouncement, January/February, 1999, p. 39. 
Election Commission of India, Electoral Reforms (Views and Proposals), Nirvachan 
Sadan, 1998, p. 7. 
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on the state-owned electronic mass media. But it covers a rather small 
fraction of the expenses involved. 
Another serious problem with which the Election Commission has 
recently been seized with is the difficulty to define a criminal and to prevent 
his entry in politics: 
The Commission is conscious of the fact in the eye of law a 
person is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty... In 
the Commission's considered opinion, a person who is 
facing trial in a serious offence, if kept out of the electoral 
fray till he is exonerated of the charge, should not have a 
legitimate grievance, as such restriction on his right to 
contest election would be a reasonable restriction in the 
greater public interest and for bringing sanctity to the 
august House which are the supreme law making bodies of 
the country. 
Pending government action on this proposal, the Commission has 
already initiated some steps in this direction. In August 1997, it invoked 
Article 324 of the Constitution to oblige all candidates then contesting to 
file affidavits along with their nominations about their convictions and cases 
covered by Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which 
disqualifies persons convicted of those specified offences. 
The Election Commission of India as well as many prominent 
citizens and jurists like Jayaprakash Narayan and Justice (Rtd.) V.R. 
Krishna Iyer have been advocating electoral and party reforms over the 
years. At least two parliamentary committees were also appomted to 
examine and recommend reforms, mainly state-funding of elections'. The 
Election Commission has expressed desire to be kept informed of these 
" Ibid, pp. 24-25. 
20 See M.P. Singh, "Electoral Politics and Phases of Politicization in India", Trends in 
Social Science Research, Vol. Ill, No. 2, December, 1996. 
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deliberations and given opportunity to express its views before the 
committee. In view of the seriousness of the malady, it appears imperative 
now to entrust the task of considering comprehensive electoral and party 
reforms to a full-scale constitutional commission like the Sarkaria Panel on 
the Centre-State Relations'. It may be interesting to draw attention here to 
the valuable work done in this respect by the Royal Commission sponsored 
a score of academic studies on the problem as well as it held hearings itself 
and submitted its recommendations in four volumes in 1993. 
Some of the recommendations of this Commission as well as some 
Canadian practices in this regard in vogue since the early years of this 
century may also be considered for adoption in India. Volume 3 of the 
Report which is presented in the form of a model legislation has some 
interesting ideas about political parties, constituency associations, and party 
foundations under this parliamentary law. Each of these organizations is 
registered under Section 24 of the model Act on the condition that they must 
have a constitution that shall: 
> Promote democratic values and practices in a manner 
consistent with the spirit and intent of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
> Provide clear and consistent rules on the selection of 
candidates, leaders, delegates, if any, and officers; 
> Provide that members of the party who select the party's 
candidates, select delegates to a leadership convention or 
select a party leader must be votes. 
The proposed legislation goes on to provide other legal 
requirements to facilitate smooth functioning of these organizations and 
Ministry of Supply and Services, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party 
Financing, Final Report, Vols. 1-4, Canada. 
166 
procedure for settlement of disputes, which need not necessarily detain us 
here. 
A party foundation may be registered under this Act by a 
recognized party as "a distinct and permanent institution" 
> to develop and promote public policy options, 
> educate party members on the matters of public policy, and 
> provide the party with research and advise on policy. 
These party foundations are to be incorporated under the Canada 
Corporations Act. The Canadian Royal Commission believes in full 
disclosure of the size and source of contributions to parties and candidates 
to forestall any undue influence on elected officials by contributors of large 
amounts. It recommends submission of interim unaudited report of all 
contributions by registered parties and their ancillary organizations for the 
first six months of the year and a "full audited return on their financial 
activities for the entire year." 
In this context, it would be appropriate to consider the combination 
of parliamentary and federal systems of Governance in Canada. Such a 
system has forced the Canadians to depart from the practices of electing 
party leaders by the parliamentary organizations (elected MPs).^^ The 
Canadian parties early in the 20"* century, gave up the practice of electing 
party leaders by the parliamentary consensus in favour of a national 
leadership convention composed by provincial party delegates voting as 
individuals rather than as state delegations en bloc as in the American 
national party conventions organized every four years for nominating 
Presidential candidates. This device of electing the party leader introduces 
an overarching national element over the state/province-based national 
22 The Pioneer, 28 October, 1998. 
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parties in the USA and Canada. The adoption of the party convention 
system in Canada was done to make the leadership election process more 
representative and federal. In view of the increasing fragmentation of the 
Indian part system, the adoption of the Canadian system of party leadership 
convention here would introduce an element of federal aggregation of 
political forces in the country. And now that the growing regionalization of 
parties in India have rendered the process of formation and maintenance of 
stable parliamentary government at the Centre a highly problematic 
proposition, this reform is all the more desirable, and that too on an urgent 
basis. 
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution 
(NCRWC)^"' that reported in 2002 also made some recommendations 
bearing on the question of reforming the working of coalition governments 
that can be summarized and critically evaluated as follows. The main 
suggestions for stabilizing coalition governments relate to a more 
comprehensive legal ban on the politics of defection in addition to 
individual defections banned in 1985 anti-defection. Act enshrined in the 
Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, the Commission is now for prohibiting 
party splits and mergers as well during the pendency of the legislature. Any 
act of defection by an individual or a group should entail the forfeiture of 
membership. A related recommendation is to limit the size of the cabinet to 
10 per cent of the strength of the Lower House. 
Another recommendation in this context is the introduction of what 
is called a 'constructive vote' to no-confidence by charging the rules of the 
business of the House whereby the Speaker would admit a motion of a no-
confidence only when it is accompanied by a proposal for an alternative 
government. Moreover, the Commission recommends a comprehensive 
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Government of 
India, 2002. 
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legislation regulating the structure, working, and financing of political 
parties. 
A significant change in the electoral system is also recommended. 
Instead of the first-past-the-post or the plurality principle, the majority 
principle is suggested. It would mean that, if in the first round of balloting 
no party or candidate registers 50 plus one or above percentage of votes, a 
second vote would be taken with the candidates with the largest and the 
second largest plurality remaining in the field. The glaring anomalies have 
arisen as a result of the first-past-post system, there is an urgent need to 
replace the system with a more suitable one. 
The Tarkunde Committee( Committee to suggest Electoral Reforms 
appointed by Jayaprakash Narayan on behalf of the Citizens for Democracy) 
in its report spoke of the possibility of adopting the 'Partial List System'— 
a mix of the PR and plurality system—which would result in the total 
strength of each party (directly elected+elected from the list) being roughly 
proportionate to the votes polled by the party. However, the Committee 
also acknowledged the weaknesses of the system and called for a 
widespread public debate for a consensus to emerge. The Committee on 
Electoral Reforms (1990), headed by Dinesh Goswami, also favoured an 
exhaustive debate on the electoral system and recommended the 
appointment of an expert committee for this purpose. 
The Law Commission of India, in its recent proposals on 'Reform 
of the Electoral Laws' has suggested that the strength of the Lok Sab ha be 
increased from the present 550 to 688 (138 additional members a 25 per 
cent increase). The additional 138 members could be elected as per the List 
system. These 138 seats could be divided State wise as per population 
(smaller States being clubbed together). After the elections for the 550 
direct seats have been completed, the total number of votes secured by each 
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recognized political party in a State should be calculated and the additional 
seats allotted to a State (from among the 138) be proportionately divided 
between the recognized political parties on the basis of the total votes polled 
by each of them in that State/group of States. Prior to the election, every 
recognized political party must the list system. 
The proposals made by the Tarkunde Committee and the Law 
Commission seek to combine the benefits of Proportionate Representation 
and the FPTP system However, it must be realized that any PR system 
increases 'the disjunction between popular vote and government formation'. 
Further a List system/partial list system increases the control exercised by 
the party leadership and given the lack of internal democracy in most 
political parties, such a system may resuh in party dictatorship. Under the 
FPTP electoral system, minorities and social groups are able to forge social 
coalitions in a competitive political environment. Under a PR system, the 
proportion of representation of various groups may increase but the 
'character and effectiveness' of this representation is likely to suffer and 
may also result in minority voters become a 'national constituency'. 
Yet another proposal for reforming the electoral system has been put 
forward by the Vice- President of India, Krishna Kant (this suggestion was 
first made by him when he was the Governor of Andhra Pradesh). He has 
made out a case for a system of negative voting. A negative vote 
provision—wherein a voter would have the benefit of an extra column on 
the ballot paper stating, none of the above—would, he felt, be a legal 
channel for the expression of dissent. In the convocation address at the 
National Law School of India University, Krishna Kant once again pleaded 
for the 'rejection vote' and emphasized that it was not a negative solution as 
negating the negative aspects of the political process becomes positives, 
non-violent action for forced to field the best among the people. However, 
the negative vote suggestion may at the most, serve as a negative solution to 
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the problem and will in no way positively contribute to strengthening the 
electoral system. 
The functioning of Parliament and state legislatures in recent years 
has been examined in detail by the National Commission to Review the 
Working of the Constitution. The commission's observations are worth 
noting: 
If there is sense of unease with the way the Parliament and 
the state legislatures are functioning, it may be due to a 
decline in recent years in both the quantity and quality of 
work done by them. Over the years the number of days on 
which the houses sit to transact legislative and other 
business has come down very significantly. Even the 
relatively fewer days on which the houses meet are often 
marked by unseemly incidents, including use of force to 
intimidate opponents, shouting and shutting out of debate 
and discussion resulting in frequent adjournments. There is 
increasing concern about the decline of Parliament, failing 
standards of debate, erosion of the moral authority and 
prestige of the supreme tribune of the people."'' 
An important initiative was taken in 1993 to improve the 
functioning of Parliament by setting up seventeen Department Standing 
Committees to consider, in depth, the demands for grants of the ministries 
and departments with objectivity and 'freedom from partisan passions'. 
Unfortunately, even the work of these Standing Committees has become 
largely ceremonial. Plenty of reports are produced, deficiencies in the 
working of ministries are discussed, and a large number of recommendations 
are made. But practically no action has taken by the government, except to 
report that necessary action is under consideration'. With increasing in 
political instability, soon a new government or a new minister takes office, 
'^ Ibid., p. 105. 
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and the Standing Committee is reconstituted under a new chairman. In any 
case, the committees have large membership (with as many as forty-five 
m 
members belonging to different parties). Again, to quote the National 
Commission, 'the adhocism (sic) tells on the quality of work done by the 
committees whose reports suffer from absence of critical analysis of the 
work of the ministries under their supervision. Parliamentary oversight, 
essential for enforcing accountability of the executive, is worse than useless 
if it degenerates into a meaningless routine'. 
Given the controversy and the misuse of the Constitution, there 
have been several demands for the deletion of article 356 from the 
Constitution altogether. On 10 May 1997, the Standing Committee of the 
Inter-State Council decided not to scrap Article 356, but to have ample 
safeguards against its misuse. They could not, however, agree as to what the 
safeguards should be. The Constitutional Review Commission in 2003. 
while recommending that the Article be not deleted, cautioned that it be 
used sparingly and only as a last resort. It also suggested that in case of a 
political breakdown, the State in question be given an opportunity to explain 
its position and try to redress the situation before invoking the dreaded 
Article.'^ ^ Nothing came of these several recommendations. It is gratifying to 
note however, that the Inter-State Council, in its meeting in Srinagar in 
August 2003 decided that a Constitutional Amendment should be added to 
incorporate safeguards against the misuse of this Article. Only one hopes 
that this time they act on this, and end the nefarious use of the central power 
in conveniently dismissing those state governments that it does not like. 
" Ibid, p. 101. 
*^ Summary of Recommendations, iSupra «o?e. 23, paras 8, 18, 19. 
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So far as the role of constitutional heads of the state at union and 
state level is concerned, the NCRWC, by and large, reiterates the 
recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission. The President and the 
Governors are expected to play a strictly constitutional and non-partisan 
role in the formation of governments and dissolution of the House. In case 
of a hung House where no party is voted back with clear majority, the 
Commission advises the matter to be left with the members of Parliament 
and State Legislatures belonging to various coalitions parties to elect a 
leader by majority. 
For stability of party governments or coalition governments at the 
state level, the NCRWC Report does not think it a good idea to delete 
Article 356 of the Constitution. Instead, its advice is to use the union's 
power under this Article sparingly and only in cases of genuine 
emergencies. Besides, a state government against whom action is being 
contemplated must be given an opportunity to explain its own position. 
Normally, a state government should be "speaking document", spelling out 
the conditions and reasons that justify such an assessment. 
Moreover, even if a state government is dismissed, the Assembly 
should not be dissolved until after the Parliament had an opportunity to 
consider and approve the proclamation of President's rule in a state. These 
recommendations amount to constitutionally entrenching the case law 
regarding this matter in the Bommai judgement of the Supreme Court^^, 
which has virtually become the Constitution II for the constitutional 
emergency in a state. The last meeting of the Inter-State Council in 2003 in 
Srinagar came to a consensus to the incorporate the Bommai ruling 
^^  Supreme Court, S.R. Bommai V. Union of India and Others, Judgements Today, Vol. 
II. No. 8, March, 1994. 
173 
regarding the President's Rule in the constitution through an amendment. 
This is yet to be done. 
To sum up, federal coalition governments in India have by now come 
of age. Initially detested like plague, the Indian experience suggests that 
given a serious attempt and reforms they can in fact contribute to a more 
democratic and federal governance. 
ADMINISTRATIVE R E F O R M S A N D G O V E R N A N C E 
The central theme of administrative reforms has been improvement in 
governance. It is basically related to the idea of change in the administration 
that is brought about through deliberate efforts. It is a long term process that 
requires the investment of talent, zeal and commitment, scarce resources and 
above all time whereas governments are usually short-term and look for 
quick solutions. In other words, evaluation must be viewed as a pail of the 
process of administrative reform. Administrative reform is a more widely used 
term for manipulation of the public administration of the country although 
many other terms too are in competition with it. Reform is, argues Caiden, 
'tossed around like a boat in a storm from conception to finality is a long, 
arduous and difficult journey beset with numerous obstacles, unforeseen 
perils and unexpected surprises'. Other terms are admmistrative re-
organisation, administrative rationalisation, administrative changes etc. Since 
the late eighties, the term 'good governance" has quickly swerved into 
prominence. Good governance is an expression as it highlights the 'software" 
of administrative reform. 
With independence, the nature and the spirit of administration were 
bound to be radically different since its moral foundation had undergone 
^^  Gerald E. Caiden, "Administrative Reform—Proceed with Caution", International 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1999, p. 827. 
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dramatic changes. The Indian historical experience, both during the British 
period and its immediate aftermath, led to the emergence of a public 
administration that was ill-suited to the needs and aspirations of the people. 
Given the new challenges of economic development and social change, the 
prevalent administrative structure was both structurally in adequate and 
functionally unprepared in India's changed socio-political circumstances. So 
there was a need for administrative reforms. Several steps were undertaken 
in the aftermath of the 1947 transfer of power. These are followings major 
committees and commissions on administrative reforms recommendations. 
A comprehensive review of working of the machinery of Central 
Government was undertaken towards the end of 1949 by Gopalaswami 
Ayyanger Committee which dealt with organization changes, improvement 
in caliber of personnel and improvement in methods of transaction of 
governmental business. He recommended a distinction between a 
"Ministry" and a "Department". He recommended a new grouping of 
ministries responsible for economic and social services under the name of 
bureaus like bureau for agriculture and natural resources, industry and 
commerce, transport and communication, labour and social services. 
The Gonvala Report on Public Administration in India (1951) 
underh'ned the need for a clean, efficient and impartial administration, to 
promote which a tribunal of enquiry was to be appointed. Shortly thereafter. 
India invited an American expert, Paul H. Appleby to examine the country's 
public administration. Appleby's judgement rating the Government among the 
dozen or so most advanced governments of the world"^ sent the morale of the 
political and administrative leadership soaring. Of the twelve recommendations 
29 
Appleby, Paul H. ; Public Administration in India . Report of a Survey. Cabinet 
Secretariat. Government of India, New Deiiii. 1953, p.8 
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Appleby made, two were accepted and implemented. These related to the 
establishment of the Indian Institute of Public Administration as an 
autonomous organization and an O&M Division in the Government of India. 
As the O&M Division was a significant landmark in the historv o( 
administrative reform in India. The O&M Division was created 'with the aim 
of initiating and sustaining a concerted effort to improve administrative 
efficiency in all branches'^" of administration. The O&M set up is inspired bv 
the belief that the main leadership towards administrative improvement must 
necessarily come from each ministry, the function of the higher-tier central 
O&M Division being basically to supply leadership and drive and by a 
cooperative effort to build up a common fund of information, experience and 
competence in O&M work'.^* The O&M division provided the much-needed 
standing machinery for bringing about administrative improvement in public 
administration on a continuous basis. To be able to accomplish this goal it 
charted out a threefold plan of action for itself First, it sought to make civ il 
servants conscious of the prevailing inadequacies in public administration, and 
at the same time, of the need and scope for improvement. Secondly, instead of 
being guided by mere impressions and hearsay it found out facts to ascertain 
what actually was wrong, and where. That is, it tried to locate the true causes 
which adversely affected speed and quality of work. Finally, it devised and 
applied appropriate remedies to effect economy and improves efficiency. In 
immediate terms, the O&M set-up was more a machinery for administrative 
improvement than reform operating as it did at the micro-level. It sought to 
develop proper procedures for the disposal of work, aids for quicker and proper 
disposal of such work, control mechanisms: it also attempted to keep watch 
over the disposal of receipts and reducing delays, initiating a regular system of 
^° Organisation and Methods Division, First Annua/ Report (1954-55), Cabinet 
Secretariat, Government of India, 195S, p. 1 
'^ Ibid, p. \. 
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inspections, simplified and effective reporting and training of louer categories 
of staff and so forth. But its long-term achievement lay in making civil 
servants improvement conscious. Under its leadership O&M units were set up 
in the states as well, thus spreading the sweep of reform. 
The annual reports of the O & M Division covered its activities and 
indicated future lines of approach to problems of administrative reorganisation. 
From 1954 to 1964 it published seven such reports ''• which provide valuable 
details of the work it did as well as of matters relating to the modernisation of 
the machinery of government and its procedures of work. The reports were, as 
a rule, placed before Parliament where they were regularly discussed. The 
parliamentary discussion provided guidelines for reform, kept alive 
parliamentary and (to an extent) popular interest in it and thus disseminated the 
need for improvement. Besides, the O & M Division initiated action which 
culminated in two noteworthy statements on administrative procedure laid 
before Parliament. In the first statement, laid before the Lok Sabha on 10 
August 1961.""' the government delineated measures to delegate more power 
and authority to field personnel, to speed up execution of developmental plans 
and programmes, to raise managerial skills through training and counseling and 
to reduce delays by undertaking O & M studies, etc. These measures were 
necessary for implementing the Third Five Year Plan which had placed heavy 
responsibilities on the administrative system. Two years later, the government 
presented to Parliament an outline'^ ^ of the progress made in the matter. Many 
rules were revised to cut down delay and a number of reports and returns were 
32 
33 
34 
The seventh report covered the years 1961-64. 
It is reproduced in Organisation and Methods Division. Papers on Measures for 
Strengthening of Administration, New Delhi. Department of Cabinet Affairs. Cabinet 
Secretariat, 1961. 
It is reproduced in Organisation and Methods Divi3ion, lmpro\ement of 
Administrative Efficiency, New Delhi, Department of Cabinet Affairs, Cabinet 
Secretariat, 1963. 
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either eliminated or simplified. As one third of the secretariat had been engaged 
in "house-keeping work" alone, continuous attention was gi\en to simplif\ing 
such activities. Training programmes for civil servants were started to improve 
efficiency. Attention was given to economy in public administration. Yet. the 
O & M effort had several limitations which further curtailed its otherwise 
modest role in administration reform. Its single greatest weakness was that it 
lacked the correct type of leadership and even professionalism. 
In a period often years (1954-64) the O & M Division had seven 
directors, some of them for as little as six months. Consequenth. it was ne\er 
able to map out a long-term programme of action for itself Secondly, it was 
very sparsely manned, the top-level functionary carrying only part-time 0 & M 
responsibilities. O&M was an entirely new task in government not readil>' 
intelligible to civil servants, thus demanding a special effort on their part. No 
wonder it got relegated to the background in the face of other activities. A 
lesson to be learnt from this experience is that novel tasks should never be 
made part-time jobs: they are not taken seriously. Thirdly, the field of O&M 
operation was carved out in a restrictive way. as two other organizations vvere 
already doing similar or allied tasks - the Special Reorganisation Unit (called 
the Special Inspection Unit since 1964) in the Ministry^ of Finance and the 
Committee on Plan Projects in the Planning Commission. Fourthly, although 
named as the Organisation and Methods Division, the Division confined its 
attention largely to control measures and in the process failed to give adequate 
attention to business practices in public administration, an aspect which has an 
obvious importance in any programme of work simplification and 
improvement in India. Nor did organization studies receive adequate attention 
from the Division. In short, the O&M Division got deflected from its original 
charter and remained busy with less consequential administrative matters. 
Nevertheless, this Division was a historical necessitv. and marked an essential 
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stage in the evolution of administrative refonn in the countr>. At the tune ot 
Independence the Government of India lacked even basic information on the 
public administration of the country. No account existed of the machiner} of 
governance in India. Not surprisingh. the first task of the newlv established 
O&M Division was to 'know yourself" - that is. to undertake the preparation of 
what were called the 'Descriptive Memoirs." Each memoir described the origin 
of a ministr>', its major functions, its internal composition, giving its 
organizational chart as well as organizational strength. In all. twenty-two such 
descriptive memoirs were brought out. 
The Administrative Refonn Commission (1966-70): In 1966, the mobl 
comprehensive examination of India's public administration was entrusted to a 
high-powered Administrative Reforms Commission under the chairmanship of 
Morarji Desai (later K. Hanumanthaiya). Hitherto, similar commissions were ab 
a rule manned by civil servants. The ARC was the single most comprehensive 
investigation into the country's public administration in independent India. It 
produced nineteen reports, making a total of 581 recommendations. This was in 
addition to the reports of the study teams and task forces set up by it. The most 
momentous report submitted by the ARC relates to personnel administration. In 
the report also, its most critical recommendation is about opening the "road to 
the top'. The Commission wanted to promote specialisation among civil 
servants and to make even the "heaven-born" IAS to specialise, thus curtailing 
its all-purpose character. Selection to the top posts was to be based on the result 
of a mid-career competitive examination open to all officers. It recommended a 
scheme of reform which envisaged entr> into the middle and senior 
management levels in the central secretariat from all the services. Where the 
regularly constituted services were already in existence to attend to specific 
functions, the middle and senior level poshions in the corresponding areas in 
the secretariat w ere normally to be occupied by the members of the concerned 
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functional semces. And. in non-functional areas the middle level personnel 
were to be drawn, through the device of a midcareer competitive examination, 
from all the sources on the basis of equal opportunity for all. 
This recommendation about specialization was not accepted b\ the 
Government. The ARC wanted the generalist India Administrativc Ser\ ice to 
specialize, but the Government turned down its plea. A unified grading 
structure was recommended; posts entailing similar qualifications, difficulties. 
and responsibilities were to be grouped in the same grade. This was a sensible 
recommendation made by the ARC, but its acceptance depended upon political 
leadership. The political leadership has shown consistent passivity in regard to 
administrative re-inventing despite a lot of drum-beating. Whatever, to 
administrative reformers, the experience of the ARC carries valuable lessons. 
The Economic Administration Reforms Commission: The Economic 
Administration Refonns Commission (EARC) was set up in the early eighties 
and its chairman was L.K. .Tha, a member of the Indian Civil Service who had 
specialised in the economic affairs of the country. The Economic 
Administration Reforms Commission submitted, in all. thirty-seven reports. It 
recommended reduction of governmental activities as well as changes in the 
style of governmental functioning, the motivation being to reduce the load on 
public administration and to minimize harassment to citizens and delays to 
business and industrv. Above all, the L.K. Jha Commission recommended 
appropriate changes in the country's public personnel policies to promote a 
greater measure of specialisation and professionalisation. This had also been 
the message of the ARC. Two reports of the EARC covering accountabilit} and 
economy in public expenditure are particularly notable, these being missing 
concerns of earlier administrative reform in India. Accountability has two 
dimensions. Nonns, methods, procedures, rules etc. have already been 
prescribed in public administration and administrative action must conform to 
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them. Its second dimension is substantive, meaning achievement of the 
assigned task. Accountability is thus responsibility for observation of laws, 
rules, procedures, methods etc. as well as the assigned tasiv. Toda\. 
achievement orientation is viewed as the true test of accountability. especialK 
in what is known as development administration. To repeat, the accountabiUty 
of a civil servant must be in ternis of his performance. This requires that the 
tasks of an organization must be defined clearly and a time frame should also 
be laid do^vn. What is emphasized is that a ministry/department should ask 
itself well in advance what it proposes to do in the ensuing year and formulate 
as specific and precise an answer to this question as possible. When a blue-
print of this kind is ready, it should be possible to assign tasks and 
responsibilities to different wings and divisions and to individual officers 
within them. A pre-requisite for ensuring individual accountability is an 
effective system of appraisal of performance. The perfonnance appraisal of a 
civil servant must be focused firmly on the performance of a task whereas at 
present, it is about the general assessment of a person. Another requirement is a 
certain minimum stability of tenure of civil servants. All these aspects need to 
constitute a package and must be enforced as a whole. If administrati\ e 
transfers and posfings are arbitrary and too frequent, accountability \^ •ould 
always remain an unrealisable dream. Economy in public administration, 
another pressing problem, compels rationalization of business methods and 
procedures. The prevalent practice of involving the maximum number of 
people in decision-making must be given up and the goal ought to be 'to 
involve minimum of people in decision-making". Equally necessan,' is the 
streamlining of the classical staffing pattern being observed in public 
organizations. The Economic Administration Refonns Commission was 
unimpressed about the effectiveness of economy measures such as a general 
ban on air travel by government servants, overtime payment, employment of 
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temporan' staff and the like. These serve only cosmetic purposes with little 
lasting effect. It is also seen that an economy drive general!}' focuses on "non-
plan* expenditure, which too is not altogether correct. The traditional staffing 
pattern characterised by the pyramidal structure with a very wide base and a 
narrow apex, coming down from colonial times, is no longer appropriate and 
must be changed. The structure to be adopted should have fewer posts at lower 
levels and more posts at higher levels as it would lead to greater economy and 
efficiency. A restructuring which would increase the number of officers and 
reduce the clerical levels would not necessarily result in the reduction of 
employment opportunities in the country. In any case, the creation of new desk 
jobs in the Central Government as an instrument of generating employment 
would be a plain mistake, considering particularly the cost of retaining an 
employee in the Central Government. Surpluses thrown up by efforts to reduce 
the staff requirements of different Departments can be absorbed in filling the 
vacancies which do arise. Reductions in numbers can also be gradualK 
achieved by a reduction in recruitment to different services each year. An 
exercise in economy in Indian administration is apt to be more realistic if an 
examination is first made of the causes leading to proliferation of government 
personnel. The reasons for the increase in the number of government 
employees are: (i) an enlargement of the area of governmental activit}. (ii) 
Government's working methods and procedures, and (iii) weaknesses in the 
organisational framework arising from an obsolete staffing pattern. The scope 
of governmental activities and the staff needed to carr}' them out was bound to 
be enlarged in independent India. But such a process need not continue 
indefinitely. New activities and new responsibilities should be assumed only 
after computing their cost. While some new activities may have to be taken or 
old ones expanded, some others can be discontinued or curtailed, the staff 
requirements of the fonner being met by the staff thrown up as surplus by the 
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latter. This is not done. The surplus staff does not remain idle: they soon 
discover work for themselves by spending their time re-examining and re-
scrutinising what has been done elsewhere! 
Economic Liberalisation- In Jul\ 1991. Economic liberalisation in 
India's context meant delicensing. deregulation, disinvestment and 
privatization. The 'licence-permit raj' was to be dismantled and so was the 
"subsidv State'. Privatisation of industries was to be consciousl) promoted. 
Administrative reform under liberalisation demands redefinition of the role of 
public administration with a corresponding change in its corporate culture. 
With the growing space to be occupied by the private sector, the career 
bureaucrac) is called upon to ensure that private sector organizations comph 
with the laws of the land. Public administration of the country is thus to create 
new types of organization on the pattern of the Independent Regulator} 
Commissions of the USA. Public administration will interact increasingl\ with 
multinational organizations, which requires that it possesses new skills and 
competences. At present, it is suffering from several pathological weaknesses 
which it must shed. Excessive secrecy, limited accountability, and inadequate 
perfomiance appraisal weaken the civil service effectiveness, as do the 
problems of polificai interference in specific situations and government's 
widespread and intricate interventions that delay action, create unwarranted 
power, and provide opportunities for corruption. Numerous government 
commissions have pointed out the particular problems of the civil service and 
made recommendations to tackle them, but their recommendations have largelv 
been ignored. Support for what are essentially the second generation reforms in 
India has flowed in an organized way from the Fifth Central Pay Commission 
(1987) although mention also deserves to be made of the Chief Ministers' 
Conference held in 1997 and the Expenditure Reforms Commission (2001). 
However, the Fifth Central Pay Commission is the most explicit text book of 
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the second generation administrative reform in India. Most admirably, the 
report of the Commission provides the basic framework of refonn and the 
Expenditure Refomis Commission lays down the necessary basis of building 
the road map of its agenda, the case supporting the shift having originaily been 
made out by the L.K. .Tha Economic Administration Reforms Commission. 
The follovN ing recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission 
are particularly important for the reform of the civil service and public 
administration: 
> A multi-pronged approach to employment reduction in Government 
of India targeting a 30 per cent reduction over a ten-}ear period. 
Contrary to this recommendation and despite the modest measure 
abolishing four secretary-level posts announced by the Finance 
Minister in his 1999 Budget speech, central employment has 
instead grown resulting in a projected increase in staff expenditure 
of 10.5 per cent over 1998-9. 
> Restructuring and 'rightsizing' central government services bv 
decentralizing functions to states and local government, bv 
converting departmental undertakings such as the Indian Railv>a\s 
into public undertakings and by entrusting certain functions to 
NGOs. cooperatives, and autonomous bodies. 
> Doing away with arbitrary' and frequent transfers of bureaucrats, 
particularly those in all-India services at state level by laying down 
minimum tenures for posts and the need to clear all premature 
transfers through a civil services board, to be constituted for this 
purpose. The annual confidential report (ACR), arbitrary transfers, 
and sale of posts are alleged by many observers to be the principal 
means of subverting or circumventing the civil service, leading to 
corruption. 
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> Restructuring performance appraisal to make the current ACR 
s>stem more effectixe and open, coupled with a tl\e-\earl\ high-
level review of higher civil service to decide v^hether its members 
should undergo compulsorv premature retirement or not. 
> Increased transparency by passing a Right to Information Act and 
corresponding revision of the Official Secrets Act. 
> In addition, a closer link between performance and promotions or 
pay increases, improved procedures to ensure indi\idual 
accountabilit>' for lapses, and improved enforcement of sanctions 
are needed. More broadly, a simplification and liberalisation of 
excessive restrictions, along with privatisation, should reduce red 
tape and the scope for corruption. 
In addition, it would permit a downsizing of the civil service and a focus 
on fewer, truly public activities, where better delivery could be demanded. Ail 
these measures would be far more effective if they were conducted within the 
framework of a clearly defined and articulated vision for the reform of the 
countrv's administrative system has to be delayering in order to reduce levels 
and b} introducing level-jumping in order to combat delays. 
> Large, unwieldy sections have to give way to small, business-like 
desks, the vast arniy of ministerial staff may be gradually replaced 
by executive assistants, with the group "D" personnel being trained 
as multi-skilled functionaries. 
> Automation and computerisation should be brought in wholesale, 
so as to cut down on paper-work. Employees could be seated in 
large ergonomically designed halls in furniture of modular design 
in an aesthetically pleasing environment. Their productivity can be 
increased remarkably, by cutting down on holidays, keeping a 
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check on punctuality by adopting the time-clock system and asking 
the canteens to serve tea right at their tables. 
> The work of the Government is presently shrouded in myster> and 
the Official Secrets Act gives the prevalent furtiveness a legal 
sanction. What is required is a Right to Information Act. under 
which citizens have a right to find out exactly what is going on. at 
least immediately after a decision is taken. Transparency also 
means that all decisions are reasoned ones and contain an innate 
justifying logic. 
> The society needs a new kind of public servant to fit this new role. 
For the present, there is no alternative to the competitive 
examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission, the 
Staff Selection Commission, the Railway Recruitment Board etc. to 
get the best talent. But these august bodies need not be bothered if 
recruitment to less than 15 jobs is involved. Employment on 
contract basis should as a policy be encouraged. Government 
employees should have the right to retain their lien for two years in 
case they wish to migrate to the private sector. 
> Several steps have been suggested in order to make performance 
appraisal more effective. The annual confidential report (ACR) has 
been restored for the Group D cadres. The ACR format should 
follow the rating system based on a 10-point scale as in the armed 
forces. Any performance below the benchmark laid down for 
promotion should be treated as adverse. The final grading should be 
communicated to the employees. An important suggestion is that of 
a quinquennial appraisal of Group A officers, so that a full picture 
of the personality emerges after every five years. Remarks about 
integrity would be allowed in such periodical reviews by a 
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knowledgeable group and could lead to compulsor>' retirement of 
the officer in a manner that would be upheld by the law courts. 
> Man) solutions have been tried out in the past to remed\ 
stagnation. The Commission has suggested an Assured Career 
Progression Scheme (ACP), under which two guaranteed financial 
upgradations would be given to Group B. C and D officials after 8 
and 16, 10 and 20, and 12 and 24 years respectively. For Group A 
cadres, there would be three such upgradations after completion of 
4. 9 and 13 \ears of service. The benefit of higher pa> scale. 
including pa\ fixation, would be available but not a functional 
promotion to the higher post. In some cases of isolated categories, it 
would be known as the dynamic ACP scheme for financial 
upgradation to higher posts which do not presently exist. 
> There is also a Flexible Complementing Scheme which had been 
initially designed for the Group A scientists involved in research. A 
number of functional promotions were made under this scheme in 
scientific departments notified as such by the Department of 
Science and Technology, the Fifth Pay Commission widened the 
scope of the scheme so as to cover all research and development 
professionals, whether they were scientists, technologists or 
medical and computer professionals, at the same time taking out of 
the scheme certain non-entitled categories which had managed to 
get the benefit undeservedly. 
> In order to build the spinal chord of the bureaucrac), the Fifth Pa\ 
Commission advocated the constitution of a high powered civil 
services board both at the centre and the states. Minimum tenures 
would have to be notified for each post. Appointments, even in the 
states, have been suggested through the mechanism of the civil 
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services board and the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. No 
premature transfer would be allowed except after a particular case 
giving detailed reasons for such transfer, has been moved to the 
civil services board, 'the findings of the civil services board are to 
be accepted invariably and in case of disagreement, the entire 
proceedings have to be laid on the Table of the House. Government 
employees who bring extraneous pressures to bear for their postings 
and transfers must be proceeded against departmentally. 
> Coming to the employment in the central government the Fifth Pa} 
Commission has anahsed the rate of growth in the size of the 
government machinery. Contrary to popular belief, the annual 
compound rate of growth in number of civilian employees during 
1984-94 has been 1%. while the armed forces personnel have 
increased by an annual rate of 1.4%. Among the civilians, the 
central police organisations have multiplied very fast, showing the 
growth rate of 5.6%. The Fifth Pay Commission advocated a multi-
pronged strategy to cut down numbers. First, there is a backlog of 
3.5 lakh vacant posts. These could be abolished straightaway. 
Secondly, there could be a freeze on further emplo>ment of junior 
staff while a sharp cut-back in intake has been advocated for the 
executives. Thirdly, there is need for a perspective manpower plan 
under which there would be a downsizing of numbers by 30% in a 
ten-year period. This could be achieved by the usual wastage 
through deaths and retirements, assisted by a greater number of 
retirements under the voluntary retirement scheme with the golden 
handshake and compulsory retirement of those who are found to be 
incompetent or corrupt. Detailed strategies have been worked out 
for the optimization of the all India and central services, scientific. 
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engineering and medical services, and employment in the 
departments of railway, posts, telecommunications, central police 
organizations and the defence services. In each of these, a 
minimum cut of thirty percent in the next 10 years has been 
recommended. 
> Some quite drastic suggestions have been made in order to increase 
the time available for work in Government offices. These are: 
(a) Shift from 5-days to a 6-day week, with the second Saturdav 
being an off day: This would mean an increase of 40 working 
days in a year. 
(b) Gazetted holidays have been reduced from 17- to 3 - viz. 
Republic Day. Independence Day and Mahatma Gandhi's 
birthdav. The reduction of 14 days here has been made up b\ 
increasing the number of restricted holidays. 
(c) No holidays to be declared on the demise of any leader, 
except the incumbent President and Prime Minister. 
(d) Overtime allowance has been abolished. 
The Chief Ministers' Conference (\991): In 1997. the chief ministers 
met in Delhi and emphasized the need for enforcing accountability in the 
country's administration and to this end favoured the proclamation of a 
citizens" charter. They supported transparency in administration and wanted the 
citizens to enjoy the right to information. They condemned administrative 
corruption and supported ethics in the public services. 
Expenditure Reforms Commission ^2001): The Expenditure Reforms 
Commission, under the chairmanship of K.P. Geethakrishnan. Government of 
India. Appointed in February 2Q0Q, it was given one year's time to complete its 
economy exercise suggesting "a road map for reducing the functions, activities 
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and administrative structure of the Government*. The Expenditure Refomis 
Commission functioned as a staff reduction committee in view of the 
Govewmenfs worry that the non-developmental expenditure of the 
Government was showing a very high rate of growth calHng for its immediate 
downsizing. 
Other Reforms: A word may also be said here of -administrative reform" 
introduced by forces other than formally appointed committees and 
commissions. Technolog\ is entering public administration in ever-increasing 
ways to simplify administrative processes and procedures, thus contributing to 
citizen satisfaction. IT or Information Technology is finding increased 
application in public administration which has the effect of removing discretion 
traditionally enjoyed by the bureaucracy and removing room for corruption. IT 
is a powerful aid to reform and to simplify public administration in man\ 
intimate ways. The future is to see more of its application although its full 
utilization is presently slowed down by interrupted electricity supply in man> 
areas and other human factors. A discussion of administrative reform in India is 
equally bound to remain incomplete without a reference, however brief, to the 
emergence of a new agency to articulate it. This agency is the superior 
judiciary of the countr>': its new role began in the seventies. The normal image 
of the judiciar>' is one of a dispenser of justice, a role that it performs in 
adjudicating in disputes between the state and citizens and between citizens. 
Since the seventies this organ of state found itself broadening its role. The then 
Chief Justice. Justice P.N. Bhagv\ati helped discard the customary role oi" 
passivity by introducing the concept of'Public Interest Litigation*. As a result, 
the Supreme Court of India interpreted its role in a more liberal w ay. even 
giving rise to what has come to be known as 'judicial activism" in India. Under 
this innovation, the Supreme Court began interesting itself in a wide range of 
matters affecting societal interest. The basket of judicial intervention includes 
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both substantive and procedural matters of administrative reform. Even 
otherwise, the regular judiciar>- makes pronouncements on matters of 
administrative reform in the ordinary' course of its functioning. Earlier, an 
appeal against the judgement of the central administrati\e tribunal could be 
made to the Supreme Court of India alone. In the late nineties the Supreme 
Court ruled that an appeal could be made to a high court. The Supreme Court 
has emphasized the concept of accountability in public administration, giving it 
an enlarged interpretation. It has sought to prevent the country's premier anti-
corruption agency, namely the Central Vigilance Commission from becoming a 
subservient limb of the executive by wanting the fonner (the Central Vigilance 
Commission) to become a statutor\' body, thus becoming independent of the 
executive in its functioning. A notable feature of India's history of 
administrative reform confmns that the country's federal system has not 
deterred the higher level central government from delving into the 
modernization exercises at the lower state, even local government. The 
Administrative Reforms Commission (1966-70) did not hesitate to examine the 
state government also although it was set up by the Government of India.. 
Implementation 
A policy by itself cannot solve problems: it has to be implemented and 
an implementation strategy requires to be meticulously planned which demands 
efficiency to implement a refonn and what is more, institutionalize it. Mere 
acceptance of a report is not enough. As functionaries are accustomed to the 
older order of things there is always a risk of their reverting to past practices 
unless strong efforts are made to institutionalize the reforms. Civil senants, 
looking after implementation must definitely be a cut above the rest, as they 
would be called upon to display vision, drive and imagination in the handling 
of administrative reform. Administrative reform must not be taken as a routine 
job: the ringing in of a new order requires extra effort and drive. A strong 
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minister must be put in cliarge of the refonn agency: this is part of the larger 
requirement of an assured poHtical stabiHt\ in the countr\. A systemic reform 
necessarily confronts numerous problems strewn all over its path including its 
follow-up stages. All this demands high-quality leadership. Nor must one 
expect miraculous change in public administration immediately after the 
administrative refonn has been implemented fully. Reform is a slow, complex 
exercise and quick results cannot be expected. Monitoring, reporting and 
evaluating mechanisms to require to be developed. Recommendations of 
administrative reform are too plentiful, easily remindful of the leaves in 
Vallambrosa. The distressing fact is that India's implementation record has 
been dismally poor. Implementability of any particular recommendation must 
be seriously weighed by administrative reformers. Also administrative growth 
confronts definite limits which a refonner may ignore at his own peril. It has 
never been contended that administrative refonn in India has no future. What is 
asserted here is that a bold non-stop incrementalism must preferably inform 
administrative reform: the administration can be strengthened onh gradualh. It 
requires continuous top level leadership and monitoring particular!}' at the 
follow up stage. What generally happens is that the more pedestrian a 
recommendation the greater is the chance of its acceptance and 
implementation. But the critically crucial recommendations in a report ma> be 
one or tw'o: when such recommendations do not gain implementation, little 
impact is likely to be made on the system. One such recommendation for 
example, made by the much-quoted Administrative Reforms Commission 
(1966-70) was in its report on personnel administration relating to "road to the 
top": By side-tracking this recommendation the much-needed structural reform 
of Indian administration was overlooked and a rare opportunity was missed. In 
short, administrative refonn is a slow meandering process, requiring enormous 
patience and tact. In his book Administrative Reform Comes of Age. Gerald 
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Caiden concludes. "Administrative reform is difficult and fraught with 
problems. It rarely succeeds as expected and usually fails through fault\ 
implementation'.''^ No proposal for reforni is likely to be effective if there is no 
significant change in the mindset of the bureaucracy. An attitudinal and 
beha\ ioural revolution must animate India's bureaucracy, frozen as it i!> in the 
antiquated mould of colonial culture. The new slogan should be : service v\ith a 
smile, not after a mile! India's foremost need, today, is to repair and reconstruct 
the country's public administration even though the country shows a proneness 
to set up a committee on administrative refonn at the slightest provocation. A 
serious approach to administrative reform must follow a systematic path. 
Public administration of the land has become too unwieldy picking up a 
lot of non-essential work, resulting in blatant oversizing. The Constitution of 
India prescribes what the Government of India should pick up and what it 
should not. The latter should restrict itself to functions included in the union list 
of subjects enumerated in the Constitution. The immediate logic tlow ing from 
this is that the ministry of agriculture should be the priorit} item for 
dismantling, at least slimming. As a general rule, the Government of India 
should restrict its operational sphere to the union list of subjects only. Even in 
the concurrent list which is constitutionally open to both the levels of 
government, the Govermnent of India must be more circumspect and restrained 
in its advances. This would result in considerable pruning of the machiner\ of 
governance. Better methods of work and improved administrative practices 
must be introduced. Recourse must at the same time be taken to delayering to 
save manpower and quicken decision. Accountability and transparency must be 
vigorously enforced, and reference here must be made of the need for citizens" 
charters and the freedom of information law. Corruption, which is presentl} 
Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Reform Comes of Age, New York, Walter de 
Gruyter, 1991,p.295 
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India's greatest shame, must be brought under firm control. Citizens" charters 
are to guide citizens through details of services they are entitled to. But the 
government including the civil service appears to have paid little attention to its 
blueprint. A citizens' charter enjoys but paper existence carr> ing little 
operational meaning in government departments. The charters tell the citizens 
details of the services they can avail of the officials who will do the job and 
the time frame in which such services are to be carried out. The charters mosth 
cover public works, transport, industr}'. health, food and civil supplies, sales 
tax. and excise departments among others, organizations entailing extensi\'e 
public dealings. Officials, however, continue to behave in a feudal manner and 
the charters are treated as mere pieces of paper pasted outside government 
offices. This is the finding of a study into the implementation of the citizens" 
charter and corruption in Delhi government departments.'" 
According to the study charters are incomplete and cannot be 
implemented as they do not provide detailed infonnation. The transport 
department does not mention bus routes or timings. While the food and civil 
supplies department's charter does not include ration cards. On the corruption 
front, touts and "middlemen" freely operate in all zonal transport department 
offices for all manner of ser\ices. Police constables have been complaining that 
transport department officials demand a bribe even from them for driving 
licences. The study suggests that in the income tax department, receipt of funds 
after processing under 143(1) (a) rule, issue of tax clearance certificates, and 
allotment of Pan card im'olve. "mutual corruption" while scrutiny, search and 
seizure operations and survey operations involve "extortionist corruption". In 
the excise department, there is a "strong nexus" between businessmen and 
officials. Some businessmen act as conduits between officials and other 
businessmen. In the food and civil supplies department, touts charge between 
^^  See The Statesman, 24 .Tuly 2002, p.3 
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Rs 350 and Rs 700 for getting ration cards made. Agents "working"' at the 
industr)' department get "work" done at residence of department officials. 1 lie 
study does not just find fault. It offers a remedy too: the induction of 
ombudsmen or "Jonta Praharis'" (people's sentinels) - on the pattern of the 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation - to oversee the charters' successful 
implementation. It may be said in the end that structural remedies are welcome 
but more crucial is the attitudinal change on the part of the local bureaucracy, 
which when achieved would solve most of the problems confronting the 
citizens of India. A list of committees and commissions set up on 
administrative refomi since Independence is in the Annexure. 
Critique on Administrative Reform 
Administrative reform is intensely contextual: its contents must 
necessarily be related to the context in which it is discussed. The first phase of 
administrative reform which began in 1947 was characterized by se\eral 
internal shifts and jumps. The first few years after Independence were devoted 
to probing and searching. The government of the day was engaged in assessing 
the general national situation, a necessar\' preliminary to prepare the road map 
of the future and. then started the O&M era spanning the period 1954-64. The 
Department of Administrative Reform established in 1964 was to prepare the 
ground for a wide-ranging inquiry into India's public administration. The 
period 1966-70 was covered by the Administrative Reforms Commission. 
From the seventies to the eighties of the last twentieth century India found 
itself engaged in the follow-action on the ARC. The eighties of the twentieth 
century saw India embroiled in its ever-growing economic problems, a solution 
to which was perceived to be in the adoption of the free market model of 
development. The goal of a free market economy and globalisation beckons a 
new public servant. The higher civil service needs to possess new intellectual 
and social competences. In other words, the civil service under globalisation 
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has to be re-invented: the generalist administrator of today needs to speciaHze: 
new skills are required to be courted. Under the impact of the nev\ economic 
thrust a part of the civil ser\ace will get increasing global exposure. Many civil 
servants would be interacting with their counterparts in other countries, mostlx 
western, and thus would need a knowledge of economics, international trade, 
mercantile law and other specialist areas. They must quickly display their 
master\' of the subject-matter no less than negotiating skills. Specialisation is 
an inescapable need of the career bureaucracy in the new economic order. 
The central reform agency of the country, nameh' the Ministry of 
Personnel must be a sleek body manned by hand-picked civil servants gifted 
with \ision and dynamism and armed with enough discretion to permit 
minimum freedom from routine procedures. A strong minister must be put in 
charge of this agency: this is part of the larger requirement of an assured 
political stability in the country. In India the path of administrative reform 
bristles with difficulties and problems, two of them being most formidable in 
nature. The prevalent culture of VIPism or the ruling elite being above the law 
is the single greatest barrier to administrative reform in India. Members of the 
ruling elite are especially earmarked persons, entitled to special treatment and 
thus verily not subject to the treatment accorded to ordinary men and women of 
India. This is not done under any law. These members move along a different 
network for whom public administration poses little problems and is thus 
already reformed and thus no demand for reform is raised b\' them! One ma\ 
thus state without fear of contradiction that neither the politician nor the civil 
service is very friendly to administrative reform. The politician has become a 
part of the Establishment and he has developed a vested interest in the status 
quo and as such he is not pro-change.'^'' In an administration designed by the 
One hears about the contrary view of the new civil sei'vant being less change 
resistant and more progressive in his orientation. He represents 'the new 
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colonial rulers, reform is apt to reduce the authority, power and prestige of the 
civil service. As the civil service itself is a part\' to the dispute, civil servants 
are as a class basically unfriendly to administrative reform. In short, 
implementation of administrative refomi is unimpressive, even sluggish in 
view of the apathy, even antipathy on the part of the career bureaucracy. 
Perhaps the long-term remedy lies in initiating a search which goes beyond the 
politician and the bureaucracy. 
The key to the success of administrative reform in India perhaps lies 
v\ith the civil society. The noise made by the civil society would surely compel 
the politician to hear and the career bureaucracy to reform the administrative 
system. Corruption in public administration is the second factor vetoing 
administrative reform. The country's middle class buffeted b> the 
cumbersomeness and cussedness of the administration temporarily reforms it 
by bribing the concerned functionaries. A citizen's point of contact with public 
administration is almost invariably a point of harassment e\en torture to him to 
avoid or reduce which he has no option but to grease the officials" palm. Thus 
induced, the bureaucracy temporarily bends the cumbersome rules to 
accommodate him. In India, administrative corruption is a temporary, custom-
made administrative reformer! Reasons for low level success of administrative 
reform could be many, the chief among them being the: 
> Intricate nature of administrative reform itself 
Inadequate political and community support 
generation of civil servants'. These civil servants "are aware of the colonial 
mentality of their peers and are keen to shed off the pure bureaucratic image. 
Therefore, it may be assumed that refonn of the machinery of government 
should not prove to be too much of a hassle in the new environment. It is 
therefore concluded that the changes that have been brought about in India... 
demonstrate that reform is possible, provided the correct strategy was 
followed" (Habib Zafaruliah' and Ahmed S. Huque 'Public Management in 
South Asia: Dimensions and Directions of Change, 'International Journal of 
Public Administration. Vol.. XXI, No. 10, 1998, pp. 81.2 
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> Insufficiency of resources allotted 
> Mind-set of the reformers themselves 
It is also not entirely untrue that the bases on which refonn proposals 
are built may itself be questionable, even out-of-date. Reform of complex 
governmental organizations in the modem age must take cognizance of the fast 
occurring advances in the social sciences, organisation theory etc."*^  
This is an aspect to which not much attention has been paid. It is also 
true that many reformers are seen to take up the task with fixed notions and arc 
over-committed to certain techniques, philosophies or viewpoints. When the 
recommended reform fails—as it so often does —. they adopt the posture of a 
defensive advocate rather than that of a diagnostician. If the pet model does not 
work out well, the right thing would be to censure those who have been in love 
with the model. The fact is that many a time the reform pieces themselves are 
poorl)' conceived. On closer examination man\ reform proposals are 
discovered to have serious shortcomings. Nor should one forget that the 
announcement of a reform commission attracts many charlatans. Reform 
exercises provide opportunities that man) individuals and institutions are in 
eager search of The\ overnight emerge as experts though the> are no better 
than pretenders or even quacks. But they are excellent time-servers and good in 
public relations. They have a knack of making administrative reform 
complicated, even incomprehensible. In their own career they have had no 
conspicuous success and having failed in their area take to the business of 
reforming for they would not be on the scene to reap the fruit of their ill-
thought out solutions. David H. Rosenbloom rightly remarks; 'Reform can 
have a business side. Management consultants can profit handsome!}' from 
• 5 0 
Gerald E. Caiden, Supra note 35, p. 14 
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their efforts to re-design and reengineer. Private corporations and public 
agencies, not-for-profits engaged in reform, need contracts or grants to service. 
Reform is also attractive for academics seeking to influence events and build 
their careers. Inevitably, some refonners know less than they claim: some 
many not even believe in what they are selling'"'^ The ultimate success of 
administrative refonn depends on a complex of significant factors. Of the 
foremost importance in this respect, however, is the availability of complete 
and sustained top level political and bureaucratic leadership to the cause of 
administrative reform. Any significant measure of administrative reform is apt 
to upset the existing structure and status of vested interests, and the resultant 
resistance can be neutralized only by finu determination on the part of the 
country's top level political and bureaucratic leadership. This support is vital 
especially when it is remembered that in India the entrenched vested interests 
are aggressively active and assertive during the implementation stages. 
Teething problems, not uncommon are experienced in the post-implementation 
stage which demands supportive leadership. Refonn measures have so far 
produced results too insignificant to make a noticeable change in the ground 
level readily. This is primarily so for want of a change in the attitude of the 
career bureaucracy. Bureaucracy must unreservedly cooperate with the 
reformers, which requires nothing short of a mental revolution on its part. The 
sad fact today is that the implementing levels of the bureaucracy are deep!}' 
grounded in the perverted perception of public service: people entrusted with 
the administration's delivery system view ever}' contact point with the citizens 
as an opportunity to exploit and harrass them. Administration's counterpart is 
discretion, and in India discretion is employed by the clerk to abuse the 
opportunity to fatten his personal pocket. Little evidence is given to view the 
^' David R. Rosenbloom , "Observations on American Administrative Reform"', 
International Journal of Public Administrutiotu Vol.XXl, No. 10, 1998. p. 1413 
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public service as a service to the society, whicii requires nothing short of a 
mental revolution on the part of the bureaucracy particularly in those sections 
coming in direct contact with the people. Constituency friendly attitude can be 
promoted by suitable training courses, appropriate rules and regulations 
reinforced by a regular system of checks and control by the established 
hierarchies. 
In 1947 India won Independence: since then the challenge is to give to 
the people of India good governance. From the standpoint of the quality e.g. 
effectiveness, efficiency; there is no denying the fact that it suffers from many 
drawbacks, which has done great damage to the image of Indian governance. 
This has been calling for sweeping political and administrative reforms for 
good governance in India. 
'A^'lgi^'if^-^Si^'Si^'S^-V^^'i^^^l^^'iF^^^^'Ss^^ 
^i i/^ 
»» 
•^** 
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The "principles" that the Constitution ordained to be '•fundamental in 
the governance of the country" has been blatantly disregarded. After more than 
sixty years of getting independence, India has come to a watershed in the 
political and administration has become inefficient and insensitive to the needs 
of the society. The study is on identifying the main problem areas of affecting 
governance and the causes of the present malaise which is visualized as 
proceeding on the basis of the values of good governance—in keeping with the 
values, spirit and substance of the Constitution and without infringing its basic 
features or parliamentary system of government. 
For about thirty years or so, one political party enjoyed a clear majority 
in the Centre and in most of the States. Accordingly, stability was not a 
problem and, at the same time the political system enjoyed the benefit of all the 
positive features of the parliamentary democracy. In fact, the parliamentary 
democracy in India was hardly put to a test until one party maintained its 
monopoly. Now the suitability of the parliamentary system of democracy to our 
society has been seriously debated, when it has increasingly been becoming 
more and more difficult for any one party or an alliance of parties to form a 
viable government? Since no party or an alliance of different parties emerges as 
having a clear majority, post-election maneuvering becomes an important part 
of government-making. Unviable coalitions come to power with the help of 
'outside support' of heterogeneous combinations. Subsequently, whenever 
there is a threat to the government on accounts of splits and re-alliances of 
parties, palace revolutions are managed by the ruling party or alliance to 
remain in power. The electorate severally punishes the parties, which resort to 
such unethical measures, but the damage has already been done till then. 
Needless to say, the consequences are disastrous; corruption, criminalization of 
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politics, politicization of criminals, misuse of religious sentiments, exploitation 
of various castes and tribes as vote-banks. 
The Vohra Committee' pointed out the politician-police-criminal nexus 
in the country. The Chief Vigilance Officer is seized with the matter. Indira 
Gandhi described it as a global phenomenon, but we find it assuming 
horrendous proportions in this country. Several interpretations are plausible. 
Political and party elites use money and muscle power as means to overcome 
the problems of mass democracy. Like the way the method of representation 
had been invented to overcome the inconveniences of direct democracy and 
keep power safely in the hands of the elites, party leaders may be resorting to 
the use of money and muscle power to get through the elections in a mass 
democracy. In the olden days structured violence and social domination were 
helpful to win elections. When such means are no more feasible, at least to the 
extent to win election, parties and candidates have resorted to market principles 
- setting price for vote for which the possessors of the commodity are willing 
to part with. Where that is not possible or sufficient, coercion is employed. 
Winning elections has become a costly affair, and parties need huge amounts of 
funds to meet this situation. Party leaders try to accumulate sufficient funds for 
re-election. Although parties always fielded candidates in elections on the basis 
of their 'winnability', the prerequisites for this have changed over time. Some 
30-40 years ago winnability was basically related to the candidate's popularity, 
social support base, etc. Now winnability depends on one's ability to spend 
huge amounts in election, and employing people to ensure victory. It has 
' Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India had dated 9th July 1993 established 
a Committee, to take stock of all available information about the activities of crime 
Syndicates/Mafia organisations which had developed links with and were being 
protected by Government functionaries and political personalities. 
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become virtually impossible for a person without "means" to think of 
becoming a candidate of an established party with a hope of winning an 
election. Increasingly, party seats are offered to '"sound parties" - rich traders, 
contractors, dealers in real estate, retired officers, business people and 
industrialists, and wealthy professionals. Candidates spend huge amounts of 
money in election campaign - to buy votes or to offer allurements to voters -
and they expect high returns on this. One of the reasons for growing criminality 
in politics could be due to the failure of the law and order agencies, 
bureaucracy and the judiciary. Parties increasingly accept and receive criminals 
into their fold and field them in elections because they find acceptance for such 
candidates among the electorate. There is found of a growing concern about the 
declining quality of leadership; increasingly inability of parties to intervene in 
policy process and policy making in the representative bodies; and the way 
party functionaries desert, split and destroy parties for their selfish ends. Parties 
have come to be increasingly looked upon by leaders, functionaries and 
supporters as means to fulfill personal interests. Representative bodies are more 
arenas for party leaders to attack each other and settle personal scores, than to 
as spaces to deliberate upon policies and legislate. Party leaders spend much of 
the time in the Parliament and Legislative Assemblies on party quarrels or 
matters that involve issues relating to swindling public wealth. 
Discussions have been there on the need for party reforms. The focus of 
attention on the party system should shift from the number of parties to what 
they do. There is a need for two kinds of reforms here: 
> There is a need for minimalist legislation to regulate the internal 
functioning of political parties. The legislation could require political 
parties to follow their own constitution, to allow for external adjudication in 
the last instance, maintain an open register of membership and provide for" 
regular and democratic election to the highest decision making body. At the 
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same time the temptation to legislate on every aspect of the functioning of 
political parties must be resisted. 
> Contrary to dominant opinion, there is in fact a special need to protect small 
political formations, along the lines of saving small scale industry from big 
monopoly houses in the economic realm. The experience of the last few 
decades shows that the compulsions of large scale and huge resources built 
into our existing system tends to kill smaller political formations, forcing 
them to become part of one of the big parties. Not only should any attempt 
to further discourage smaller parties (as suggested by the Law Commission) 
be resisted, institutional innovations should be made to enable the smaller 
formations overcome unfair competition of scale and resources. This could 
be done by not allowing recognized parties to participate in the panchayat 
elections or by making available monetary and other resources on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
This is the biggest challenge before the parties, because no reform is 
possible without the willingness, cooperation, and active pursuit of reform by 
leaders of parties, who exercise the necessary legislative powers. Self-
regulatory capacity of parties and the will and wisdom for self-reform among 
leaders is crucial. They should realize that survival and consolidation of 
democracy are crucially hinged upon the health of political parties. But this 
does not come about on its own.^  In the present circumstances change in the 
working of parties is possible to some extent when pressure is brought on them. 
The role of opinion makers, civil society organizations and judiciary is 
important in this context. But the pressure has to come mainly from below. So 
it depends on the ability of the electorate to choose right people as their 
We have seen recently the resistance of parties, transcending party ideologies, policy 
positions and party statuses, to the directives of the EC for the declaration of assets 
and criminal record by candidates in the elections to the legislatures. 
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representatives. Indian electorate lias shown maturity to vote out parties for bad 
governance, but the question is/are they able to bring in parties that could 
provide good governance? Several party leaders feel that unless awareness 
grows among people in this direction, nothing can be achieved in making 
parties more responsive and representative. There is also a need of social 
transformation where caste identities are diluted in the political arena and 
corruption and criminality are curbed in the society at large so that parties 
function and perform better. This is a need that makes it mandatory for the 
parties to function in a democratic manner, including the election of party 
functionaries and selection of candidates. Excessive regulation may be 
counterproductive, but a consensus could be worked out on the need for party 
reform and where and how such reform could be initiated and implemented 
through legislation. There is the model code of conduct. There are rules by the 
Election Commission (EC) which make it mandatory for parties to hold 
elections to the policy and decision making bodies, to submit statements of 
income and election expenditure by parties, and these can be given legal status. 
EC has come out with several recommendations on party and electoral reform 
and these can be considered by the Parliament. Therefore, what the country 
needs is a larger agenda, in which the role of parties has to be redefined and 
their functioning regulated. I 
The issue of unequal access to resources in politics has conventionally 
been taken up in the old arena as the measure for reducing the role of 'money 
power' in politics with its typical emphasis on a regime of controls to ensure a 
ceiling on political expenses. The emphasis should now shift from the issue of 
ceiling to that of securing a floor, from a regime of controls to a package of 
enabling measures to ensure adequate and equal supply of resources. Contrary 
to popular impression based on highly publicized cases of national and state 
level political elites, there is a serious dearth of legitimate resources in politics. 
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made worse by grossly unequal distribution of what is available. The problem 
is not that spending more money ensures victory in elections, but that lack of 
money denies an entry into the political arena. This area acquires new salience 
in the context of the democratic upsurge from below and the rolling back of the 
welfare state. Some measures to rectify this inequality are: 
> Funds to be given on a non discriminatory basis to all the candidates/ 
parties, and not only to recognized political parties as suggested by the 
Indrajit Gupta Committee. 
> Funding to be available in cash rather than kind (again, contra the Gupta 
Committee) so that it could be used for political activities in-between 
elections. 
> Tax exemption up to a certain limit to individuals and companies for 
contributions to political parties. 
> Civil society initiatives to set up public funds for political workers. 
Some old and long-standing suggestions for controlling electoral 
malpractices need to be noted. These are the popular verdict that controls such 
malpractices: 
> Candidates should be made to declare the cases pending against him or 
her involving charges of criminal conduct or corruption at the time of 
filing nominations. 
> Similarly, candidates should declare property and income for the last three 
years at the time of filing nominations. False declaration on both these 
should be a ground for disqualification. 
> The returns of expenses filed by the candidates and the tax returns filed by 
political parties should be made public. 
> The ceiling on election expenditure should be regularly increased and 
fixed only at a point where one candidates' expense affects all the others. 
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> Political advertising on television should be banned before it can take off 
and develop vested interests. 
Some crucial electoral reforms are needed now in order to support a 
group effort at governance- like coalition governance if it were to become 
inevitable- such as Proportional Representation, List System, etc. The first 
generation of reformers was quite persuaded by the merits of proportional 
representation as against the existing first-past-the-post system. I think there is 
a need to rethink if PR needs to figure on the radical agenda and if the issue of 
electoral system deserves to have the salience in the agenda of political reforms 
that it has enjoyed in the past. The changing pattern of politics, the rise of 
region-based parties and decline of national parties has automatically corrected 
the vote-seat imbalance at the national level and rendered harmless some of the 
classic arguments in favour of the PR system. Besides, there is an insufficient 
recognition in radical circles of the virtues of the existing system, especially its 
impact on the politics of social cleavages. By forcing the political actors to 
form social coalitions at the constituency level, the existing system promotes 
social cohesion, while a PR system can easily turn into a system of separate 
electorates. It seems much of the enthusiasm for a PR system emanates from 
lack of careful analysis of the political consequences of this system It only 
illustrates how an agenda of political reforms can get distorted by attractive 
global imports. 
The anti-defection law represents one of the few cases of successful 
institutional innovation in post-independence of India. While it would be sad to 
give up its gains, it would be fatal to try and 'tighten' it up by banning 
defections altogether. The disastrous implications of such a provision for inner-
party democracy must be weighed against any presumed gains. The anti-
defection act needs fine tuning by making the Election Commission rather than 
the speaker the adjudicator of any dispute. The political horse-trading and 
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money games played before the Rajya Sabha elections could be discouraged 
by allowing political parties to inspect the record of how their legislators voted. 
Another favourite subject of old style political reforms was to legislate on the 
nature of the party system, mainly to determine the number of players and to 
bring it close to the 'ideal' of a two party system. Only suitable persons are 
allowed to enter Parliament or State Legislature as representatives of the 
people. For this, all citizens who have a vote should take the trouble of 
exercising it. Apart from that they should not vote for those who are 
suspected of being corrupt or are tainted with criminality directly or by 
I 
association. Some other suggestions are 
> The President of India should insist on participation of partners of any 
coalition governance in future. The outside supporter contrives an 
arrangement by which he can enjoy the fruits of office without being 
responsible for any of its omissions and commissions. This type of 
coalitionism is disrespect to the Constitution and institutions created by 
it and no less a fraud on the nation. 
> Our Constitution should be amended to facilitate the appointment of 
persons need not necessarily be MLAs or MPs. To bring in men of 
merits to handle the Ministries there is need today for the theory of: right 
man for the right job. 
> Article 83 of the Indian Constitution may be amended to ensure that the 
Loke Sabha is not dissolved before the completion of its 5years terms. 
I 
> The country must find a method to ensure a positive and constructive 
role to be played both the ruling as well as opposition parties while 
formulating and implementing key policy matters of the country. It is an 
essential pre-requisite of the parliamentar>' democracy to deliver the 
goods. 
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> Suitable electoral reforms can be suggested to ensure that very small parties 
are eliminated from the field and some party or an alliance of parties does 
1 
get a clear majority in the legislature. This can be done by requesting the 
voters to cast their second preference also in addition to the first. An exact 
formula on these lines has been worked out by an eminent administrator 
which is at the Annexure. Of course, defections and splitting of parties has 
to be completely banned to ensure that whichever government gets the 
majority lasts its full term. 
> Even in the present electoral arrangement, the President can try several 
alternatives if no party or alliance gets a clear majority in the House. The 
leader of the largest single party can be appointed as the Prime Minister and 
other Ministers can be appointed from different political parties on the basis 
of their strength in the House. This is known as the ^National Government\ 
Or, else the parliament can be asked to elect its own leader in a special 
sitting, if two (or more) largest parties are nearly equal in strength. Such 
experiments have not been necessary so far. but the day does not seem to be 
far off when they will have to be tried. There seems little doubt that the 
President will have to play a very active role in the formation of 
government in the years to come. 
Since the Centre-State relations is a focus area in Indian federal 
polity and governance. The frequent imposition of President's rule in 
different states under Article 356 of the Constitution by the successive 
Union Governments for partisan ends during the last five plus decades of its 
operation, not only surcharged the political climate of the country but also 
generated national debate on the issue whether Article 356 of the 
Constitution should be retained or not. Of course, there are divergent views 
for obvious political reasons amone oolitical parties on the relevance of 
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Article 356 in the context of fragile and fluid coalition politics in India at 
large. 
The office of the Governor and his role is also becoming more and 
more controversial. It has been alleged that the Governor normally uses his 
powers to sustain the interests of the party at the Centre. The governors 
have been acting/working as agent of the Centre and those who did not, 
were either removed or transferred. A second look at the Article 356 of the 
Indian Constitution is needed since in a situation of 'Hung Assembly' a 
Governor has a vital role to play. Thus, the practice of nominating 
governors needs to be abolished. Governors should either be directly elected 
chief executives, by the state legislature. 
Political reforms need not necessarily mean changing the political 
system from parliamentary to presidential or the like, although this 
consideration may not be ruled out either: Not all, the needed changes may 
call for constitutional amendments, but no patchwork remedies may help; a 
holistic fully integrated approach to political reforms may be necessary. 
However, the efficacy of the Presidential form of government, as compared to 
the Parliamentary system is being debated very strongly in the present context. 
There are several advantages in this system. The executive is not responsible to 
the legislature and is assured of a full term of five years. On the other hand, the 
legislature can give its free and frank opinion on every proposal without 
embarrassing the government whose survival does not depend on the success 
or failure of a Bill or resolution in the House. The Parliamentary debates can 
be more meaningful. Also, if the Prime Minister or a Chief Minister is directly 
elected, it is more likely that eminent persons who are above casteism and 
petty vested interests get elected as the head of the executive. In a Presidential 
form of government, the executive is not responsible to the legislature, but it is 
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responsible to the electorate on whose mandate it has to govern the nation for 
the full term without any uncertainty. 
It must be remembered that the Presidential form of government or any 
other system is hardly a panacea for all evils. What if a government having 
come to power in a Presidential system behaves in an autocratic manner? The 
only way a government can be removed before its term is by impeachment, 
which is not easy at all. Even if the control of a legislature on the executive is 
not good enough, it is better than nothing. The fact is that there is no substitute 
to political maturity. It has often been said that it is not the form of government 
that is important, but the extent of government. That government is the best, 
which governs the best. 
Coming to the administrative system, much of the problem arose due 
to its colonial legacy. Since independence, there has hardly been any change 
in its culture, work style, structure and organization. A few hundred ICS 
men of what was known as steel frame governed the country by iron first 
grip on the administrative machinery. After independence, as per the Indian 
Constitution, the permanent executive of the government carries out the affairs 
of the government according to the decisions of the political executive. In this 
process, the permanent executive will have to be guided by the law of the land 
and the Constitution. The accepted norms of governance developed over the 
years, which are usually codified in the form of rules and procedures, guide the 
permanent executive in the discharge of its responsibilities. Since any change 
in these procedures involves lengthy and cumbersome processes, the civil 
service generally becomes inflexible and rigid even if some procedures have 
outlived their utility. 
The relation between the political executive and the bureaucracy has 
been a matter of debate and controversy. To a great extent, this is because of 
the inherent nature of the relationship between the ministers and the civil 
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servants. In any form of government and more so in a democracy, such as 
India's, the civil servants are subordinate to the ministers. However, this is not 
always the case. Where the minister is ignorant and incompetent, the officers 
under him have a field day doing exactly as they please with the minister 
unable to do a thing. On the other hand, when the minister is powerful the 
officers are generally too willing to do the minister's bidding; often in 
contravention of all rules and regulations. Also, as we have already pointed out, 
ministers and bureaucrats in India have often enjoyed a highly mutually 
beneficial relationship based on a quid pro quo basis; i.e. a relationship based 
on mutual exchange of favours. The net result of all this has been a highly 
politicized bureaucracy and this fact, has not changed much even in the post-
globalisation era. The task of policy making in the government is complex 
and needs specialist knowledge of the subject. Under the existing system all 
senior appointments in the ministries are monopolized by the IAS officers 
who are generalists. The hold on policymaking by a group of people who 
have no expertise in the area is regarded as the single biggest factor for poor 
administration in the country of most expert committees and knowledgeable 
persons. 
The Administrative Reforms Commission^ (ARC) which made a 
comprehensive study of reform ^ measures needed to tone-up the 
administration observed as early as 1969. We can no longer be satisfied with 
the development of a broad genius like that of a professional civil servant, 
rather we must try and develop a professional economic administrator, a 
professional social administrator and so on. Effective administration 
requires to match each job with the man possessing the needed qualification 
The Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Personnel Administration, 
Government of India, 1969, pp. 10-14. 
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and competence. The commission emphasized, 'Future administration has to 
be oriented towards specialization and an important objective of personnel 
administration should e to create and nurture the needed specialization". 
Most ministries have a centralized system of governance with all 
powers concentrated in Secretariat/headquarters with very little delegation 
to various directorates, field outfits and autonomous bodies functioning 
under them. Delegation of authority is critical to effective functioning of the 
government and cutting down levels and the time taken in arriving at a 
decision. Centralized control leads to inefficiency, delay and wastage, as one 
set of rules cannot be equally applicable to thousands of diverse situations 
which obtain in a country of India's size and complexity. The 
Administrative Reforms Commission had argued for greater delegation as it 
helps speedy decision which is the essence of good administration. It laid 
down two criteria: in making delegations the approach should be that powers 
to be delegated be the 'maximum possible' in the circumstances then 
minimum necessary. Wherever any modifications or changes have been 
made in the delegations, there should be done through amendments to the 
rules themselves and not through executive instructions. 
One pervasive feature of the Indian bureaucratic machine is the 
existence of a large number of rules relating to service conditions as well as 
operational matters such as fundamental rules, supplementary rules, general 
financial rules, delegation of financial power rules, treasury rules, account 
code and conduct rules. They have been framed during the British rule and 
bear a heavy imprint of colonial mindset with emphasis on checks and 
balances, lack of trust and suspicion. Numerous clarifications. 
Administrative Reforms Commission, Delegation of financial and Administrative 
Powers, Government of India, 1969, p. 3. 
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administrative instructions and guidelines have been issued making them 
bulky, confusing and often incomprehensible. Even the ministry of finance 
and the department of personnel which issues innumerable clarifications on 
these rules every year is unable to keep pace and has now entrusted their 
publication to a private publisher, who brings out unauthenticated copies, 
which most government departments are forced to use in the absence of an 
official publication. One can imagine the chaos which the system leads to. In 
most of the government department these rules are interpreted and applied 
by junior functionaries in what is called babus, senior officers have neither 
time nor inclination to wade through them. They were supported by a vast 
army of the educated Indians holding clerical and middle level jobs, whose 
loyalty was bought by clever mix of crumbs of power and opportunity of 
illegal gratification. They survived by servility, doing ji-huzoori and 
chamchagiri of the imperial masters. 
Integrity is an important element in enforcing accountability in 
governance. The ministerial level has to discharge this responsibility in the 
government. The elected representatives perform the same task in the 
legislature and its committees. How can they elicit respect or generate just 
fear if their own integrity is in doubt? What is more, there is a general belief 
that incidence of corruption and misuse of authority is more widespread at 
that ministerial level than in the Civil Service. In fact, the nexus between the 
corrupt civil servant and the corrupt minister has been believed in this 
country since the very beginning. The political masters are, therefore, 
accepted by the public as shielding the corrupt and adding to the general 
environment proliferating corruption.^ There was suspicion of 'extra 
Kamla Prasad, Indian Administration: Politics, Policies and Prospects, Dorling 
Kindersiey, India, 2006, p. 311. 
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constitutional authority' exercising official power and engaging in misuse 
for political and family benefits. This was highly damning when the loyalty 
test was introduced for senior civil servants if they wished to enjoy safety 
and property. States were quick to follow suit. Corruption at all levels grew 
by leaps and bounds. There was no longer an adequate check to arrest the 
tide. There were willing civil servants available to join in the race for 
political favour in promotion to prestigious positions and in making 
illegitimate gains. The moral authority of the government was so eroded that 
it was in no position to control the cancerous growth in the bureaucracy.^ 
Corruption at high places gets all the media attention it is the lower level 
graft which hurts the common man. An ordinary person has to face a great 
deal of inconvenience if he has to get a passport, a driving license or an 
electric connection. Departments such as police, municipal corporation, land 
records, sales tax, income tax, excise and customs are known to cause 
harassment to people and even routine work cannot be done without giving 
bribe to the lower level functionaries. In addition to the above mentioned 
efforts and simultaneous use of the various Inquiry Commissions appointed 
by the Government during the last about fifty and half years of the Republic, 
there has not been any concerted, coordinated, effective and continuous fight 
to prevent corruption or prosecute and punish the corrupt - a miniscule of 
successful cases of prosecution and punishment notwithstanding. 
With the changing role of the state, the public services have been under 
tremendous pressure for restructuring. It has become necessary to provide a 
more responsive government whose focus is to serve the public effectively and 
to ensure efficient and cost effective administration. There is growing 
realization and recognition about the need for administrative reforms to 
^ Ibid, p. 312. 
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increase the capabilities of the administrative systems in carrying out goals for 
economic and social development. There is also a need for transformation in 
the civil services to make them more efficient, clean, and accountable and 
citizen friendly. This aptly sums up the present picture of Indian bureaucracy. 
Public administration and the civil services in India at all levels are passing 
through difficult times in terms of eroded credibility and effectiveness. There is 
a growing public perception of an unholy nexus between certain elements 
among politicians and civil servants and criminals. Honesty is at its lowest 
level. Transparency and accessibility to the political and bureaucratic elements 
in charge of administration seldom exist. Pursuit of career advancement has 
taken precedence over ethical values. The measure of good governance is how 
far the government is able to improve the quality of life of people. Even the 
best designed policy achieves little if not implemented properly. Poor quality, 
high cost, and corruption affect the delivery of services adversely. A well 
functioning bureaucracy can provide sound policy inputs and deliver critical 
public goods and services at least cost. 
Since independence there has been a significant effort to bring 
structural changes in the administrative set up to fulfill the aspiration of the 
people to bring about good governance. These reforms will have to aim at 
changing the attitude of all functionaries of the government and hence the 
reform process will first have to take a close look at the existing processes and 
procedures. Some operational suggestions, which are urgently required, as a 
part of the efforts to provide good governance, are following: 
> Accountability is difficult for an average citizen to have access to 
information about schemes that affect him. The complicated procedures 
distance government from the people who are sought to be provided with 
services and create potential sources of corruption. Computer based 
information systems can help cut out discrefion and delay, like installing a 
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system where one inserts a ten rupee note and gets a land ownership record. 
Each department can have a citizen's charter estabUshing clearly 
enforceable norms. 
> Codification of the delegation of powers between ministers and the 
bureaucracy is necessary, it must also be ensured that the delegated powers 
are exercised. There is a need to reduce levels in the hierarchy and make 
administration officer-oriented so that responsibility can be fixed on an 
individual. Audit should focus more on the output of a scheme than on 
procedures. Instead of post-audit, concurrent audit must be introduced. 
Departments such as police and revenue which have direct dealings with the 
people must be assessed, at least once in three years, by an independent 
professional organization consisting of eminent men from the public, 
including non government organizations (NGOs). 
> Action against corrupt officers in many states cannot be initiated now as the 
power to sanction prosecution is vested in the state governments. This may 
be made a semi-judicial process where a designated authority can sanction 
prosecution on receipt of complaint from the investigating agencies. 
> The civil service must also shift its focus from being a provider and 
regulator to that of a facilitator. Government should outsource as many 
activities as possible so that the civil service concentrates only on the 
essentials. What the government does not have to do, or what others can do 
more efficiently, is better to off load rather than keep with the government. 
Historically, when we achieved independence, there were several subjects 
that the government had to handle. This need not be the situation now. 
' 1 
> Transparency and right to information: As a rule, most of the decisions in 
government are taken behind closed doors and an air of secrecy generally 
pervades its functioning. There is a need to share more information with the 
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people and make the process of decision-making transparent. Amendments 
need to be made to the Official Secrets Act as well as the Civil Services 
Code of Conduct to facilitate transparency. The public should have easy 
access to government orders, forms etc. These can even be made available 
at post offices, banks and fair-price shops; the existing grievance redressal 
centre in all offices should be converted into public facilitation centre, with 
people encouraged to obtain information relevant to their needs. 
> There has to be a periodic review of rules and simplification of procedures, 
besides reducing the discretionary powers to a minimum. There is a need to 
legislate a Right to Information Act in every state and each department 
should bring out a compendium of all the relevant forms, which the public 
have to use, and made available at a single place. The renewal period for 
licenses etc. can be enhanced so as to reduce transactional costs. 
> Monitoring and evaluation of programmes: Implementation of development 
programmes needs to be more effective. Close monitoring could be 
organized in selected areas like primary health, primary education, 
watershed development and empowerment of local people. Through a 
process of stratified random sampling, five to ten villages can be identified 
in every state for impact studies and for making periodic progress reports in 
these sectors. This work can be entrusted to academic institutions or 
consultants. Allocation of additional funds to the states can be made in such 
a manner that those who perform better get a corresponding weight-age 
over others who do not effectively implement the programmes. Also, as part 
I 
of external mechanisms, civil society organizations can ensure that the 
public sector performs and problems are brought to the notice of the public. 
Second, a free press can certainly take on the role of a watchdog. It can 
always check whether the public agencies perform or not. And the third is 
social audit by something like the gram sabha. After the constitutional 
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amendment we have a forum for participative democracy. If the gram 
sabhas function, the representatives of the village have to stand before the 
electorate and explain what they have done or not done. If we have such 
direct accountability mechanisms, both sides will be alert. It is possible that 
with minor tinkering and a careful analysis of what people are doing, we 
will be able to achieve good governance through public reforms. 
> Improving systems and methods: The paper work in government offices 
should be reduced by abolishing all unnecessary reports and returns and 
reducing the number of routine circulars. The existing system of file 
movement has to be thoroughly recast making it officer oriented and 
reducing the number of levels through which a file has to pass before a final 
decision is taken. Merging field departments with the secretariat can 
substantially reduce the time taken in decision-making. The number of 
meetings both at the secretariat and the field levels should also be 
drastically reduced so as to provide adequate time for officers to make field 
visits and be in touch with the people. 
> Rationalization of civil services: In several departments, there is a need to 
induct more officers for service delivery rather than for supervision. The 
location of field staff and the number of employees in many departments 
are skewed. In many cases, more officers are located in the state or district 
headquarters, when the need is to have officers at the actual 
implementation/cutting edge levels. An effective system of panchayats can 
help in combining the functions of several field departments in a single 
individual, whose work can be supervised by the higher functionaries of 
the Panchayati Raj system. With the changing role of government, the size 
and scale of civil service should also change. Efforts must be made to 
identify surplus staff, set up an effective redeployment plan and devise a 
liberal system for exit. For the time being, recruitment should be limited 
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only to functional posts while vacancies at the secretariat and clerical 
levels should not be filled. 
> Lateral entry into the civil service, on a contract basis, can also be 
considered to enhance mobility. There has to be a conscious effort to prune 
the size of bureaucracy especially at the clerical levels. Reducing the 
number of general holidays as recommended by the Fifth Pay Commission 
should help in better utilization of the existing staff. Officers must be 
encouraged to join voluntary organizations of repute as well as educational 
and research institutions during mid-career. Besides reducing the size of 
the bureaucracy, this will also help in widening the knowledge base of the 
officers concerned. 
> Stability of tenure: A malaise afflicting civil service has been the instability 
of tenure, leading to reduced involvement and respect for authority. If an 
incumbent is not sure how long he will stay in a particular position, he will 
never be able to pay attention to details or master the situation at his work 
place. While employees such as teachers, village accountants, etc., need 
not be transferred at all, except on promotion, there has to be a minimum 
tenure prescribed for other field level functionaries like district collectors, 
superintendents of police, project officers etc. For higher ranks in civil 
service, like secretaries to government, the posting can be contractual for a 
fixed period and systems evolved to ensure that they are not removed 
before their period of contract expires without their consent or explanation. 
> Establishment of the Ombudsman institution at the earliest possible to 
deal with political corruption with suo-moto powers of imitating action 
against the elected functionaries of the government, including the Prime 
Minister of India ^ 
> Performance appraisal: There has to be a regular appraisal of performance 
of public service providers at every level. As is done for the armed forces, 
a grading system on a ten-point scale to assess the individual traits and 
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attributes could be introduced as a part of the annual confidential reports. 
Counseling may be introduced for those employees who repeatedly get 
adverse remarks. A time-frame should be fixed for writing the annual 
confidential reports as well as for their acceptance. It may be a good idea to 
provide a copy of each year's completely written annual confidential report 
to the employee concerned, to enable him to know how his/her 
performance had been judged and what improvements are required for 
better performance.. 
The inward and outward reforms needed for public service will, 
however, be time consuming. Reducing the size of government, ensuring better 
orientation and stability of tenure leading to professionalism etc., will not take 
place within a short span of time. But every country should have a vision of its 
future and steps initiated in time and the process pursued vigorously to ensure 
good governance, at least in the near future. I 
The above-suggested agenda, because of its huge scope and 
implications, might deter some of us from action. But the complexities of 
the problems should not cloud our thinking and should not deter us from 
advocating sensible solutions. Any serious reform advocacy must be based 
clear thinking, rational analysis, and once the goals are clear, it becomes 
easier to design campaigns and activities to suit the requirements. A vibrant 
and informed civil society, media exposure and "political will" to enforce 
these governance reforms are the vitals input. ' 
As the Indian political system has evolved from dominant party system 
to multi party system, effective decision-making is now possible only through 
political bargaining and accommodation. The need for political as well as 
administrative reforms is definitely there in the governance of the country. But 
it is debatable whether a code of governance is required. The Constitution has 
provided guidelines for governance in the form of 'Directives, a proper Code 
for Good Governance' needs to be agreed upon. 
^'^F'Sr^g^g^sfc^fc^fc^gfc^^'tifa^^tfi.'Sfi.'g^^sife^tffa^ifc^tifc^sP^^^ 
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Appendix-I 
VOHRA COMMITTEE REPORT* 
1. 1 Government had (through its Order No.S/7937/SS(ISP)/93 dated 9th July '93) 
estabUshed a Committee, comprised as below, to take stock of all available 
information about the activities of crime Syndicates/Mafia organisations which had 
developed links with and were being protected by Government functionaries and 
political personalities. Based on the recommendations of the Committee, Government 
shall determine the need, if any, to establish a special organisation/agency to regularly 
collect information and pursue cases against such elements: 
(i) Home Secretary Chairman 
(ii) Secretary (R) Member 
(iii) DIB Member 
(iv) Director CBI Member 
(v) JS(PP) MHA Member Secy. 
1.2 The Committee was authorised to invite senior officers of various concerned 
Departments to gather the required information. 
1.3 Special Secretary (Internal Security & Police), MHA, was subsequently added as 
a Member of the Committee. The Committee was desired to submit its Report within 
3 months. 
2.1 In the first meeting of the Committee (held on 15th July '93), I had explained to 
the Members that Government had established the Committee after seeing the reports 
of our Intelligence and Investigation agencies on the activities/linkages of the 
Dawood Ibrahim gang, consequent to the bomb blasts in Bombay in March 1993. 
From these various reports, it was apparent that the activities of Memon Brothers and 
Dawood Ibrahim had progressed over the years, leading to the establishment of a 
powerfiil network. This could not have happened without these elements having been 
protected by the functionaries of the concerned Government departments, specially 
Customs, Income Tax, Police and others. It was, therefore, necessary to identify the 
linkages and to also determine how such information could be timely collected and 
acted upon in the future. 
2.2 In the course of the discussions, I perceived that some of the Members appeared to 
have some hesitation in openly expressing their views and also seemed unconvinced 
that Government actually intended to pursue such matters. Accordingly, I addressed 
separate personal letters to each of the Members of the Committee seeking their well 
considered suggestions and recommendations. Their responses are briefly brought out 
below. 
Secretary (R&AW) 
2.3 The various offices abroad of this Agency have limited strength and are largely 
geared to the collection of military, economic, scientific and political intelligence. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 
R&AW monitor the activities of certain organisations abroad only insofar as they 
relate to their involvement with narco-rerrorist elements and smuggling arms, 
ammunition, explosives, etc. into the country. It does not monitor the activities of 
criminal elements abroad, which are mainly confined to "normal smuggling without 
any links to terrorist elements". The present strength of the Agency's offices abroad 
would not permit it to enlarge its field of activities. If, however, there is evidence to 
suggest that these organisations have links with Intelligence agencies of other 
countries, particularly Pakistan, and that they are being used or are likely to be used 
by such countries for destabilising our economy, it would become R&AW's 
responsibility to monitor their activities, as is being done by this Agency to collect 
vital information in regard to the investigations in the Bombay bomb blasts case. 
2.4 The creation of a nodal agency to collect information regarding the activities of 
Mafia organisations is very essential. All the existing information/data available with 
R&AW, IB and CBI could be made available to this nodal agency. R&AW will 
nominate an officer of suitable rank to liaise with the nodal agency on a regular basis 
to enable expeditious follow-up action. 
Director CBI 
3. 1 A Report on the nexus between the Bombay City Police and the Bombay under-
world was prepared by CBI in 1986. It would be usefiil to institute a fresh study by 
CBI, on the basis of which appropriate administrative/ legal measures could be 
initiated. 
3.2 An organised crime Syndicate/Mafia generally commences its activities by 
indulging in petty crime at the local level, mostly relating to illicit 
distillation/gambling/organised satta and prostitution in the larger towns. In port 
towns, their activities involve smuggling and sale of imported goods and 
progressively graduate to narcotics and drug trafficking. In the bigger cities, the main 
source of income relates to real estate - forcibly occupying lands/buildings, procuring 
such properties at cheap rates by forcing out the existing occupants/tenants etc. Over 
time, the money power thus acquired is used for building up contacts with bureaucrats 
and politicians and expansion of activities with impunity. The money power is used 
to develop a network of muscle-power which is also used by the politicians 
during elections. 
3.3 CBI has reported that all over India crime Syndicates have become a law unto 
themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men have become the 
order of the day. Hired assassins have become a part of these organisations. The nexus 
between the criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly 
in various parts of the country. The existing criminal justice system, which was 
essentially designed to deal with the individual offences/crimes, is unable to deal with 
the activities of the Mafia; the provisions of law in regard economic offences are 
weak; there are insurmountable legal difficulties in attaching/confiscation of the 
property acquired through Mafia activities. 
3.4 It has been suggested that the menace has first to be tackled at the local level 
where the agencies of the State and the concerned Central Enforcement Agencies like 
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Customs and Excise, Income Tax etc. would be required to take effective action. In 
cases where a crime Syndicate has graduated to big business, it would be necessary to 
conduct detailed investigations into its assets, both movable and immovable. It has 
been stressed that when such action is not timely and effectively taken, the lower 
functionaries of the concerned State and Central Departments/organisations start over-
looking the activities of the crime Syndicates. To elucidate this point, the Director 
CBI has given the example of IQBAL MIRCHI of Bombay who, till the late 80's, was 
merely a visitor to passenger and carrier ships to obtain liquor and cigarettes for 
selling the same at a profit. In the last 3-4 years, MIRCHI acquired real estate valuing 
crores of rupees; he has many bank accounts and has been paying lakhs of rupees to 
his carriers. The growth of MIRCHI is due to the fact that the concerned Enforcement 
agencies did not timely take action against him and, later, this perhaps became 
difficult on account of the enormous patronage that he had developed. If MIRCHI is 
investigated, the entire patronage enjoyed by him and his linkages will come to light. 
Director CBI has observed that there are many such cases, as that of MIRCHI where 
the initial failure has led to the emergence of Mafia giants who have become too big 
to be tackled. 
3.5 Director CBI has stated that the main mode of communications/contacts of the 
Mafias operating at the international level is through telephonic communications. 
Referring to the useful leads emerging fi"om the investigations into the activities of 
Dawood Ibrahim, a Mafia leader, the director CBI has stated that the effective 
monitoring of the telephone calls made from India/received from abroad would yield 
usefiil information and, for this being done, Government may grant sanction to 
monitor certain telephone connections. 
3.6 The assistance of Banks is an essential input. The Bank Managers can be placed 
under obligation to render reports on all heavy transactions and suspicious accounts to 
the Enforcement agencies. Such a practice obtains in UK. 
3.7 Concluding his analysis. Director CBI has made the following suggestions to 
bring under control the activities of the criminal Syndicates: 
(i) Identification of offences and award of deterrent punishments, including 
preventive detention. 
(ii) Trial procedures should be simplified and hastened. 
(iii) Surveillance should be carried out through finger printing, photographs 
and dossiers. 
(iv) Monitoring mechanisms should be established at the State and Central 
levels. 
(v) Establishment of Special Cells in the States CIDs and CBI. 
(vi) Suitable amendments should be introduced in the existing laws to more 
effectively deal with the activities of Maixa organisations, etc.; this would also 
include review of the existing laws. 
(vii) A detailed case study of 10-15 cases would provide useful information 
regarding the administrative/legal measures, which would be required to be 
taken to effectively tackle the fimctioning of Mafia organizations. The CBI 
can do this within a short period. 
IV 
Director. IB 
6.1 DIB has reported that due to the progressive decline in the values of public life in 
the country "warning signals of sinister linkage between the underworld politicians 
and the bureaucracy have been evident with disturbing regularity, as exemplified by 
the exposures of the networks of the Bombay blast case". He has 
recommended itnmediate attention to:-
(i) Identification of the nexus between the criminals/Mafias and anti-national 
elements on the one hand and bureaucrats, politicians and other sensitively 
located individuals on the other. 
(ii) Identification of the nature and dimensions of these linkages and the modus 
operandi of their operations. 
(iii) Assessment of the impact of these linlcages on the various institutions, 
viz., the electoral, political, economic, law and order and the administrative 
apparatus. 
(iv) Nexus, if any, between the domestic linkages with foreign intelligence. 
(v) Necessary action to show effective action to coimteract/ neutralise the Mafia 
activities. 
(vi) Political and legal constraints in dealing with the covert/illegal functioning 
of the linkages. 
6.2 Like the Director CBI, the DIB has also stated that there has been a rapid 
spread and growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug Mafias, smuggling 
gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the country which have, over the 
years, developed an extensive network of contacts with the 
bureaucrats/Government functionaries at the local levels, politicians, media 
persons and strategically located individuals in the non-State sector. Some of 
these Syndicates also have international linkages, including the foreign 
intelligence agencies. In this context, the DIB has given the following examples 
(i) In certain States, like Bihar, Haryana and UP, these gangs enjoy the 
patronage of local level politicians, cutting across party lines and the protection 
of governmental functionaries. Some political leaders become the leaders of 
these gangs/armed senas and, over the years, get themselves elected to local 
bodies, State Assemblies and the national Parliament. Resultantly, such 
elements have acquired considerable political clout seriously jeopardizing the 
smooth functioning of the administration and the safety of life and property of 
the common man, causing a sense of despair and alienation among the people, 
(ii) The big smuggling Syndicates, having international linkages, have spread 
into and infected the various economic and financial activities, including havala 
transactions, circulation of black money and operations of a vicious parallel 
economy causing serious damage to the economic fibre of the country. These 
Syndicates have acquired substantial financial and muscle power and social 
respectability and have successfiilly corrupted the government machinery at all 
levels and wield enough influence to make the task of Investigating and 
Prosecuting agencies extremely difficult; even the members of the Judicial 
system have not escaped the embrace of the Mafia. 
(iii) Certain elements of the Mafia have shifted to narcotics, drugs and weapon 
smuggling and established narco-terrorism networks, specially in the States of 
J&K, Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra. The cost of contesting elections has 
thrown the politician into the lap of these elements and led to a grave 
compromise by officials of the preventive/detective systems. The virus has 
spread to almost all the centres in the country; the coastal and the border States 
have been particularly affected. 
(iv) The Bombay bomb blast case and the communal, riots in Surat and 
Ahmedabad have demonstrated how the Indian underworld has been exploited 
by the Pak ISI and the latter's network in UAE to cause sabotage, subversion 
and communal tension in various parts of the country. The investigations into 
the Bombay bomb blast cases have revealed extensive linkages of the 
underworld in the various governmental agencies, political circles, business 
sector and the film world. 
6.3 DIB has stated that the network of the Mafia is virtually running a parallel 
Government, pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance. It is thus most 
immediately necessary that an institution is established to effectively deal with the 
menace. In this connection, the DIB has stated: 
(i) Presently, there, is no system/ mechanism which is specifically designated to 
collect and collate intelligence pertaining to the linkages developed by crime 
Syndicates/Mafias with the governmental set up. Nonetheless, the various 
intelligence/investigation/enforcement agencies collect, in the normal course of 
their functioning, information about the nexus between the bureaucracy and 
politicians with the Mafia gangs, smugglers and the underworld. These agencies 
use such available inputs "only within the narrow confines of their work charter 
and choose not to take undue cognisance and follow-up action, leave alone 
sharing with any other agencies". Thus, all these agencies "ftmction within their 
own cocoons, with the result that a plethora of information fails to get specific 
and purposeful attention needed for the exposure of the Linkages". It 
is, therefore, necessary to immediately have an institutionalized system which 
"while giving total freedom to the various agencies to pursue their charter of 
work, would simultaneously cast on them the onus of sharing such inputs to a 
nodal outfit whose job will be to process this information for attention of a 
single designated authority". This will enable the nodal Group to provide useful 
leads to the various agencies and, overtime, a progressive database will get 
generated "to facilitate periodic reviews and analysis which could then be passed 
to a designated body". 
7.1 As would be seen from the afore-stated brief discussion, specially the views 
expressed by Director CBI and DIB, it is evident that the muscle power of the crime 
Syndicates is sustained by their enormous financial power which, in turn, is, secured 
by the Mafia elements by committing economic offences with impunity. In this 
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context, I held detailed personal discussions with Secretary (Revenue) under 
whose control operate the various economic intelligence/investigative/enforcement 
agencies. 
7.2 The Department of Revenue functions through the following major agencies: 
(i) Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEQ 
Inter alia, CBSE is responsible for the prevention of smuggling, In this and other 
tasks, it is assisted by the by the Director General of Revenue Intelligence (DGRI) 
and the Directorate General of Anti-Evasion (DGAE). The DGRI deals with the 
evasion of customs duties; the DGAE with Excise duty evasion. 
an Central Board of Direct Taxes fCBDT) 
Income Tax Department administers the Income Tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, etc. 
(iii) Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB) 
The CEIB is responsible for coordinating and strengthening the intelligence gathering 
activities and the investigative and enforcement actions of the various agencies 
responsible for investigation into economic offences and the enforcement of economic 
laws. The CEIB is responsible for maintaining liaison with the concemed 
Departments Directorates both at the Centre and at the State levels and is expected to 
provide overall direction to the investigative agencies under the Department of 
Revenue. 
The CEIB is expected, inter alia, to attend to the following tasks: 
(a) Identification of major sources generating black money; directing and 
developing intelligence about such sources; plaiming and coordinating action 
and operations against such sources. 
(b) Assisting the various enforcement agencies in strengthening the 
intelligence gathering infrastructure and building up their capability for 
storage and retrieval of intelligence. 
(c) Conducting investigative and analytical studies in difficult areas of black 
money operations and monitoring indicators thereof 
(iv) Enforcement Directorate 
This Directorate is concemed mth the enforcement of the investigation and penal 
provision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; collection of intelligence relating 
to foreign exchange offences; enquiries into suspected violations of the provisions of 
FERA, etc. 
(v) Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) 
The NCB is responsible for the administration of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances Act. It is responsible for coordination with different Central and State 
Goverrmient Departments/Ministries and the various Central and State law 
enforcement agencies for the implementation of the NDPS Act. I explained to 
Secretary (Revenue) the broad considerations on account of which the government 
had set up a Committee to look into the linkages developed by the Mafia elements. He 
informed me that he had recently held a meeting with senior representatives of the 
RBI, the Chairman CBEC, Chairman CBDT and the Economic Intelligence Council 
in the Department of Revenue, and readily agreed with my request to attend a meeting 
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of the Committee along with his concerned officers for a fiill discussion on the issues 
before the Committee. Accordingly, I arranged a meeting of the Committee (30th Aug 
'93) to hear the views of Secretary (Revenue), who was accompanied by chairman 
CBDT, DGRI, Member (Customs) and Director (Enforcement). During the course of 
the discussions with Secretary (Revenue) and his aforesaid principal officers, the 
following significant observations were made: 
(i) In the normal course of his work, to detect violations of Customs & Excise 
laws, the DGRI comes across information on linkages crime Syndicates and 
governmental functionaries etc. As following of such information is not within 
the charter of duties of DGRI, his officers focus primarily on the information 
relating to the violation of laws relating to their charter, 
(ii) As in the case of DGRT, indirect information also becomes available the 
CBDT about linkages. Here again, not being directly relating to their charter of 
responsibilities, the CBDT do not follow up such leads. 
(iii) While the NCB is specifically responsible for booking drug 
traffickers, with the increasing importance being given to Narco-terrorism, the 
NCB has been asked to gather further information so that the real king-pins 
in the narcotics trade can be apprehended. 
(iv) The Directorate of Enforcement comes across information on linkages and 
passes it on to the CBI and IB. 
(v) Of late, currency amounting to crores of rupees is being 
seized, invariably packed in suitcases and gunny bags. The Banks are 
reluctant to pass on informaton about account holders to CBDT and do 
not allow their officers to hold exploratory enquiries. 
(vi) While a certain amount of, information is shared between the 
various organisations under the Department of Revenue, and those under 
the MHA and Cabinet Secretariat, the exchanges are sporadic and limited. This 
is perhaps due to the fact that each concerned organisation/agency is anxious to 
protect its sources and is apprehensive that a full sharing of all information 
might jeopardise its operations, on account of premature leakage of 
information. 
(vii) While DGRI, Director (Enforcement) and DG NCB are authorised to 
undertake phone tapping of suspected offenders, the DGRI has not 
been allowed to enforce surveillance on the telephonic comniunications of 
political personalities. 
(viii) Senior Police officers, even in the border States, are not trained or 
adequately informed of the work done by the Directorate of 
Enforcement, specially in regard to money laundering operations, 
(ix) Information about the activities of drug traffickers is passed on by 
DGNCB to the concerned State Governments and their agencies. 
However, niggardly responses by the latter and prolonged delays in the 
disposal of cases before the Courts seriously hampers, the effective 
functioning of the NCB. While the NDPS Act prescribes the award of 
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deterrent punishments to offenders, the results are to the contrary. It is 
necessary that the Directorates of Prosecution in the State Ciovemments are 
urgently brought under the control of the State Police. 
7.5 Secretary (Revenue) stated that the field officers of his various Departments were 
faced with various problems, amongst which are: 
(i) The utter inadequacy of the criminal justice system; cases are not 
heard timely; fiinctioning of the Government lawyers is grossly inadequate; 
all this results in a low percentage of convictions and mild 
punishments. Unless the criminal justice system is geared up, the work of 
the enforcement agencies cannot be effective. 
(ii) The field officers of the various agencies of the Revenue Department 
are often pressurized by senior government functionaries/political 
leaders, apparently at the behest of crime Syndicates/Mafia elements. Unless 
the field level officers are offered effective protection, they cannot 
be expected to maintain interest in vigorously pursuing action against 
the activities of such elements. 
7.6 Chairman CBDT stated that insofar as the fimctioning of his officers is concerned, 
whenever they come into possession of any information regarding the violation of any 
other law, they pass it on to the concerned agency. He suggested that if the 
information available with other agencies is passed on to him, his officers could 
pursue the sane. 
8.1 As a result of the discussions held by the Committee with Secretary (Revenue) and 
his principal officers, it is evident that: 
(i) While, in the course of their normal activities, information on the linkages 
of the crime Syndicates sometimes becomes available, such information is not 
pursued on the score that it is not directly related to offences falling within the 
laws administered by these agencies; 
(ii) Such information is occasionally passed on by these agencies to the 
CBl and or IB; 
(iii) The various agencies under the Department of Revenue do not 
specifically search out information on the linkages of crime Syndicates. 
9. 1 Consequent to the Committee's discussions with the Secretary (Revenue) and his 
principal officers, I held a series of further personal discussions with the Secretary 
(Revenue). At my request. Secretary (Revenue) gave me a personal note indicating his 
views, which are briefly as below: 
(i) The information gathered by the various agencies under the Revenue 
Department, while gathering intelligence on offences relating to the laws 
administered by them, is generally not put to any use unless it is required to be 
passed on to other intelligence agencies outside the Department of Revenue, 
(ii) The linkages developed by crime Syndicates get generally confirmed 
when pressure is mounted on the concerned agencies not to take action 
against the offenders or to go slow in the cases against them. Such pressures 
are mounted either immediately after a raid is conducted or at the time 
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when prosecution is about to be initiated. Pressures are also exerted 
whenever corrupt and undesirable officers are shifted from sensitive 
assignments (Preventive Customs Divisions at the Airports, sensitive 
Collectorates in the Central Excise etc.). 
(iii) In the narcotics arena, which includes cuhivation of opium, manufacture of 
alkaloids, prevention of narcotics, smuggling etc. the financial stakes are 
astronomically high. Consequently, the level of corruption is of a very high 
order in this area of functioning and enormous pressures are brought to bear 
even when subordinate officials are posted away especially when the shift of an 
officer adversely affects the interests of those who are making easy money. 
(iv) Narcotics trade has a world-wide network of smugglers who also have 
close links with terrorists. Terrorists indulge in narcotics trade to amass 
huge funds, in various foreign currencies, from which they source their 
procurement of weapons etc. 
9.2 While the Department of Revenue has initiated a number of steps to deal with the 
activities of smugglers and to plug loop-holes in the system, Secretary (Revenue) has 
stated that a possible approach to effectively liquidating the linkages developed by the 
crime Syndicates would be to mercilessly prosecute the offenders without succumbing 
to any pressure whatsoever. He is of the view that once the offenders are deterrently 
punished under the law, their influence and strength will start declining, as also of all 
those who support them, wherever located. He has emphasised that for this objective 
being achieved it will be extremely necessary that: the entire governmental machinery 
involved in taking action against the crime Syndicates is allowed to perform its duties 
with total freedom; officers with impeccable integrity should be posted to head the 
various organisations which are responsible for taking action against tax offenders, 
smugglers etc; such officers should be selected with utmost care and provided 
sufficiently long tenures, giving them the clear mandate to ruthlessly punish the 
offenders; action must be taken to ensure the objective functioning of Courts which 
deal with the trial of economic offences; all cases before the Courts should be 
speedily concluded without the judicial officers coming under any pressure or 
succumbing to temptations; inefficient and corrupt elements in the various 
organisations venue must be weeded out and Govenmient should take stringent action 
against officers who seek to exert political pressure for securing postings and 
appointments of their choice. 
10.1 From the above narrated analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn:-
(i) On the basis of the extensive experience gained by our various concerned 
intelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies, it is apparent that crime 
Syndicates and Mafia organisations have established themselves in various 
parts of the country. 
(ii) The various crime Syndicates /Mafia organisations have developed 
significant muscle and money power and established linkages with 
governmental functionaries, political leaders and others to be able to 
operate with impunity (as recently exemplified by the activities of the Memon 
Brothers and Dawood Ibrahim). 
(iii) While the CBI and IB and the various agencies under the Department 
of Revenue, in their normal course of functioning, come across information 
relating to the linkages of crime Syndicates/Mafia organisations, there is 
presently no system under which they are expected to pass on such information 
to an indentified nodal agency. Sharing of such information is presently of an 
occasional nature and no evidence is available of the same having been put to 
any operational use (the only mentionable exception perhaps relates to the recent 
investigations into the activities of Memon Brothers and the Dawood gang on 
which several of our agencies were put to work collectively). 
11.1 Even where an agency comes across certam information about the linkages of 
crime Syndicates, it has no mandate to immediately pass it on to one or more 
agencies. An agency which comes across information regarding linkages is also 
apprehensive that the sharing of such information may jeopardize its own functioning 
through premature leakage. In sum, the various agencies presently in the field take 
care to essentially focus on their respective charter of duties, dealing with the 
infringement of laws relating to their organisations and consciously putting aside any 
information on linkages which they may come across. 
12. 1 In the discussions in the Committee, I asked each of the Members as well as the 
Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers about their views regarding the 
establishment of a Nodal Agency for the collection, collation and operationalisation of 
all information relating to the activities of crime Syndicates. Broadly, the following 
approaches have been mooted: 
(i) The DIB has stated that while considering the establishment of any nodal 
mechanism, "It must be appreciated that the problems has enormous impact on 
national security and is indeed highly political in nature". In this context, he has 
suggested that the nodal set up should be under the IB, which is even otherwise 
engaged in monitoring various political activities having a bearing on national 
security. He has recommended that "an exclusive Top Secret Cell be established 
in the IB to function as the Nodal Group for receipt of inputs from various 
security/revenue agencies which reveal a politician-bureaucrat-underworld 
nexus. Such sharing will be through personal communications in writing, while 
operating difficulties could be sorted out through periodic meetings among the 
heads of these organisations to be chaired by the Home Secretary". The Top 
Secret Cell will share all tactical and operational information with other 
concerned agencies on "need to know and act basis". 
(ii) The other approach recommended is to set up a system under which the 
Heads of the various Intelligence and Revenue agencies shall meet on a regular 
basis and exchange vital information, without there being any leakage. 
13.1 In the background of the discussions so far, there does not appear to be need for 
any fiirther debate on the vital importance of setting up a nodal point to which all 
existing intelligence and Enforcement agencies (irrespective of the Department under 
which they are located) shall promptly pass on any information which they may come 
across, which relates to the activities of crime Syndicates. 
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13.2 If the preposition in the preceding para is sustained, a decision will need to be 
taken regarding the Department/Ministry under which the nodal set-up should be 
located. 
14.1 Under the existing arrangements for the transaction of Government business, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for all matters relating to internal security. It 
is for this reason that the Intelligence Bureau is a part and parcel of this Ministry (It is 
only by tradition that the DIB reports directly to authorities outside MHA). R&AW 
functions under the Cabinet Secretariat and deals with external intelligence. The 
various Intelligence, Investigation and Enforcement agencies dealing with the 
implementation of economic laws report to the Revenue Department under the 
Ministry of Finance. The CBI, which is the principal criminal investigation agency of 
the Centre, is under the Department of Persoimel. 
14.2 In my view, considerable care would have to be taken to ensure that the 
information which becomes available to the Nodal Cell is handled by a very senior 
and trust-worthy officer. Any leakage of such information would not only jeopardize 
potential action against the powerful criminal Syndicates, but may also be susceptible 
to political exploitation. Under all circumstances, it will have to be ensured that the 
information available with the nodal set-up is used strictly and entirely for stringent 
action against the crime Syndicates, without allowing any scope whatever of its being 
exploited for political gain. 
14.3 In the preceding context, it would be logical if the nodal set-up is under the 
MHA, directly handled by the Home Secretary who can be assisted by one or more 
selected officers of the Ministry for the collation and compilation of all information 
received from IB, CBI, R&AW and the various agencies under the Department of 
Revenue The maimer in which such information is operationalised would need to be 
confidentially discussed wdth the concerned Heads of Organisation and, as necessary, 
with Secretary (Revenue). It will also need to be ensured that the nodal set-up 
fimctions with extreme secrecy. Needless to say, any leakage whatever about the 
linkages of crime Syndicate senior Government functionaries or political leaders 
in the states or at the centre could have a destabilizing effect on the functioning 
of Government. As such, it would not appear prudent to entrust the functioning of the 
Nodal Cell to any level below that of the Home Secretary. Further, the government 
would also have to carefiilly consider and prescribe the authorities to whom the 
Home Secretary will report in regard to the sensitive information received by the 
nodal set-up as well as regarding the operations to be launched by one or more of the 
concerned agencies to apprehend, investigate and prosecute the offenders. 
15.1 In the normal course this report would have been drafted by the Member 
Secretary and finalized by the Committee. Considering the nature of the issues 
involved, I did not consider it desirable to burden the Members of the Committee with 
any further involvement beyond the views expressed by them. Accordingly, I decided 
to personally dictate this Report. 
15.2 I have prepared only three copies of this Report. One copy each is being 
submitted to MOS(IS) and HM, the third copy being retained by me. After HM has 
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perused this Report, I request him to consider discussing further action with finance 
Minister, MOS(IS) and myself. The emerging approach could thereafter be got 
approved from Prime Minister before being implemented. At that stage other 
concerned senior officers would be taken into confidence. 
15.3 After an initial discussion at the level of MOS(IS) and HM I could send a copy 
of this Report to FM, before the issues are discussed with him. 
Sd/- (N. N. VOHRA ) HM rCopv No. 1/3] 
HOME SECRETARY MOS [Copy No.2/3] 
5.10.93 
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Appendix-II 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW 
THE WORKING OF THE CONSTITUTION ON UNION-STATE 
RELATIONS' 
Office of Governor 
8.14.1 The Commission had issued a consultation paper with a questionnaire 
on the office of the Governor for eliciting public opinion. The issues raised and the 
suggestions made in the consultation paper related to amending articles 155, 156, 200 
and 201 with a view to entrusting the selection of Governors to a Committee, making 
the five-year term a fixed tenure, providing for removal only by impeachment and 
limiting his powers in the matter of giving assent to Bills and reserving them for the 
consideration of the President. 
8.14.2 After carefiiUy considering the public responses and after full 
deliberations, the Commission does not agree to dilute the powers of the President in 
the matter of selection and appointment of Governors. However, the Commission 
feels that the Governor of a State should be appointed by the President, after 
consultation with the Chief Minister of that State. Normally the five year term 
should be adhered to and removal or transfer of the Governor should be by 
following a similar procedure as for appointment i.e. after consultation with the 
Chief Minister of the concerned State. 
8.14.3 The Commission recommends that in the matter of selection of a 
Governor, the following matters mentioned in para 4.16.01 of Volume I of the 
Sarkaria Commission Report should be kept in mind: 
*> He should be eminent in some walk of life. 
*t* He should be a person from outside the State. 
*** He should be a detached figure and not too intimately connected 
with the local politics of the State. 
*> He should be a person who has not taken too great a part in 
politics generally, and particularly in the recent past. 
In selecting a Governor in accordance with the above criteria, the persons 
belonging to the minority groups should continue to be given a chance as 
hitherto. 
8.14.4 There should be a time-limit - say a period of six months - within 
which the Governor should take a decision whether to grant assent or to reserve 
a Bill for consideration of the President. If the Bill is reserved for consideration 
of the President, there should be a time-limit, say of three months, within which 
the President should take a decision whether to accord his assent or to direct the 
Extracts from the Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution, 2002. 
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Governor to return it to the State Legislature or to seek the opinion of the 
Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the Act under article 143. 
8.14.5 In Jamalpur Gram Panchayat - Vs. Malwinder Singh - AIR 1985 SC 
1394, the Supreme Court held that if the assent of the President were sought to the 
law for a specific purpose, the efficacy of the assent would be limited to that purpose 
and cannot be extended beyond it. The court held that if the assent is sought and 
given, in general terms so as to be effective for all purposes, different considerations 
might arise. In the case before the Supreme Court case the assent was given by the 
President for giving protection to the legislation under article 31 (as it then stood) and 
article 31A and the court held that such assent would not operate for the purposes of 
article 254(2) of the Constitution. However, the court upheld the law passed by the 
State Legislature on the ground that it fell under entry 18 of the State List and not 
entry 41 of the Concvurent List. 
8.14.6 It is felt desirable that a suitable amendment should be made in the 
Constitution so that the assent given by the President should avail for all 
purposes of relevant articles of the Constitution. It would be inappropriate to drag 
the assent of President into such arguments. From the time the Bill is introduced till 
the assent of President is given, the whole procedure and proceedings are legislative 
in character. It is a collective action of the President, the House of the People, and the 
Council of States. It is not permissible to enquire as to how the mind of each member 
of the House and the President worked during the entire proceedings beginning with 
the introduction of the Bill and concluding with the according of assent by the 
President. The procedures are "certainly internal matters which are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court to inquire into." The court is entitled to go into the questions 
as to whether the enactment is either ultra virus or unconstitutional. The assent of the 
President is not justiciable. See AIR 1983 SC 1019 at 1048 para 88 - M/s Hoechst 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others. Even if noting sent to the 
President by the concerned Ministry does not reflect all the articles in the 
Constitution, which referred to the effect of the assent of the President i.e. articles 
31A, 31C, 254, it cannot be presumed that the President was not aware of or did not 
bear in mind, the relevant articles dealing with the effect of the assent of the 
President. However, it is desirable that when a Bill is sent for the President's 
assent, it would be appropriate to draw the attention of the President to all the 
articles of the Constitution, which refer to the need for the assent of the 
President to avoid any doubts in court proceedings. 
8.14.7 A suitable article should be inserted in the Constitution to the 
effect that an assent given by the President to an Act shall not be permitted to be 
argued as to whether it was given for one purpose or another. When the 
President gives his assent to the Bill, it shall be deemed to have been given for all 
purposes of the Constitution. 
8.14.8 It is recommended that the following proviso may be added as 
second proviso to article 111 of the Constitution: 
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"Provided further that when the President declares that he assents 
to the Bill, the assent shall be deemed to be a general assent for all 
purposes of the Constitution." 
Suitable amendment may also be made in article 200. 
Failure of Constitutional Machinery 
8.15.1 The Constitution of a country - or, for that matter, any enactment 
containing important and far-reaching provisions - is expected to provide for 
situations where circumstances arise, in which those provisions cannot be worked in 
strict conformity with the constitutional or statutory text, as applicable in normal 
circumstances. In India, the specific topic of failure of constitutional machinery in he 
States is deaU with, in three articles of the Constitution - articles 355 to 357 and 365 
- of which, article 356 is the one most talked about and subject of controversy 
allegedly on grounds of having been frequently misused and abused. 
8.15.2 It is important that article 356 is read with the other relevant articles 
viz. articles 256, 257, 355 and 365. Insofar as article 355 also inter alia speaks of the 
duty of the Union to protect the State against external aggression and internal 
disturbance and to ensure that the government of the State is carried on in accordance 
with the Constitution, it is obvious that article 356 is not the only one to take care of 
a situation of failure of constitutional machinery. The Union can also act under 
article 355 i.e. without imposing President's rule. Article 355 can stand on its own. 
Also, Union Government can issue certain directions under articles 256 and 257. 
While article 356 authorises the President to issue a proclamation imposing 
President's rule over a State if he is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the 
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of 
this Constitution, article 365 says that where a State fails to comply with Union 
directions (imder articles 256, 257 and others) "it shall be lawful for the President to 
hold that a situation has arisen in which the Goverrmient of the State cannot be 
carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution". The scheme of the 
Constitution seems to clearly suggest that before rushing to issue a proclamation 
imder article 356, all other possible avenues should be explored and as Dr. Ambedkar 
said, article 356 should be used only as a matter of last resort. It should first be 
ensured that the Union had done all that it could in discharge of its duty under article 
355, that it had issued the necessary directions under articles 256-257 and that the 
State had failed to comply with or give effect to the directions. 
Use-misuse of Article 356 
8.16 Since the coming into force of the Constitution on 26 January 
1950, article 356 and analogous provisions have been invoked 111 times. 
According to a Lok Sabha Secretariat study, onl3 occasions the analogous 
provision namely section 51 of the Government of Union Territories Act 1963 
was applied to Union Territories of which only Pondicherry had a legislative 
assembly until the occasion when it was last applied. In the remaining 98 
instances the article was applied 10 times technically due to the mechanics of the 
Constitution in circumstances like reorganisation of the States, delay in 
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completion of the process of elections, for revision of proclamation and there 
being no party with clear majority at the end of an election. In the remaining 88 
instances a close scrutiny of records would show that in as many as 54 cases 
there were apparent circumstances to warrant invocation of article 356. These 
were instances of large scale defections leading to reduction of the ruling party 
into minority, withdrawal of support of coalition partners, voluntary resignation 
by the government in view of widespread agitations, large scale militancy, 
judicial disqualification of some members of the ruling party causing loss of 
majority in the House and there being no alternate party capable of forming a 
Government. About 13 cases of possible misuse are such in which defections and 
dissensions could have been alleged to be result of political manoeuvre or cases in 
which floor tests could have finally proved loss of support but were not resorted 
to. In 18 cases common perception is that of clear misuse. These involved the 
dismissal of 9 State Governments in April 1977 and an equal number in 
February 1980. This analysis shows that number of cases of imposition of 
President's Rule out of 111, which could be considered as a misuse for dealing 
with political problems or considerations irrelevant for the purposes in that 
article such as mal-administration in the State are a little over 20. Clearly in 
many cases including those arising out of States Reorganisation it would appear 
that the President's Rule was inevitable. However, in view of the fact that article 
356 represents a giant instrument of constitutional control of one tier of the 
constitutional structure over the other raises strong misapprehensions. 
Sarkaria Commission 
8.17 Chapter 6 of the Sarkaria Commission Report deals with emergency 
provisions, namely, articles 352 - 360. The Sarkaria Commission has made 12 
recommendations; 11 of which are related to article 356 while 1 is related to article 
355 of the Constitution. Sarkaria Commission also made specific recommendations 
for amendment of the Constitution with a view to protecting the States from what 
could be perceived as a politically-driven interference in self-governance of States. 
The underlined theme of the recommendations is to promote a constitutional structure 
and culture that promotes co-operative and sustained growth of federal institutions set 
down by the Constitution. 
Should Article 356 be Deleted? 
8.18 The Commission had issued a consultation paper along with a 
questionnaire with a view to elicit the views and responses of the public. Large 
majority of the responses were against deletion of article 356 but favoured its being 
suitably amended to prevent misuse. There are three patent reasons which require the 
retention of the article: 
(i) Article 356 and related provisions were regarded as a bulwark of the 
Constitution, an ultimate assurance of maintaining or restoring representative 
government in States responsible to the people. 
(ii) In a fairly large number of cases the invocation of article 356 has been found 
to have been not only warranted but inevitable. 
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(iii) If this article is deleted, article 365 would lose relevance and use of article 
355 in the absence of 356 might bring a drastic change in Union-State 
relations which may be worse from the point of view of both the States and the 
Union. 
The Commission is, therefore, not in favour of deletion of article 356. 
Need for Conventions 
8.19.1 In considering the issues raised regarding article 356 the 
Commission found that a great part of the remedy to prevent its misuse lies in 
the domain of creating safeguards and constitutional conventions governing its 
use. The ultimate pVotection against the misuse of article 356 lies in the character 
of the political process itself. The Commission is, therefore, for generating a 
constitutional culture that relies on conventions and treats them with same 
respect as a constitutional provision. 
8.19.2 Article 356 has been lodged in the Constitution as a bulwark, a 
giant protection and a remedy of the last resort. The invocation of article 356 is 
a constitutional device, the operation of which is vested in the executive domain. 
In invocation, it is therefore essential to preserve its stature in the constitutional 
scheme. If the exercise of this power is perceived to yield to political expediency, 
it will greatly damage the majesty of the executive power and the federal 
balance. The Commission, therefore, recommends, in the spirit of the framers of the 
Constitution, that article 356 must be used sparingly and only as a remedy of the last 
resort and after exhausting action under other articles like 256, 257 and 355. 
8.19.3 It has been widely represented that the process of invocation of 
article 356 must follow the principles of natural justice and fair consideration. 
This aspect also weighed heavily during discussions in the Constituent Assembly 
and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee had hoped that warning would be 
given to the errant States and they would be given an opportunity to explain 
their position. One other issue regarding the issue of such a warning is whether it 
should be made public or given wide publicity. The Commission have 
considered this aspect very carefully and have come to the conclusion that taking 
this matter to the public domain at this stage may apparently allow for 
transparency but is likely to generate a great deal of heat in the political domain 
providing the anti-social forces a free play for social disharmony and violence. It 
may also encourage from the very outset a process of litigation that may apply 
continuous brakes in exercise of the executive responsibility. 
8.19.4 The Commission feels that in a large number of cases where article 
356 has been used, the situation could be handled under article 355 i.e. without 
imposing President's rule under article 356. It is most unfortunate that article 
355 has hardly been used. 
8.19.5 In case of political breakdown, the Commission recommends that 
before issuing a proclamation under article 356 the concerned State should be 
given an opportunity to explain its position and redress the situation, unless the 
situation is such, that following the above course would not be in the interest of 
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security of State, or defence of the country, or for other reasons necessitating 
urgent action. 
Situation of Political breakdown 
8.20.1 One of the principal criticisms against the imposition of the President's 
rule has been the unseemly hurry of Governors to recommend it - particularly in a 
politically conflicting context - without exploring all possibilities of having an 
alternative Government enjoying confidence of the House. Even while making such 
an exploration the Governors placed excessive reliance on their subjective satisfaction 
to ascertain majority support for one or the other political party by resorting to 
headcounts of supporters presented before them by the political parties. 
8.20.2 he issue of determining the majority support of a political party in the 
House has been dealt with in the Rajamannar Committee Report, Sarkaria 
Commission and the Bommai judgement. The Commission notes that the political 
events in a divisive context in several States have repeatedly shown tremendous speed 
and mobility of shifting political loyalties. In such a situation the task that a Governor 
may impose upon himself to determine the majority support of one or the other party 
is indeed an onerous one. The assessment of the Governor, no matter how carefiilly 
and objectively determined, can lose validity in no time in the climate of quick 
shifting sands of political loyalty, ft is, therefore, not a matter of subjective 
determination of the Governor or the President. The constitutional requirement is that 
a Government should enjoy the confidence of the House and its open and objective 
determination is possible only on the floor of the House. There may conceivably be 
exceptional circumstances and situations which are not conducive to hold the floor 
test. The Commission is not, therefore, in favour of a static binding rule but would 
rely on a political and constitutional process in a constitutional forum for a valid 
determination of majority support for a particular party in the House. The procedure 
suggested forms a part of the Bommai judgement and thus holds ground judicially. 
8.20.3 The Commission recommends that the question whether the 
Ministry in a State has lost the confidence of the Legislative Assembly or not, 
should be decided only on the floor of the Assembly and nowhere else. If 
necessary, the Union Government should take the required steps, to enable the 
Legislative Assembly to meet and freely transact its business. The Governor 
should not be allowed to dismiss the Ministry, so long as it enjoys the confidence 
of the House. It is only where a Chief Minister refuses to resign, after his 
Ministry is defeated on a motion of no-confidence, that the Governor can dismiss 
the State Government. In a situation of political breakdown, the Governor 
should explore all possibilities of having a Government enjoying majority 
support in the Assembly. If it is not possible for such a Government to be 
installed and if fresh elections can be held without avoidable delay, he should ask 
the outgoing Ministry, (if there is one), to continue as a caretaker government, 
provided the Ministry was defeated solely on a issue, unconnected with any 
allegations of maladministration or corruption and is agreeable to continue. The 
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Governor should then dissolve the Legislative Assembly, leaving the resolution of 
the constitutional crisis to the electorate. 
8.20.4 The problem would stand largely resolved if the recommendations 
made in para 4.20.7 in Chapter 4 in regard to the election of the leader of the 
House (Chief Minister) and the removal of the Government only by a 
constructive vote of no-confidence are accepted and implemented. 
8.20.5 Clause (1) of article 356 contains the expression 'or otherwise'. 
Clearly, the satisfaction of the President, as regards the existence of the situation 
contemplated under article 356, flows from two streams. It is immaterial that in most 
cases where article 356 had been invoked in the past it was on the basis of the report 
of the Governor. Given the circumstances of global nexus in activities of terrorism, 
insurgency, lawlessness, the material flowing from the source "otherwise" than the 
report of the Governor is equally germane to the scheme of invoking this provision. 
If, to meet with the desirable objective of transparency, as suggested by the Sarkaria 
Commission, the Governor's Report is projected in the public domain by making it a 
speaking document and given wide publicity, it would raise serious problems in the 
discharge of the executive responsibility. For purposes of publicity it would be 
difficult to differentiate between the Report of the Governor and the materials 
received "otherwise". The Commission recommends that normally President's 
Rule in a State should be proclaimed on the basis of Governor's Report under 
article 356(1). The Governor's report should be a '^speaking document", 
containing a precise and clear statement of all material facts and grounds, on the 
basis of which the President may satisfy himself, as to the existence or otherwise 
of the situation contemplated in article 356. 
Constitutional Amendments 
8.21.1 Article 356 has been amended 10 times principally by way of 
amendment of clause 356(4) and by substitution/omission of proviso to Article 
356(5). These were basically procedural changes. Article 356, as amended by 
Constitution (44* Amendment) provides that a resolution with respect to the 
continuance in force of a proclamation for any period beyond one year from the date 
of issue of such proclamation shall not be passed by either House of Parliament unless 
two conditions are satisfied, viz:-
(i) that a proclamation of Emergency is in operation in the whole of India or 
as the case may be, in the whole or any part of the State; and 
(ii) that the Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of 
the proclamation during the extended period is necessary on account of 
difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of the 
State concerned. 
8.21.2 The fulfillment of these two conditions together are a requirement 
precedent to the continuation of the proclamation. It could give rise to occasions for 
amendment of the Constitution from time to time merely for the purpose of this clause 
as happened in case of Punjab. Circumstances may arise where even without the 
proclamation of Emergency under article 352, it may be difficult to hold general 
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elections to the State Assembly. In such a situation continuation of President's rule 
may become necessary. It may, therefore, be more practicable to delink the two 
conditions allowing for operation of each condition in its own specific circumstances 
for continuation of the President's rule. This would allow for flexibility and save the 
Constitution from the need to amend it from time to time. 
8.21.3 The Commission recommends that in clause (5) of article 356 of the 
Constitution, in sub-clause (a) the word "and" occurring at the end should be 
substituted by "or" so that even without the State being under a proclamation of 
Emergency, President's rule may be continued if elections cannot be held. 
8.21.4 Whenever a proclamation under article 356 has been issued and 
approved by the Parliament it may become necessary to review the continuance 
in force of the proclamation and to restore the democratic processes earlier than 
the expiry of the stipulated period. The Commission are of the view that this 
could be secured by incorporating safeguards corresponding, in principal, to 
clauses (7) and (8) of article 352. The Commission, therefore, recommends that 
clauses (6) & (7) under article 356 may be added on the following lines: 
"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing clauses, the 
President shall revoke a proclamation issued imder clause (1) or a 
proclamation varying such proclamation if the House of the People 
passes a resolution disapproving, or, as the case may be, disapproving 
the continuance in force of, such proclamation. 
(7) Where a notice in writing signed by not less than one-tenth of the total 
number of members of the House of the People has been given, of their 
intention to move a resolution for disapproving, or, as the case may be, 
for disapproving the continuance in force of, a proclamation issued 
under clause (1) or a proclamation varying such proclamation: 
(a) to the Speaker, if the House is in session; or 
(b) to the President, if the House is not in session, 
a special sitting of the House shall be held within fourteen days fi^om the date 
on which such notice is received by the Speaker, or, as the case may be, by 
the President, for the purpose of considering such resolution." 
Dissolution of Assembly 
8.22.1 When it is decided to issue a proclamation under article 356(1), a 
matter for consideration that arises is whether the Legislative Assembly should 
also be dissolved or not. Article 356 does not explicitly provide for dissolution of 
the Assembly. One opinion is that if till expiry of two months from the 
Presidential proclamation and on the approval received from both Houses of 
Parliament the Legislative Assembly is not dissolved, it would give rise to 
operational disharmony. Since the executive power of the Union or State is co-
extensive with their legislative powers respectively, bicameral operations of the 
legislative and executive powers, both of the State Legislature and Parliament in 
List II of VII Schedule, is an anathema to the democratic principle and the 
constitutional scheme. However, the majority opinion in the Bommai judgement 
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holds that the rationale of clause (3) that every proclamation issued under article 
356 shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at 
the expiry of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been 
approved by resolutions passed by both Houses of Parliament, is to provide a 
salutary check on the executive power entrenching parliamentary supremacy 
over the executive. 
8.22.2 The Commission having considered these two opinions in the 
background of repeated criticism of arbitrary use of article 356 by the executive, 
is of the view that the check provided under clause 3 of article 356 would be 
ineffective by an irreversible decision before Parliament has had an opportunity 
to consider it. The power of dissolution has been inferred by reading sub clause 
(a) of clause 1 of article 356 along with article 174 which empowers the Governor 
to dissolve Legislative Assembly. Having regard to the overall constitutional 
scheme it would be necessary to secure the exercise of consideration of the 
proclamation by the Parliament before the Assembly is dissolved. 
8.22.3 The Commission, therefore, recommends that article 356 should be 
amended to ensure that the State Legislative Assembly should not be dissolved either 
by the Governor or the President before the proclamation issued under article 356(1) 
has been laid before Parliament and it has had an opportunity to consider it. 
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Appendix-Ill 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SARKARIA COMMISSION REPORT* 
Institution of Governor under tlie Constitution 
1. 4.16.01 A person to be appointed as a Governor should satisfy the following 
criteria: (i) He should be eminent in some walk of life. 
(ii) He should be a person outside the State. 
(iii) He should be a detached figure and not too intimately connected with 
the local politics of the State; and 
(iv) He should be a person who has not taken too great a part in politics 
generally, and particularly in the recent past. 
In selecting a Governor in accordance with the above criteria, persons, 
belonging to the minority groups should continue to be given a chance as hitherto. 
(para 4.6.09) 
2. 4.16.02 It is desirable that a politician from the ruling party at the Union is not 
appointed as Governor of a State which is being run by some other party or a 
combination of other parties. (para 4.6.19). 
3. 4.16.03 In order to ensure effective consultation with the State Chief Minister 
in the selection of a person to be appointed as Governor, the procedure of 
consultation should be prescribed in the Constitution itself by suitably amending 
Article 155. (para 4.6.25). 
4. 4.16.04 The Vice-President of India and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha may be 
consulted by the Prime Minister in selecting a Governor. The consultation should be 
confidential and informal and should not be a matter of constitutional obligation. 
(para 4.6.33) 
5. 4.16.05 The Governor's tenure of office of five years in a State should not be 
disturbed except very rarely and that too, for some extremely compelling reasons 
(para 4.7.08). 
6. 4.16.06 Save where the President is satisfied that, in the interest of the security 
of the State, it is not expedient to do so, the Governor whose tenure is proposed to be 
terminated before the expiry of the normal term of five years, should be informally 
apprised of the grounds of the proposed action and afforded a reasonable opportunity 
for showing cause against it. It is desirable that the President (in effect, the Union 
Council of Ministers) should get the explanation, if any, submitted by the Governor 
against his proposed removal from office, examined by an Advisory Group 
consisting of the Vice-President of India and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or a 
retired Chief Justice of India. After receiving the recommendation of this Group, the 
President may pass such orders in the case as he may deem fit. (para 4.8.08) 
Extracts from Chapter-IV of the Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State 
Relations, Part-I, New Delhi, Govemment of India, 1988. 
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7. 4.16.07 When before expiry of the normal term of five years, a Governor 
resigns or is appointed Governor in another State, or has his tenure terminated, the 
Union Government may lay a statement before both Houses of Parliament explaining 
the circumstances leading to the ending of the tenure. Where a Governor has been 
given an opportunity to show cause against the premature termination of his tenure, 
the statement may also include the explanation given by him, in reply, (para 4.8.09) 
8. 4.16.08 As a matter of convention, the Governor should not, on demitting his 
office, be eligible for any other appointment or office of profit under the Union or a 
State Government except for a second term as Governor or election as Vice-
President or President of India. Such a convention should also require that, after 
quitting or laying dovra his office, the Governor shall not return to active partisan 
politics. (para 4.9.04) 
9. 4.16.09 A Governor should, at the end of his tenure, irrespective of its 
duration, be provided reasonable post-retirement benefits for himself and for his 
surviving spouse. (para 4.10.02). 
10. 4.16.10 (a) In choosing a Chief Minister, the Governor should be guided by the 
following principles, viz.: 
(i) The party or combination of parties which commends the widest support in 
the Legislative Assembly should be called upon to form the Government, 
(ii) The Governor's task is to see that a Government is formed and not to try to 
form a Government which will pursue policies which he approves. 
(b) If there is a single party having an absolute majority in the Assembly, the 
leader of the party should automatically be asked to become the Chief 
Minister. 
If there is no such party, the Govemor should select a Chief Minister from 
among the following parties or group of parties by sounding them, in turn, in the 
order of preference indicated below: 
(i) An alliance of parties that was formed prior to the Elections. 
(ii) The largest single party staking a claim to form the Government with the 
support of others, including 'independents. 
(iii) A post-electoral coalition of parties, with all the partners in the coalition 
joining government. 
(iv) A post-electoral alliance of parties, with some of the parties in the 
alliance forming a Government and the remaining parties, including 
'independents supporting the Government from outside. 
The Govemor while going through the process described above should select a 
leader who in his (Governor's) judgement is most likely to command a majority in 
the Assembly. 
(c) A Chief Minister, unless he is the leader of a party which has absolute 
majority in the Assembly, should seek a vote of confidence in the Assembly 
within 30 days of taking over. This practice should be religiously adhered to 
with the sanctity of a rule of law. (Paras 4.11.03 to 4.11.06). 
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11. 4.16.11 The Governor should not risk determining the issue of majority 
support, on his own, outside the Assembly. The prudent course for him would be to 
cause the rival claims to be tested on the floor of the House. (para 4.11.07). 
12. 4.16.12 The Governor cannot dismiss his Council of Ministers so long as they 
continue to command a majority in the Legislative Assembly. Conversely, he is 
bound to dismiss them if they lose the majority but do not resign. (para 4.11.09) 
13. 4.16.13 (a) when the Legislative Assembly is in session, the question of 
majority should be tested on the floor of the House. 
(b) If during the period when the Assembly remains prorogued, the Governor 
receives reliable evidence that the Council of Ministers has lost 'majority' he 
should not, as a matter of constitutional propriety, dismiss the council unless 
the Assembly has expressed on the floor of the House its want of confidence 
in it. He should advise the Chief Minister to summon the Assembly as early 
as possible so that the 'majority' may be tested. 
(c) Generally, it will be reasonable to allow the Chief Minister a period of 30 
days for the summoning of the Assembly unless there is very urgent business 
to be transacted like passing the Budget, in which case, a shorter period may 
be allowed. In special circumstances, the period may go up to 60 days. 
(paras 4.11.10,4.11.1 land 4.11.13). 
14. 4.16.14 So long as the Council of Ministers enjoys the confidence of the 
Legislative Assembly, the advice of the Council of Ministers in regard to summoning 
and proroguing a House of the Legislature and in dissolving the Legislative 
Assembly, if such advice is not patently unconstitutional, should be deemed as 
binding on the Governor. (para 4.11.17). 
15. 4.16.15 (a) The Governor may in the exigencies of certain situations, 
exercise his discretion to summon the Assembly only in order to ensure that the 
system of responsible Government in the State works in accordance with the norms 
envisaged in the Constitution. 
(b) Then the Chief Minister designedly fails to advise the summoning of the 
Assembly within six months of its last sitting, or advises its summoning for a 
date falling beyond this period, the Governor can summon the Assembly 
within the period of six months specified in article 174 (1). 
(c) When a Chief Minister (who is not the leader of the party which has absolute 
majority in the Assembly), is not prepared to summon the Legislative 
Assembly within 30 days of the taking over (vide recommendation 4.16.10(c) 
above) or within 30 days or 60 days, as the case may be, when the Governor 
finds that the Chief Minister no longer enjoys the confidence of the Assembly 
(vide recommendation 4.16.13(c) above), the Governor would be within his 
constitutional right to summon the Assembly for holding the "Floor Test". 
(paras 4.11.19 and 4.11.20). 
16. 4.16.16 If a notice of a no-confidence motion against a Ministry is pending 
in a House of the Legislature and the motion represents a legitimate challenge from 
the Opposition, but the Chief Minister advises that the House should be prorogued. 
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the Governor should not straightaway accept the advice. He should advise the Chief 
Minister to postpone the prorogation and face the motion. (para 4.11.22) 
17. 4.16.17 (a) When the advice for dissolving the Assembly is made by a 
Ministry which has lost or is likely to have lost majority support, the Governor 
should adopt the course of action as recommended in paras 4.16.12, 4.16.13 and 
4.16.15(c) above. 
(b) If ultimately a viable Ministry fails to emerge, the Governor should first 
consider dissolving the Assembly and arranging for fresh elections after 
consulting the leaders of the political parties concerned and the Chief 
Election Commissioner. 
(c) If the Assembly is to be dissolved and an election can be held early, the 
Governor should normally ask the outgoing Ministry to continue as a 
caretaker Government. However, this step would not be proper if the 
outgoing Ministry has been responsible for serious mal-administration or 
corruption. 
(d) A convention should be adopted that a caretaker Government should not take 
any major policy decisions. 
(e) If the outgoing Ministry cannot be installed as a caretaker Government for the 
reason indicated in (c) above or if the outgoing Ministry is not prepared to 
fiinction as a caretaker Government, the Governor, without dissolving the 
Assembly, should recommend President's rule in the state. 
(f) If fresh election cannot be held immediately on account of a national calamity 
or State-wide disturbances, it should not be proper for the Governor to install 
a caretaker Government for the long period that must elapse before the next 
election is held. He should recommend proclamation of President's rule under 
Article 356 without dissolving the Assembly. 
(g) If it is too early to hold fresh election, the Assembly not having run even half 
its normal duration of five years, the Governor should recommend President's 
rule under Article 356 without dissolving the Assembly. 
(paras 4.11.25 to 4.11.30). 
18. 4.16.18 The Governor has no discretionary power in the matter of nominations 
to the Legislative Council or to the Legislative Assembly. If at the time of making a 
nomination, a Ministry has either not been formed or has resigned or lost majority in 
the Assembly, the Governor should await the formation of a new Ministry. 
(Para 4.11.31). 
19. 4.16.19 Where a State University Act provides that the Governor, by virtue of 
his office, shall be the Chancellor of the University and confers powers and duties on 
him not as Governor of the State but as Chancellor, there is no obligation on the 
Governor, in this capacity as Chancellor, always to act on Ministerial advice under 
Article 163 (1). However, there is an obvious advantage in the Governor consulting 
the Chief Minister or other Ministers concerned, but he would have to form his own 
individual judgement. In his capacity as Chancellor of a University, the Governor 
may be required by the University's statute to consult a Minister mentioned in the 
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statute on specified matters. In such cases, the Governor may be well advised to 
consult the Minister on other important matters also. In either case, there is no legal 
obligation for him to necessarily act on any advice received by him. 
(paras 4.11.37 to 4.11.39) 
20. 4.16.20 The Governor, while sending ad hoc or fortnightly reports to the 
President, should normally take his chief Minister into confidence, unless there are 
over-riding reasons to the contrary. (Para 4.12.06). 
21. 4.16.21 The discretionary power of the Governor as provided in Article 163 
should be left untouched. (para 4.13.03). 
22. 4.16.22 When a Governor finds that it will be constitutionally improper for 
him to accept the advice of his Council of Ministers, he should make every effort to 
persuade his Ministers to adopt the correct course. He should exercise his 
discretionary power only in the last resort. (para 4.13.04). 
23. 4.16.23 Certain specific ftinctions have been conferred (or are conferrable) on 
the Governors of Maharashtra and Gujarat (Article 371(2), Nagaland [First Proviso 
to Article 371A(l)(b), Article 371A (l)(d) and Article 371A(2)(b) and (f)], Manipur 
(Article 371C(1), Sikkim [Article 371 F(g)] and Arunachal Pradesh [First Proviso to 
Article 371 H(a)] to be exercised by them in their discretion. In the discharge of these 
functions, the Governor concerned is not bound to seek or accept the advice of his 
council of Ministers. However, before taking a final decision in the exercise of his 
discretion, it is advisable that the Governor should, if feasible, consult his Ministers 
even in such matters, which relates essentially to the administration of a State. 
(para 4.14.05). 
24. 4.16.24 It would be neither feasible nor desirable to formulate a 
comprehensive set of guidelines for the exercise of the discretionary powers of the 
Governor. A Governor should be free to deal with a situation according to his best 
judgement, keeping in view the Constitution and the law and the conventions of the 
Parliamentary system outlined in this chapter as well as in Chapter V "Reservation of 
Bills by Governors for President's consideration" and Chapter VI "Emergency 
Provisions". (para 4.15.06). 
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Appendix IV 
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS O F THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
SERVICE R E F O R M S ' 
The civil service, to ensure good governance, can be expected to play its proper role 
in our parliamentary democracy. 
TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: Making the Civil Service Responsive, Transparent, 
Accountable and Ethical: 
1. To mould young entrants for the higher civil service through training, government 
may go back to the period from 1948 till 1971 when the age of eligibility was 21-
24 years for general candidates (as against 21-30 years for general candidates at 
present) with five years age concession for members of the Scheduled 
Castes/Scheduled Tribes. Age concession for candidates of the Other Backward 
Classes may be three years as at present. (para 2.18) 
2. As no competitive examination will be proof against selection of a few unsuitable 
candidates. Directors of Training Academies may invoke the Probation Rules to 
weed out unsuitable officer-trainees. (para 2.20) 
3. Officers must have Aimual Performance Plan. Invariably an Annual Performance 
Plan will be a component of the Action PlanA^ision Statement of the 
Department/Ministry and its strategic long-term plan. Wherever possible, 
performance targets must be quantified. If it is not possible to quantify the targets, 
some other mode of target setting is done to ensure that an officer is held strictly 
accountable for performance. (para 2.39) 
4. After 15 years of service, a rigorous review be carried out of performance of civil 
servants based on the earlier quinquennial review of performance. If an officer is 
not honest and performance-oriented, he is weeded out of service on completion of 
15 years on proportionate pension. An officer should also have the option to retire 
on proportionate pension after 15 years of service. A similar review is carried out 
subsequently at periodic intervals to determine if performance level of an officer 
has fallen sharply/if there are allegations against an officer's integrity, (para 2.43) 
5. Each Department/Ministry should be required to identify the points of citizen 
interface, benchmark the quality of services and strengthen the existing grievance 
redressal mechanism. (para 2.01) 
6. Officers of the higher Civil Service must supervise work of junior functionaries by 
regular visits and inspections. All officers of the higher Civil Service must put on 
the website/print media their contact telephone numbers during office hours. Every 
Ministry/ Department/Office having large public interface must have a few toll 
free telephone numbers with voice mail facility. (para 2.02) 
7. Junior officers at the cutting edge level of administration should be given training 
in customer service, attending to phone calls and resolving public grievances. 
P.C. Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms, Government of India, 2004. 
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(para2.03) 
8. Rules under the Freedom of Information Act 2002 be notified immediately. The 
implementation of the Act is reviewed after three/four years by an independent 
TaskForce. (para 2.05) 
9. The Official Secrets Act is modified to cover only the essential minimum 
requirements of national security, public order and individual privacy, (para 2.06) 
10. All officers having a public interface to wear name badges while on duty. 
(para 2.08) 
11. The duties, functions and responsibilities of all senior posts be laid down and 
publicized. (para 2.09) 
12. After every five to seven years in service, a civil servant should spend at least 
two months with a non-government organization, academic institution or the 
pri vatesector. (para 2.11) 
13. ISO 9000 be introduced for government offices. (para 2.12) 
14. A ftill time officer should be posted in the Information and Facilitation Centre 
and each Department should attend to public grievances. (para 2.15) 
15. Annual Property Return of all public servants be put on the website, (para 2.16) 
16. Rules be framed under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. 1988 for 
attachment/forfeiture of benami/ill-gotten property of corrupt public servants. 
(para 2.17) 
17. Article 311 of the Constitution be amended to enable President/Governor to 
dismiss/remove public servants summarily in case of corrupt practice/having 
assets disproportionate to known source of income. The officer concerned may 
be given post-decisional hearing to prove his irmocence. To ensure natural 
justice, such post-decisional hearing has been held to be constitutionally valid 
by the Supreme Court of India. (para 2.22) 
18. Under the overall control of the Central Vigilance Commission, committees of 
experts be set up in various Departments to scrutinize cases of officers before 
initiating departmental action for corrupt practices/launching prosecution 
against them under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Such a reform will 
encourage honest officers to take bold commercial decisions in the public 
interest without the lurking fear of a vigilance/CBI inquiry. (para 2.30) 
19. Section 13 (1) (d) (iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 be amended so 
that civil servants are not incriminated for taking bona fide commercial 
decisions in the public interest. (para 2.31) 
20. Every programme of government should specify the deliverables in terms of 
services. Functioning of government offices having large interface with the 
common man should be assessed once in three/four years by independent 
organizations. (para 2.34 and 2.35) 
21. Citizen Centres should be set up to build capability for analyzing and suggesting 
changes in government policies. The civil service training institutes should 
perform the nodal role in this behalf (para 2.36) 
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22. Each Department of the Government should develop an internal evaluation 
mechanism on the basis of clearly laid down parameters. The result of such 
evaluation should be part of the Annual Administration Report. Departments 
should be held accountable for outcomes and there should be a sharp focus on 
service delivery. (para 2.41) 
23. A State of Governance Report should be brought out evaluating the 
performance of each State on the basis of a set of parameters of good 
governance. (para 2.42) 
TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: Making the Civil Service e-Govemance Friendly: 
24. Points of public interface in government should be identified for focused 
attention and improvement. Within a period of two years the procedures in the 
areas of public interface should be simplified and electronic service delivery 
for the common people be introduced. Each Department/Ministry may lay 
down a time schedule to extend service delivery through electronic means. 
(para 3.08) 
25. To provide a clean, honest and transparent government, antiquated rules and 
procedures in Government must be discarded and new simplified ones be put 
in place. Such an exercise is absolutely essential for introduction of e-
govemance. (para 3.11) 
26. E-Govemance can augment efficiency and ensure transparency in government. 
The Andhra Pradesh experiment of identifying officers as Chief Information 
Officers to be trained in the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, in e-
govemance is a noteworthy initiative. New entrants to the Civil Service have 
adequate hands - on experience with computers and the internet and they could 
be sent periodically for fiirther training in application of e-govemance. 
(para 3.13) 
27. Each Department should identify skill gaps keeping in view its functions and 
take steps to train the required number of people. (para 3.16) 
28. The National Informatics Centre (NIC) should function as a vehicle for 
disseminating best practices across the country. (para 3.18) 
29. Officers posted as Chief Executive of e-govemance projects should be given 
reasonable tenure and held accountable for results. (para 3.19) 
30. The administrative and financial flexibility required for introducing innovative 
e-govemance measures should be identified and operationalized. (para 3.21) 
31. The Minimum Agenda for e-govemance should be carried forward and each 
Department is required to identify specific activities which will be enabled in 
the next 12 months. (para 3.24) 
32. Departmental examination should include a practical test on the ability to use 
and apply computers. (para 3.25) 
33. Each Department/Ministry should have its own website of basic information 
relating to the Department/Ministry and the website be available for registering 
public grievances. (para 3.26) 
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TERM OF REFERENCE THREE: Putting a Premium on Intellectual Growth: 
34. Each Department/Ministry should undertake a review of the particular service 
of which it is the Cadre Controlling Authority to ensure that officers of the 
service are used optimally, promotion prospects for them are adequate and skill 
levels of officers upgraded periodically. Each Department/Ministry should 
undertake a skill needs assessment to identify required skills and upgraded skill 
levels. (para 4.01 and 4.02) 
35. Civil servants should be encouraged to move laterally to non-govenmient 
organizations. (para 4.04) 
36. Government should actively support and encourage outstanding work done by 
civil servants through National/State awards and commendations. (para 4.06) 
37. The initiative taken by the Department of Personnel and Training to provide 
funds to the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore to develop a two-year 
course for officers of the LAS at mid-career level is worthwhile experiment. 
Similar trainSing programmes be devised for the Indian Police Service, the 
Indian Forest Service and other Central Services. (para 4.11) 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOUR & FiVE:Protecting the Civil Servants Against Wrongful 
Pressure AND Changes in All India Service 
Rules & Central Civil Service Rule: 
38. In the proposed Civil Service law, the highest political executive shall continue 
to be the final authority to order transfer of any officer before his tenure is over, 
but he will be expected to give due consideration to Report of the 
Administrative Inquiry/views of the Civil Service Board/Establishment Board 
and record reasons on the need for premature transfer of an officer. It is 
reiterated that the political executive shall have the final authority to transfer an 
officer at any stage in public interest. An officer aggrieved by order of 
premature transfer can agitate the matter before a three-Member Ombudsman, 
who may, where suitable, award monetary compensation to be aggrieved 
officer. The constitution of the Ombudsman will be the same as the 
Ombudsman proposed for the Disputes Redressal Council as at para 6.19 of this 
Report. The President/Govemor shall receive reports from the Ombudsman and 
shall lay an Annual Report on such transfers on the table of the Legislature. 
There should be a suitable provision in the law to enable States to adopt it and 
make it applicable in the States without going through the long process of 
drafting a law and get it passed in the Legislature. (para 5.03 to 5.10) 
39. The proposed comprehensive law on the Civil Service shall incorporate, inter 
alia, a Code of Ethics and a statutory minimum tenure in a post to an officer. 
Under the proposed law, if an officer is sought to be transferred before his 
tenure, there would be an expeditious administrative inquiry by a designated 
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senior officer to be earmarked for this purpose. This can be dispensed with if the 
transfer is on promotion/deputation/foreign training. In all other cases, the 
Report of Inquiry with the views of the Civil Service Board/Establishment 
Board would be put up to the Chief Minister if officers of the All India 
Service/other civil services work in the States, or the Appointments Committee 
of the Cabinet if the officers work under the Central Staffing Scheme. For the 
officers of the other Central Services working in Ministries/Departments but not 
under the Central Staffing Scheme, the new law will prescribe a tenure with a 
provision for administrative inquiry before an officer is sought to be transferred 
except on specified grotmds. (para 5.11 and 5.15) 
40. The recommendation of the Surinder Nath Committee (July 2003) for 
increasing the domain knowledge of IAS officers be implemented. Similar 
exercise be undertaken to increase domain knowledge of officers of the other 
two All India Services and officers of the C4entral Services (para 5.17) 
41. Officers of the All India Service on deputation to their home State must 
invariably report back to their parent cadres on expiry of their periods of 
deputation. Only one term of deputation for an officer of the All India Service is 
allowed to the home State and that too to attend to urgent personal problem. The 
exemption at present available for officers of the North-East/Jammu & Kashmir 
cadres in matters of deputation may continue. Any violation of this stipulation 
will attract a major penalty proceeding and also be taken into account while 
considering the officer's empanelment/promotion. Such a stipulation would also 
be applicable to officers of the Central Service who go on deputation to 
different State Govenmients and to officers who go on deputation to 
international agencies/foreign governments. (para 5.19) 
42. Introduction of sophisticated technology alone would not make the 
administration people fiiendly unless higher civil servants have a pro-active 
attitude and reach out to the common people. They must spend much more time 
in field visits, inspections, tours and night halts in remote and rural areas, 
(para 5.23) 
43. As officers of State Services appointed to All India Services by promotion also 
have to play leadership roles, they should face an Interview by the Selection 
Board. The Interview will not be a test of knowledge but will be only a test of 
leadership qualities. The selection for promotion to All India Service will be 
made on an overall assessment of suitability of officers on basis of record of 
service and the Interview Test. (para 5.24) 
44. Not more than 50% of the officers in a batch should make it to the Senior 
Administrative Grade. 30% should be the upper limit for Higher Administrative 
Grade and 20% for the highest grade of Secretaries to Government of India. 
(para 5.25) 
45. As there are large numbers of senior officers of the All India Service 
in different cadres, in selected districts, senior officers of the rank of 
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Commissioners/Deputy Inspector Generals of Police/Conservators of Forests 
may be considered for posting as District Magistrates/Senior Superintendents of 
Police/Divisional Forest Officers. The practice of posting very senior 
/Commissioner level officers in districts was prevalent before Independence and 
even for a few years after Independence. It is still prevalent in some states, 
(para 5.26) 
46. If the Establishment Board, after giving the views of the Minister in charge, 
who is a Member of the ACC. Its utmost consideration. Fails to change its 
original recommendation regarding the posting of an officer under the Central 
Staffing Scheme, the Cabinet Secretary may send the proposals of the Board 
with observations of the Minister in charge through the Home Minister. Who is 
a Member of the ACC. To the prime Minister. Who heads the ACC for a final 
decision? (para 5.28) 
47. Steps are taken to reduce the number of officers who are empanelled for senior 
posts under the Central Staffing Scheme. (para5.30) 
48. A member of the higher Civil Service would be debarred from being appointed 
as a Private Secretary or Officer on Special Duty to a Cabinet Minister/ Minister 
of State in Government of India or in a state subject to certain stipulations. 
Ministers may have one of the officers of the civil service in their Department/ 
Ministry to ftmction as Private Secretary for a continuous period of two years 
only. The stipulation that no officer of a Civil Service can be Private Secretary 
of Minister in the States or in the Central Government for more than two years 
may provide for an exception in case of the prime Minister and the Chief 
Ministers, (para 5.31) 
49. Members of the All India Services and the Central Services. Who are regular 
recruits through competitive examinations and who are unable to get promoted 
to the higher levels in their respective service due to non-availability of posts. 
May be allowed the next higher grade as personal to them a year before 
retirement on super-annuation. Such up-gradation shall be available only to 
officers with proven record of efficiency and integrity. (para 5.38) 
50. Suspension fi-om service of All India Service officers by the State Government 
will be invalid if not confirmed by the Government of India within a period of 
60 days. (para 5.40) 
51. Under the new Civil Service law, a member of the higher civil service should 
not be appointed to any statutory commission or a constitutional authority after 
his retirement on super-annuation. To insulate him from the temptation of post-
retirement assignment, he should be appointed to such statutory bodies/ 
Constitutional Authority only when he is not over 55 years of age so that he can 
demit office from these Commissions and Authorities after serving for five to 
six years. (para 5.44) 
52. There is a case for better compensation package for members of the higher civil 
service. Such compensation must bear a reasonable comparison with 
compensation for executives in the private sector. Issues related to a better 
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package of compensation to the higher Civil Services may be referred to the 
next Central pay Commission. (para 5.45) 
53. There should be a cooling off period of at least two years after resignation / 
retirement before a civil servant can join a political party and contest elections 
to any political office. No civil servant can be appointed to the high 
constitutional office of Governor of a State unless a period of two years elapses 
between his resignation / retirement and his appointment as a Governor. 
(para 5.50) 
54. The recommendations of the National police Commission relating to tenure of 
senior police officers, independent review of the work of police departments 
and streamlining the powers of arrest should be implemented. The 
recommendations of the Malimath Committee on criminal justice system are 
also implemented. (para 5.53 to 5.55) 
55. The procedure for reimbursement of medical expenses of civil servants should 
be simplified so that quality medical services are available from recognized 
private hospitals without having to report to the CGHS on each occasion of 
ailment. The facilities available at the CGHS hospitals also need to be 
strengthened. (para 5.58) 
56. To increase the representation of women in the civil service, it is proposed that 
within 15 years, at least 25 percent members of the higher civil service should 
be women as against 12 to 13 percent women at percent. Women in the higher 
civil service are given four years of leave with full pay in their entire service 
career over and above the leave due to them under the normal leave rules. Such 
facility will enable them to balance their roles as officers with their roles as 
mothers / housewives. (para 5.60) 
RERMS OF REFERENCE SIX: Changes in Rules Governing the Disciplinary 
Proceedings: 
57. To eliminate delay in disposal of a disciplinary inquiry, the Union public / Service 
Commission need not be consulted in case of a civil servant facing charges of 
corrupt practice and whose case has been referred to the Central Vigilance 
Commission for the first stage / second stage advice. If however the officer is 
penalized in the inquiry and prefers an appeal, the case may be referred to the 
UPSC for advice on the appeal petition. (para 6.02) 
58. Where minor disciplinary proceedings are sufficient to meet the end of justice, 
major penalty proceeding which are lengthy and time-consuming should not be 
initiated. ' (para 6.03) 
59. An Inquiry Officer should be relieved from his normal duties for a sufficient 
period to enable him to complete the departmental inquiry expeditiously and 
submit the report. (para 6.06) 
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60. A database on disciplinary cases stiouid be maintained to keep track of their 
progress. (para 6.09) 
TERMS OF REFERENCE SEVEN: Any Other Matter: 
61. An Employees Health Insurance Scheme on the pattern of defense forces should 
be introduced for the civil service. (para 7.01) 
62. A high level Selection Committee having a representation of the Chairman, Union 
public service Commission is established to prepare a panel of two names for 
appointment of one of them as a member of the State public Service Commission 
by the Governor of a state. Similar High Level Selection Committee is constituted 
to recommend a panel of two names for appointment of one of them as a Member 
of the Union public Service Commission by the president. Similar Committees be 
constituted to recommend panel of suitable names for other high level statutory 
and constitutional appointments such as Securities and Exchange Board of India, 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Insurance Regulatory Authority, the 
Election Commission , the Comptroller & Auditor General to which retired civil 
servants are usually appointed. (para 7.06) 
63. To minimize litigation on service matters, in every Department / Ministry there 
would be a Dispute Resolution Council (DRC) comprising a retired official as 
chairman and two serving officers as members. The decision of the DRC shall be 
invariably implemented. In case of disagreement, orders of Core Group of 
Secretaries / Cabinet Secretary be obtained before DRC's report is acted upon. 
Similar Dispute Redressal Councils be set up by State Government. 
(para 7.14 and 7.15) 
64. To ensure that the issues relating to the civil service get focused attention at the 
highest political level, the Empowered sub-Committee Governance of the 
National Development Council should go into the policy issues of civil service 
and make suitable recommendations. (para 7.19) 
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Appendix V 
REPORT ON RIGHT TO INFORMATION ' 
The second Administrative Reforms Commission Chairperson, Shri Veerappa 
Moily submitted the first report on 'Right to Information - Master key to good 
governance'. The following are the key recommendations of the Commission on the 
subject: 
> The Official Secrets Act, 1923(OSA) in its current form is incongruous with 
the regime of transparency in a democratic society. OS A should be repealed, 
and suitable safeguards to protect security of State should be incorporated in 
the National Secvirity Act. 
> At least half the members of the Information Commissions should be drawn 
from non- Civil Service background, so that members represent the rich 
variety and varied experience in society. 
> Complete reorganization of public records is a precondition for effective 
implementation of RTI. A public Records Office should be established in 
each State as a repository of expertise, to monitor, supervise, control and 
inspect all public records. 1% of the fimds of all flagship programmes of Gol 
should be earmarked for five years for updating all records and building 
necessary infrastructure. 
> The Information Commission should be entrusted with the authority and 
responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the RTI Act in all public 
authorities. 
> Clear and unambiguous guidelines need to be evolved to determine which 
nongovernmental organizations would come under the purview of RTI Act. 
> Most requests for information are usually to use it as a tool for grievance 
redressal. States may be advised to establish independent public grievance 
redressal authorities' deal with complaints of delay, harassment and 
corruption. These authorities should work in close coordination with the 
Information Commission. 
> Certain safeguards should be introduced to discourage frivolous and 
vexatious requests so that the system is not overloaded, and discipline and 
harmony are not jeopardized. 
> A roadmap should be charted out for effective implementation of RTI Act 
in the Legislature and Judiciary at all levels. 
>• The Commission made specific recommendations, and suggested a roadmap 
to implement each of them. Detailed recommendations pertain to a variety of 
issues - including a civil service conduct rules and office procedures, record 
keeping, capacity building and awareness generation, and the exercise of 
power to remove difficulties. 
Second Administrative Reforms Commission Report on Right to Information, 
Government of India, 2006. 
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Annexure I 
LIST O F COMMITTEES A N D C O M M I S S I O N S O N ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORMESTABLISHED S I N C E I N D E P E N D E N C E 
1. The Reorganisation of Central Government (Richard Tottenham) 1945-46. (It 
visualizes an independent India; hence its inclusion here). 
2. The Advisory Planning Board (K.C. Neogi), 1949. 
3. The Secretariat Reorganisation Committee (Girija Shankar Bajpai), 1947. 
4. The Central Pay Commission (Varadachariar). 
5. The Economy Committee (Kasturbhai Lalbhai), 1948. 
6. The Reorganisation of the Machinery of Government (Gopalaswami 
Ayyangar), 1949. 
7. Estimates Committee's Second Report on Reorganisation of the Secretariat and 
Departments of the Government of India (First Lok Sabha), 1950-51. 
8. Report on Public Administration (A.D. Gorwala), 1951. 
9. Report on the Efficient Conduct of State Enterprises (Gorwala), 1951. 
10. The Machinery of Government - Improvement of Efficiency (R.A. 
Gopalaswamy), 1952. 
11. Public Administration in India - Report of a Survey (Paul H. Applyby), 1953. 
12. Estimates Committee's Ninth Report on Administrative, Financial and other 
Reforms (First Lok Sabha), 1953-58. 
13. Re-examination of India's Administrative System with special reference to 
administration of Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises 
(Appleby), 1956. 
14. The Railway Corruption Enquiry Committee (J.B. Kripalani), 1955. 
15. The Public Service (Qualification for Recruitment) Committee (A. Ramaswami 
Mudaliar), 1956. 
16. The Commission of Enquiry on Emoluments and Conditions of Service of 
Central Government Employees (Jagannath Das), 1959. 
17. The Staff Welfare Review Committee (Fateh Singh), 1961. 
18. Indian and State Administrative Services and Problems of District Administration 
(V.T. Krishnamachari), 1952. 
19. The Committee on Prevention of Corruption (K. Santhanam), 1964. 
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20. Estimates Committee's Ninety-third Report on Public Services (Third Lok 
Sabha), 1966. 
21. The Administrative Reforms Commission 1st, 1966-70. It submitted the following 
nineteen reports. 
i Problems of Redress of Citizens' Grievances 
ii. Machinery for Planning (Interim and Final) 
iii. Public Undertakings 
iv. Finance, Accounts and Audit 
V. Economic Administration 
vi. Machinery of Government of India and Procedures of Work 
vii. Life Insurance Corporation 
viii. Central Direct Taxes Administration 
ix. Administration of Union Territories and NEFA 
X. Personnel Administration 
xi. Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers 
xii. Centre-State Relationships 
xiii. State Administration 
xiv. Small Scale Sector 
XV. Railways 
xvi. Treasuries 
xvii. Reserve Bank of India 
xviii.Posts and Telegraphs 
xix. Scientific Departments (only a summary of recommendations was submitted) 
Besides the ARC set up the following 38 study teams : 
i. Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of 
Work 
ii. Study Team on Economic Administration 
iii. Study Team on Machinery for Planning 
iv. Study Team on Centre-State Relationships 
V. Study Team on Scientific Departments 
vi. Study Team on Public Sector Undertakings 
vii. Study Team on Financial Administration 
viii. Study Team on Accounts and Audit 
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ix. Study Team on Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale 
X. Study Team on Recruitment, Selection, U.P.S.C / State Public Service 
Commissions and Training 
xi. Study Team on Personnel Planning, Staffing of Public Sector Undertaking and 
Personnel Management 
xii. Study Team on Redress of Citizens' Grievances 
xiii. Study Team on District Administration 
xiv. Study Team on Agricultural Administration 
XV. Study Team on Administrative Tribunal 
xvi. Study Team on State Level Administration 
xvii. Study Team on Relations between the Press and the Administration 
xviii.Study Team on Defence Matters 
xix. Study Team on Railways 
XX. Study Team on Union Territories Administration 
(Working Groups) 
xxi. Working Group on Police Administration 
xxii. Working Group on Railways 
xxiii.Working Group on Medical and Health Administration 
xxiv.Working Group on Cooperation 
XXV. Working Group on Defence Production 
xxvi. Working Group on Small Scale Sector 
xxvii. Working Group on Central Direct Taxes Administration 
xxviii. Working Group on Life Insurance Administration 
xxix. Working Group on Company Law Administration 
XXX. Working Group on Posts and Telegraphs 
xxxi. Working Group on Development, Control and Regulatory Organizations 
xxxii. Working Group on Financial Rules 
xxxiii. Working Group on Customs and Central Excise Administration 
(Expert Groups) 
xxxiv. Expert Group on Biological including Medical Services. 
XXXV. Expert Group on Earth Services 
xxxvi. Expert Group on Natural Resources (Agriculture, Flora and Fauna), 
xxxvii. Expert Group on Engineering Sciences including Materials (Production and 
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Utilization) Research 
(Task Forces) 
xxxviii. Expert Group Task Force on Treasuries 
22. The Third Central Pay Commission (Raghuvar Dayal), 1973 
23. The Committee on Recruitment and Selection (D.S. Kothari), 1978 
24. The National Police Commission (Dharam Vira), 1979 
25. The Economic Administration Reform Commission (L.K. Jha), 1983 
26. The Fourth Central Pay Commission (P.N. Singhal), 1986 
27. The Commission on Centre-State Relations (R.S. Sarkaria), 1987 
28. The Committee to Review the Scheme of the Civil Services Commission (Satish 
Chandra), 1989 
29. The Central Fifth Pay Commission (Pandian), 1997 
30. The Expenditure Reforms Commission (K.P. Geethakrishnana), 2001 
31. The Committee on Performance Evaluation (Lt. Gen. Surendra Nath), 2003 
32.The Committee on Civil Services Reforms(P.C. Hota),2004 
33.The Second Administrative Reform Commission( Veerapa Moilly),2005 
Annexure II 
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF SELECT POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE LOK 
SABHA ELECTIONS, 1952-2004 (PERCENTAGE OF VOTES SECURED) 
Year/Name 
of party 
National 
parties 
INC 
BJS/BJP 
CPI 
CPI(M) 
BSP 
NCP 
State 
parties 
JKNC 
PDP 
SAD 
INLD 
SP 
RJD 
U S P 
CPIML 
JMM 
GGP 
SHS 
TDP 
TRS 
JD(S) 
JIXU) 
KEC(M) 
MUL 
DMK 
AIADMK 
PMK 
MDMK 
BJD 
TRMC 
FB 
RSP 
AGP 
MNF 
1952 
44.98 
3.07 
3.29 
0.99 
0.08 
0.08 
0.44 
1957 
47.78 
5.97 
8.92 
0.55 
0.26 
1962 
44.72 
6.44 
9.94 
0.72 
0J6 
2.01 
0.72 
0J9 
1967 
40.78 
9J5 
4.95 
4.44 
0.14 
0.22 
0.28 
3.79 
0.43 
1971 
43.68 
7J6 
4.73 
5.12 
0.87 
0.16 
0J7 
0.28 
3.84 
0.66 
0.49 
1977 
34.52 
2.82 
4.29 
0.26 
1.26 
0.26 
OJO 
1.71 
2.95 
0.34 
0.45 
1980 
42.69 
2.59 
6.15 
0.25 
0.71 
0.07 
0.18 
0.24 
2.14 
2_)6 
0.51 
0.65 
1984 
48.01 
7.401 
2.70 
5.72 
0.40 
1.03 
4.06 
0.10 
0.09 
2.28 
1.59 
0.42 
0.47 
1.00 
1989 
39.53 
11.49 
2.57 
6.55 
2.07 
0.02 
0.14 
0.34 
0.11 
3.29 
0.02 
2J4 
1.50 
0.52 
0.42 
0.62 
0.02 
1991 
36.64 
20.04 
2.48 
6.14 
1.80 
0.03 
0.24 
0.53 
0.79 
2.96 
0.14 
0.01 
2.06 
1.61 
0.46 
0.41 
0.63 
0.54 
0.03 
1996 
28.80 
20.29 
1.97 
6.12 
4.02 
0.76 
3.28 
0.24 
0.41 
1.49 
2.97 
0.10 
2.14 
0.64 
0.16 
0J7 
2.19 
0J8 
0.63 
0.76 
0.03 
1998 
25.83 
25.59 
1.75 
5.16 
4.67 
0.21 
0.81 
0.53 
4.93 
2.78 
0.25 
0J6 
0.05 
1.77 
2.77 
0.13 
0.22 
1.44 
1.83 
0.42 
0.44 
1.00 
2.42 
0J3 
0.55 
0.29 
0.02 
1999 
28.30 
23.75 
1.48 
5.40 
4.16 
2.27 
0.12 
0.69 
0.55 
3.76 
2.79 
0J3 
0.27 
0.05 
1.56 
3.65 
0.91 
3.10 
0.10 
0.01 
1.73 
1.93 
0.65 
0.44 
1.20 
2.57 
0.23 
0.41 
0J2 
2004 
26.53 
22.16 
1.41 
5.66 
5J3 
1.80 
0.13 
0.08 
0.90 
0.50 
4.32 
2.41 
0.71 
0J3 
0.47 
0.18 
1.81 
3.04 
0.63 
1.47 
2J5 
0.05 
0.19 
1.81 
2.19 
0.56 
0.43 
1.30 
2.07 
OJS 
0.44 
0.53 
0.05 
Source: Compiled by author from different texts. 
